The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government put pen to paper on Monday evening and officially agreed to end the armed conflict between them that began in 1964. The peace agreement will now be put to a national vote Oct. 2. If voters approve the accords — most opinion polls show the deal passing — the FARC will begin demobilizing in the coming months, and five decades of politically motivated fighting will cease by year's end. If voters reject the deal, the government's ability to end the violence will be much more uncertain.
For Bogota, the deal is a major breakthrough. Naturally, it would greatly reduce the threat of politically driven militant attacks since the FARC is the largest left-wing insurgency in Colombia. Foreign investors are now poised to have access to swaths of the country formerly beset by heavy insurgent activity without fear of militant attack. And the risk to Colombia's energy industry — which has long faced the threat of explosive attacks against energy pipelines — would also significantly drop.
But while the peace deal would be good for business, local risks would persist. This is because parts of the FARC probably either would not demobilize or would turn to ordinary crime. Compounding that risk, other criminal groups will seek to fill any vacuum created by the FARC's demobilization. As the FARC demobilized, it would abandon areas where — for nearly two decades in some cases — it has produced coca and cocaine, extorted local populations and controlled illegal mining operations. Other groups such as the National Liberation Army (the ELN, Colombia's second-largest leftist insurgency), the Clan Golfo and other smaller criminal organizations would take advantage of the FARC's sudden absence to take over these lucrative operations. Particularly profitable areas, such as the Venezuela-Colombia border region, the Pacific Coast region and parts of the south-central interior, would see increased violence as successor groups vie to control criminal economies.
Just how intense these turf wars become would depend on the types of resources being fought over and the size of forces contesting them. There is already an incipient turf war over former FARC areas in parts of Norte de Santander department between the ELN and a criminal group descended from the Popular Liberation Army, a left-wing militant group that demobilized in the 1990s. Similar incidents involving the ELN are seemingly occurring in the departments of Choco and Narino, while the Clan Golfo is fighting for control of a wider part of Meta department.
Even so, the government and economic activity in Colombia face fewer threats overall than they have in decades. The groups that will likely try to take over FARC operations are relatively small, and competition among them will limit their ability to spread. Meanwhile, the Colombian armed forces and police — strengthened after decades of fighting a counterinsurgency — can turn their attention from combating the FARC to fighting these successor organizations, which will also limit their ability to expand. So while a peace deal would not end the threat crime poses to Colombia, it would greatly improve Colombia's overall security picture.
