One of the hot foreign policy topics this U.S. election season centers on the idea that America's allies need to stop freeloading off the U.S. military and step up their game in conflict zones where they have interests. Limited resources, fear of political and militant blowback, and the comfort of knowing that a much bigger military power — such as the United States — is going to take the lead anyway often puts Washington in the unenviable position of having to twist arms to achieve even the semblance of a coalition.
So when two highly capable countries are aggressively trying to join a U.S.-led military campaign, the United States presumably has a good reason for responding with "thanks, but no thanks." This is the peculiar situation in which the United States finds itself in dealing with Russia and Turkey in the fight against the Islamic State in Syria.
The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are steadily advancing south toward the Islamic State bastion of Raqqa. This is guaranteed to be a slow and grueling fight. Once the SDF reaches the heart of the city, it will encounter an array of booby traps and suicide bombers, and the United States will have a difficult time providing those forces with air support because of the Islamic State's prevalent use of human shields.
Russia has been vocal lately about its desire to lend a helping hand in the Raqqa offensive, emphasizing at every opportunity that the United States and Russia are already coordinating on a daily basis on the Syrian battlefield. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Monday, "We hope our U.S. partners will honestly cooperate with us without seeking to implement Plan B or C behind our backs." Not waiting for an invitation from the United States, Russia has already been reinforcing a loyalist advance from the south toward Raqqa, with Syrian forces reportedly 24 kilometers (15 miles) from the town of Tabqa, just to the west of Raqqa on Lake Assad.
The United States, of course, wants the offensive against the Islamic State to succeed. If the Russia-backed loyalists retook Tabqa en route to Raqqa, the Islamic State's supply lines would be strained, aiding the SDF's assault from the north. But the United States also knows that Russia's assistance in this fight comes with a price. Russia has already tried, through peace talks and spoiler attacks, to use its involvement in Syria to draw the United States into a negotiation on broader issues — sanctions against Russia over Ukraine and the scale of NATO's military buildup in Europe, for example.
The White House has been receptive to a dialogue on tactical coordination here and there with Moscow, but Washington does not feel particularly compelled to make substantive concessions to Russia. So, much to Russia's frustration, the United States keeps its distance. Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook on Tuesday downplayed Russia's claims on coordinating with the United States in Syria, essentially clarifying that the two nations coordinate when necessary to avoid having their warplanes run into each other. As Cook said, "We don't see (coordination) as an issue right now. And if it becomes one, it's certainly something we'll be prepared to address."
Russia's intent in the coming weeks is to ensure that coordination becomes an unavoidable issue for the United States. Should Russia-backed loyalist forces come close enough to U.S.-backed SDF forces in Raqqa, Russia can position itself as either the ally to help nail the Islamic State or the obstructionist that targets the SDF forces that the United States relies on to retake Raqqa.
Russia is not the only one trying to horn in on the U.S.-led coalition in Syria. Turkey is anxiously watching as SDF forces lead a separate offensive against the Islamic State in Manbij, about 40 kilometers from the Syria-Turkey border. Had it not been for its falling out with Russia, Turkey would likely have been leading this offensive itself. Not only would it have been fighting to uproot the Islamic State, but at the same time it would have been in a position to prevent Kurdish forces within the SDF from using the resulting power vacuum to expand their territory. Turkey has already made clear its extreme displeasure with the United States for working with Kurdish forces in the SDF. To keep Turkey at bay and to keep the SDF's focus on the Islamic State, the United States has given Turkey assurances that more Arab forces will be employed within the SDF in the Manbij operation and that the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) will not be able to take advantage.
But these assurances are somewhat disingenuous. Turkey knows that the United States will be an effective constraint on Kurdish expansion only so long as the United States remains heavily invested in the fight against the Islamic State. The more success the United States has in that fight, the more it can pull back and leave it to the local forces to hold their ground. At that point, Turkey wants to be ready to fill the void. Turkey has already warned that any perceived violation of its understanding with the United States will prompt Turkish action. As Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said, "If the YPG want to provide logistical help east of the Euphrates, that's different, but after the operations end, we don't want a single YPG member west of the Euphrates."
Turkey is already laying out its justification for a future intervention in northern Syria, but there is still that pesky detail of Ankara's working out an understanding with Moscow to avoid clashes on the battlefield. As Russian- and U.S.-backed forces advance toward Raqqa, Turkey will be searching for an opening in a forced dialogue between Moscow and Washington to help clear the way.
