Slowly but surely, Cambodia's main opposition party appears to be gaining electoral ground. During local elections held June 4, the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) won 70 percent of the country's 1,646 commune councils, according to unofficial results published June 5 in a pro-government news outlet. The opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) won 482 communes. Though official results will not be published until June 25, a CNRP spokesman confirmed that the ruling party appears to have come out ahead in the popular vote, raking in about 51 percent of the public's support compared with the CNRP's 46 percent.

Many saw the local elections as a barometer for the staying power of longtime Prime Minister Hun Sen and the ruling CPP ahead of Cambodia's general elections in 2018. Though the opposition seems to have fallen well short of the target set by CNRP leader Kem Sokha, who expected the party to take control of 60 percent of the country's commune councils, the results still mark a slight improvement in the opposition's standing since June 2012, when the two parties that later merged to form the CNRP together won just 40 communes and around 30 percent of the popular vote. The following year, momentum built behind the newly united opposition as it won 55 seats in parliament — including 22 that previously belonged to the CPP — and came within 300,000 votes of winning the popular vote, despite widespread allegations of electoral fraud.

Hun Sen and the CPP continue to have a strong hold on the military and control over critical patronage networks in the country. But with the backing of a growing urban manufacturing class, the opposition has steadily made headway against them. In response, the prime minister has gradually tightened the screws on the opposition, relying on many of the tools he has used routinely since 1998 to keep the CPP comfortably in power. Over the past year, the government has exerted greater legal pressure on opposition leaders with tactics designed, in part, to stoke tension between supporters of exiled former CNRP chief Sam Rainsy and those of Kem Sokha, weakening the party from within. Military leaders, meanwhile, have threatened to squelch any attempts by the CNRP to stage mass protests like those that followed the 2013 vote, and Hun Sen has warned that attempts to foment a "color revolution" would risk returning Cambodia to the nightmarish days of the Khmer Rouge.

These dynamics will continue to play out over the coming year ahead of the general elections. A tight race in 2018 will raise the likelihood of strong-arm tactics by the ruling party that draw concern from Western countries, putting broader cooperation with Cambodia at risk. The country has already canceled joint military exercises with the United States and scrapped a long-standing U.S. Navy development and humanitarian assistance program this year — moves likely intended, at least in part, to diminish Washington's ability to pressure Phnom Penh on human rights.

But even if the next vote amounts to a watershed moment for modern Cambodia, with the opposition finally dislodging the CPP, the elections may not have serious geopolitical consequences. Under Hun Sen, Cambodia has become an increasingly reliable ally to China on regional issues; for example, it has regularly helped prevent the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from uniting against Beijing on volatile issues such as the South China Sea. Beijing, meanwhile, has poured investment and aid into Cambodia. A CPP loss in 2018 would not necessarily alter this arrangement.

After all, within the CNRP's base runs a virulent strain of anti-Vietnam sentiment rooted in the two countries' long history of tension, limiting the ability of any Cambodian government to cooperate closely with Hanoi. And as one of Southeast Asia's poorest and most underdeveloped countries, Cambodia has an insatiable appetite for Chinese aid and investment. Thus the next Cambodian government, whether run by the CPP or the CNRP, will have little choice but to try to exploit its few sources of international leverage — namely, its vote within the consensus-oriented ASEAN and its geographic position in a hotly contested region — to its advantage.