Unless the president permanently backtracks on substituting bigger banknotes for smaller ones, he is probably in for more trouble ahead. A significant share of the population simply has no valid money to pay for goods, and no feasible alternatives to fall back on, such as online or credit transactions. Though the government may be able to introduce the new bills by the end of the year, the delay will leave most Venezuelan citizens destitute in the meantime. Because several different printers are producing the new bills, it may take even longer to pump the money into Venezuela's economy. (Some of the country's 500-bolivar bills, for instance, are being transported from Sweden.)

At worst, this will trigger uprisings across the country, particularly in states such as Bolivar that are already suffering from steep inflation and worsening food shortages. The government's tendency to keep stores in Caracas well-stocked at the expense of those in other areas of the country is an ill-kept secret, as is the fact that Maduro's administration has had trouble cracking down on the illegal sale of imported food to Colombia, where shortages in border cities have created a lucrative black market for basic supplies. (These sales have stayed steady despite the government's sharp reduction in total imports, perhaps by as much as 60 percent, since 2014.) Should unrest spread, the government could send the National Guard or the army to restore order in Venezuela's most unstable regions. However, doing so would test these forces' willingness and ability to quell dissent quickly and effectively, no easy feat in a country where widespread access to the internet and social media can cause protests to spread like wildfire. Moreover, the country's armed forces are not prepared to deal with massive demonstrations, especially if they reach Caracas.

Each protest will come with the risk of retaliation by the government. In addition to physical means of cracking down on dissent, the government has other ways of discouraging opposition. For one, Caracas controls the distribution of food. If protests were to turn violent, those arrested or identified as troublemakers could be blacklisted and cut off from reliable sources of supplies. On its own, this is probably the biggest factor impeding the outbreak of sustained protests, though it could be countered somewhat by the existence of Venezuela's sizable black market, which offers an alternative avenue — albeit an expensive one — for buying food in legal tender or trading it for goods and services. Nevertheless, the black market cannot provide for the entire population. It, too, is experiencing food shortages in some provincial towns and rural areas since many black market goods are being consumed in the capital or in Colombia. So, although it is impossible to predict the exact timing or amount of violence protests may bring, it is clear that they pose the greatest risk to Venezuela's countryside.  

With heightened unrest all but certain in the weeks ahead, the speed with which the new bolivars enter into circulation will bear watching. The fact that the bolivar is now no longer a reliable currency is the primary force fueling public anger. And as long as the bulk of the country's banknotes are out of commission, Venezuela's economy and social stability will remain in jeopardy.

RANE
SUBSCRIBERS ONLY

Expert analysis when it matters most.

Get access to RANE's decision-grade geopolitical intelligence.