(Stratfor)

The tide is starting to turn in Yemen's civil war. After Houthi rebels assassinated former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the long-term battlefield dynamics in the country have shifted to favor the Saudi-led coalition. On Dec. 7, Saudi coalition forces began pushing along Yemen's west coast toward the port city of al-Hudaydah, the only major port still under Houthi control and a critical lifeline for the Houthi stronghold in Sanaa. Although previous attempts to push along the western coast — both toward al-Hudaydah and along the road from the city of Taiz — resulted in a stalemate, this latest push is making progress.

Defectors from Saleh's well-equipped Republican Guard — who were Houthi allies prior to Saleh's sudden shift in allegiance on Dec. 4 — appear to have tipped the balance. Advanced mechanized units from the United Arab Emirates and some members of the Republican Guard are reportedly taking part in the offensive headed toward al-Hudaydah. Together, these forces have effectively halved the distance between al-Hudaydah and the territory under control of the Saudi-led coalition.

The renewed push on al-Hudaydah exposes the Houthi forces to coalition air power, making counterattacks less effective, and the loss of Republican Guard equipment has cost the rebels some of their most potent firepower. Because the road to al-Hudaydah lies on a flat coastal plain with few villages, the Houthis have few natural barriers or urban environments they can use to establish a new defensive position. Instead, Houthi forces have reportedly launched a counterattack on Hays, a town to the east which coalition forces took Dec. 9.

But the United Arab Emirates, a key ally in the Saudi-led coalition, is demonstrating its influence more than just militarily. Leaders from Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) are currently convening in the Emirati capital, Abu Dhabi. In addition, the vice president of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), Hani bin Braik, said via Twitter that the STC would support the government of President Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi, the internationally recognized head of state in Yemen. Both moves show the extent to which the United Arab Emirates is able to maneuver key players to achieve Emirati goals. The GPC meeting in the United Arab Emirates also confirms the high level of Emirati influence in Yemen — even after the death of Saleh.

However, UAE influence is not necessarily enough to create a quick and final settlement in Yemen. The STC's intransigent demands to secede, for example, present a potential roadblock. Still, as long as the United Arab Emirates can keep the STC loyal to the Hadi government, the coalition will be able to create a stronger united front against the Houthi rebels. 

The Houthis, meanwhile, have found themselves fighting on new, unexpected fronts both along the coast and against civilian unrest in their territory. Reports have circulated of Houthi crackdowns — in Sanaa and elsewhere — on supposed dissidents, including accounts that anti-Houthi demonstrations have been attacked and Saleh supporters have been executed. Roads south of Sanaa were also jammed, reportedly by civilians fleeing Houthi rule.

If al-Hudaydah falls, Houthi supply lines — especially from Iran — will be strangled. Capturing the port city would also allow the coalition to resume humanitarian aid on its terms and ease U.S. pressure on the Saudis on the issue. More than that, the fall of al-Hudaydah would signal that, though a tactical victory, the death of Saleh has allowed the Saudi-led coalition to gain the upper hand in Yemen's civil war

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