The Libyan National Army (LNA) announced Dec. 14 that the pipelines at Rayayina would be reopened within one day, enabling the National Oil Corp. to bring the El Feel and El Sharara oil fields in western Libya back online. The fields have been closed for nearly two years and have the capacity to add about 400,000 barrels per day to Libya's oil production.

The country's production levels were up over the last three months because Field Marshall Khalifa Hifter — head of the LNA — seized oil terminals in the east that had been shut down by the Petroleum Facilities Guard, headed by Ibrahim Jadhran. Libya’s production, which is currently around 600,000 barrels per day, could exceed 1 million barrels per day by the middle of 2017. El Feel and El Sharara had been blocked by allies of the LNA in Zintan, but now it looks like the National Oil Corp. and the LNA are aligning themselves more closely to stabilize Libya's oil exports.

Increased oil production will have consequences both inside and outside of Libya, assuming the goal is met. Boosting production to 1 million barrels per day would require Libya’s fragile, fluid and divided security and political states to hold together, which given recent history is far from certain. Though Hifter and the LNA are now effectively in control of all of Libya's onshore oil, Hifter still does not control Tripoli or Misrata, and many groups in those key cities view the LNA as a threat. Outright fighting between Libya's rival governments and power players has been sporadic in 2016, but it could easily erupt now that Misratan militias control Sirte and are only 30 to 50 kilometers (around 20 to 30 miles) away from LNA areas of control, the closest they have been since 2014.

Outside of Libya, increased oil production will complicate an already complex OPEC oil deal meant to cut production within the bloc. The El Feel and El Sharara fields alone could supply close to what Saudi Arabia had planned to cut alone, though Riyadh has signaled that deeper cuts are possible. The conundrum clearly shows how closely the success of the OPEC deal hinges on whether or not members outside of the Gulf actually follow through on planned cuts and freezes.