Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is planning his first trip beyond Southeast Asia since taking office in June. Duterte will visit Japan from Oct. 25-27 and China at some point during the month, though the date has not yet been determined. The trip, which will mark the first visit to China by a Philippine president in five years, reflects the president's careful foreign policy strategy.

Under the administration of Duterte's predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, relations between China and the Philippines were strained by the expansion of Beijing's claims in the South China Sea. In 2012, China seized the Scarborough Shoal, just 120 nautical miles from the Philippine coast, and began its massive island reclamation campaign not long after. These activities led Manila in 2013 to ask for a Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on China's claims. In its decision announced in July, the court invalidated most of them. Despite the victory, Duterte's administration has taken a less confrontational approach to China than did its predecessor, repeatedly demonstrating an interest in mending ties with the country. The new Philippine president, for instance, took a softer tone when addressing maritime disputes during the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Laos. In addition, he announced that he would withdraw his nation's forces from a joint patrol in the disputed waters to avoid confrontation with Beijing and dispatched former Philippine President Fidel Ramos to China in August to discuss ways to manage tension. Nevertheless, Manila flaunts its maritime victory over China on the international stage to increase military cooperation from foreign powers such as Japan and Russia.

Duterte's upcoming trips to Japan and China reveal the president's foreign policy objectives with these countries. As Manila works to improve the Philippine economy — particularly in the country's restive southern region — increasing ties with Beijing could be a boon. At the same time, Duterte knows that China's naval and maritime enforcement capabilities vastly outstrip those of the Philippines. Manila hopes to compromise with Beijing enough to gain concessions while appealing to Japan to acquire the security assurances and military equipment it needs to defend its own maritime claims.

This balancing act has another component: the Philippines' relationship with the United States. Since taking office, Duterte has adopted a tough stance toward Washington — for instance by calling for U.S. special forces to withdraw from Mindanao, where they were assisting counterterrorism operation. Though these displays of nationalist bravado may help Duterte to broaden his political appeal at home, as they have for the past three decades, they could also prevent him from achieving the goals he has set for his administration. Without the security assistance that the United States has long provided through its alliance with the Philippines, Manila will struggle to combat organized crime, smuggling and southern insurgencies, while also defending its maritime territory. Still, that Duterte is exploring alternatives for outside security support and disengaging from the United States does not necessarily presage an end to the U.S.-Philippine security alliance.

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