Turkey's fragile immigration deal with the European Union is getting even weaker as Ankara faces growing complications on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. On Nov. 24, the European Parliament approved a motion to freeze Turkey's EU accession negotiations in protest of Ankara's crackdowns following a failed coup attempt. (The measure passed with 479 votes in favor, 37 votes against and 107 abstentions.) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded to the decision by threatening to release more migrants into Europe, saying, "Listen to me, these border gates will be opened if you go any further."

Erdogan was never going to allow the European Union's human rights complaints to stand in the way of his attempts to weaken his political opponents at home. Moreover, in the aftermath of the coup attempt, the president's chances have improved of securing the cooperation he needs from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to forge ahead with his plan to amend the constitution, allowing for a presidential system that would further consolidate power under him. The bargain with the MHP includes a hard-line stance toward the country's Kurdish minority, and Ankara is proceeding apace with crackdowns against Kurds in the southeast. Erdogan's administration is also working to disenfranchise Turkey's Kurdish politicians.

On its own, the EU vote will not change much. Turkey's track to EU accession has been blocked by a host of obstacles from the start. As divisions within the Continental bloc deepen and Turkey moves further down an authoritarian path, the European Union will become less tolerant to the idea of adding to its embattled bloc a large Muslim country whose sizable population would grant Ankara a great deal of voting power. And though Turkey hoped to secure a promise of visa liberalization for its citizens from Brussels, security concerns at home will continue to override that goal for now. Erdogan expected the European Union to take symbolic action against his crackdowns by censuring Turkey, and he tried to preempt it by threatening his own referendum on the country's EU accession. Though Turkey can also leverage its control over migrant flows into the Continent to force the Europeans back to the negotiating table, Ankara will do so with caution. After all, Turkey still needs to keep a toehold in the bloc so that it can continue to be a part of the European common market — and of negotiations over that market's future as the union continues to fragment.

Meanwhile, Turkey has hit several snags on the Syrian battlefield. On Nov. 24, the Turkish military said a Syrian airstrike targeting its forces as they supported the rebel forces belonging to Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Aleppo. Turkey scrambled its jets and conducted defensive air patrols over its troops in response, and it is reportedly mulling retaliatory options. Al-Bab, the last major Islamic State stronghold in northern Aleppo, is quickly becoming a flashpoint for Turkey, Kurdish fighters, the Syrian Democratic Forces and loyalist troops who consider the Turkish-backed rebel advance on the city a threat. More clashes in the area surrounding al-Bab are likely as these forces draw closer to one another and push back the Islamic State.

The threat of further conflict in Syria will threaten the delicate understanding Turkey has reached with Russia. Turkey is counting on the Russians to show restraint as it increases its military footprint in northern Syria in an effort to drive a wedge between the Kurds' Afrin and Kobani cantons. But Moscow can use Turkey's growing vulnerabilities on the battlefield to exact new economic and security concessions from Ankara as the Kremlin concentrates on negotiating limits to NATO's activity in the former Soviet Union. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's upcoming visit to Antalya, set for Dec. 1, will likely yield additional clues about the status of Turkey and Russia's ongoing dialogue.

Turkey's moves in northern Iraq will bear close monitoring in the days ahead as well. Turkish officials summoned Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani to Ankara on Nov. 23 to discuss the next steps of the operation to retake Mosul. Turkey has been building a case to intervene in Sinjar, where the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) — a Kurdish militant group based in Turkey — maintains a significant presence. Ankara is also angling to launch an offensive on the strategic Iraqi city of Tal Afar, where Turkey has positioned itself as the city's Sunni protector against encroaching Shiite militias backed by Iran. Turkey has already begun to build up its military presence on its southeastern border, and it could start pushing into Iraq in the weeks ahead. If it does, Ankara will need Barzani to run interference with Baghdad, which has grown increasingly resistant to Turkey's expanding role in northern Iraq. Either way, Turkish meddling in the region will likely widen the rifts among the Kurds, which Iran no doubt will then try to exploit.

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