The Colombian government has decided to continue pursuing peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, in spite of objections from some of the country's political factions. On Oct. 24, Senate President Mauricio Lizcano — a member of the ruling National Unity coalition — said the Senate would be willing to pass a raft of bills to end the conflict within the next two months rather than resort to holding a new referendum. (Bogota's last peace deal with the FARC was narrowly defeated during a national vote on Oct. 2.) The legislation could enable the insurgency to start demobilizing before Colombia's presidential election in 2018. But the biggest threats to the peace process lie beyond the approaching vote.

Government and FARC officials will probably try to seal and implement a deal prior to the election to protect it from any new administration led by the Democratic Center — the opposition party most critical of Bogota's recent peace agreement. The Democratic Center suggested several changes to the government's latest accord, including the idea of jailing FARC leaders, but President Juan Manuel Santos appears to have found most of those proposals to be impractical.

Based on Lizcano's statement, Congress may enshrine any renegotiated peace deal in law, ending the 52-year insurgency before Santos steps down in 2018. Bogota has made it clear that it intends to discuss the deal with only some of its political opponents, including a faction of the Conservative Party, to avoid a lengthy period of haggling over the finer points of the agreement. After all, timing will be crucial to the deal's success: The government will likely need to reach an agreement with the FARC in the next few months to end the conflict and erect the institutions required to facilitate the group's transition from militancy to political movement before Santos leaves office. The most important of these institutions will be transitional justice mechanisms such as a special court system or legal regime that would allow the rebels to lay down their arms without fear of prosecution for certain crimes committed during the insurgency. (Crimes against humanity or war crimes would likely be exceptions.)

Over the next few months, government and FARC negotiators will work to amend the peace deal that voters rejected. Though the final version may not be put before the Colombian electorate for approval, popular opinion will still play a role in the process. Consequently, the items on transitional justice — a controversial issue among voters — will likely have to be modified, perhaps by incorporating the courts proposed in the rejected draft into the Colombian justice system rather than keeping them separate. The FARC has opposed the notion of being subjected to criminal court proceedings before, but the adjustment would make the peace deal more appealing to many Colombians. After all, the agreement may also grant the FARC seats in both houses of the legislature, and legitimacy will be essential to any political movement that emerges from the insurgency.

Bogota will be working against the clock to get a deal in place. The next presidential election will not take place until May 2018, but the Santos administration only has a few months left to draw up and pass the legislation needed to end the insurgency. (The remainder of Santos' term would then be used to demobilize the FARC and begin the transitional justice process.) Though the Democratic Center holds only a minority of both legislative houses, any agreement will have to be crafted in a way that is palatable to other lawmakers whose constituencies rejected the previous deal. Total amnesty for FARC members will likely be too risky a proposition for Bogota, as will putting a new peace accord to a popular vote. Delaying the process much longer could also give a future administration an opportunity to present terms that are unacceptable to the majority of the FARC or to scrap the deal completely. Aware of these dangers, the FARC will probably move to wrap up its negotiations with the Santos administration sooner rather than later.