By Aleksander Siemaszko for the National Centre for Strategic Studies
The European Union Security Strategy adopted in 2003 (the so-called ‘Solana strategy’ ) begins, rather famously, with the following words: ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history‘. That these words seem so much out of place in the current global outlook is testimony to the current times and the fundamental change of circumstances in which the EU states operate today. This is exemplified not only by the transformation of the global system and its regional subsystem, but also by a profound change in the institutional set-up of EU foreign policy, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It should come as no surprise then that the European Council formally mandated the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy to deliver a new EU global strategy.
That this strategy is out of date despite the 2008 review is clear. What is less clear is the very purpose of an EU strategy and the expectations that it stirs. We badly need to conduct an analysis of EU goals and policy instruments, as well as of the role of the European Union in global affairs. In doing so we should avoid a vicious circle of raising unrealistic expectations and the subsequent disappointment and scepticism that this may provoke.
A strategy is defined, in the broadest sense of the term, as a plan for achieving one or more identified goals using the available resources and methods . According to Arnand Menon of King’s College, London, the European Union lacks the two necessary elements of any strategy, demonstrating a staggering deficit of a long-term foreign policy objective and failing to develop resources to pursue any meaningful external action . The consensus-based decision making process in the EU is paralysing, even in sectorial policies where the European institutions enjoy exclusive competence, like international trade. The primacy of Member States is even clearer in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where the unanimity principle brings any action to the lowest common denominator. While the 28 Member States may reach an agreement on less contested issues, a common position on strategic priorities, i.e. on the relationship with Russia or the Middle East policy, is very difficult to achieve. In consequence any EU security strategy would be so vague and full of lofty platitudes that it would bring more harm than good, highlighting the unavoidable discord between European rhetoric and practice .
This criticism is however misdirected. The top brass of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is well aware of the leading role of nation states in establishing foreign policy goals. Besides, the European Council conclusions of 2015 require EEAS to engage Member States in the strategy development process - as a result, during the last 12 months the EU High Representative Mogherini reached out to all the stakeholders involved: national governments and parliaments, the European Parliament and the experts’ community. The goal is to work out a common document, which, even if limited in ambition, could play a role as a reference point and a coordination mechanism. The EU security strategy acts as an international regime, stabilising the external policy decision making process, reducing the ad hoc transaction costs and increasing trust and transparency between major actors . Once it is negotiated the Member States could place greater confidence in the established policy priorities.
Such a strategy would also serve as a long-term programming document for European policy makers. A useful and realistic strategy should begin with an honest assessment of available means and resources for EU external policy priorities.
It is clear that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which represents the military dimension of CFSP, has lost any impetus it might have had at the beginning. While the EU is still engaged in 17 simultaneous operations outside its borders, only 7 of them are of a military nature. The rest are smaller civilian missions, such as border monitoring or police and judicial sector reforms. Substantial military engagements, such as the EU NAVFOR Atalanta operation aimed at combatting piracy on the Somali coast, are a residue of a previous, more activist policy. The ‘demilitarisation of the EU security policy’ is self-evident . The European Union, being a sui generis international actor and not a state, lacks a unified chain of command and its own military resources. Neither the EU Military Staff nor the Battlegroups - the multinational, regional units which have not been used so far - can substitute genuine security capabilities. Any transition in the direction of a defence union is in turn hampered by the unclear provisions of art. 222 (the solidarity clause) and art. 42.7 (the mutual defence clause) of the Treaty on the European Union. The EU–NATO cooperation and access to the Atlantic Alliance's military resources, envisioned in the Berlin Plus arrangement of 2003 proved to be illusionary, largely due to unresolved issues between Turkey and Cyprus . Finally, 28 EU Member States differ profoundly when it comes to strategic cultures and the role that the military plays in their respective foreign policies; while a large majority are both EU and NATO members, several countries are restricted in their conduct by the constitutional principle of neutrality .
These limitations are well understood in Brussels and in the national capitals. A smart European Union security strategy cannot be a mere carbon copy of national security strategies of Member States. Quite the contrary: it should be based on a unique EU perspective and bring to the table a comprehensive approach - a long-term policy, concentrating on the non-military aspects of the security strategy.
A security policy based on a comprehensive approach utilises a wide array of civilian and military instruments, such as trade and development policies, state-building and trust-building exercises. It takes into account the increasingly blurred lines between external and domestic policies and the rise in global interdependence. The term itself is not new - it was first coined in 2013 by the office of High Representative Federica Mogherini . In the light of recent developments in the EU’s security environment it is even more relevant today.
The negative consequences of the Arab Spring - the civil war in Syria, Libya and Yemen, the destabilisation of Sahel - as well as the ongoing hybrid war in Ukraine highlight the necessity of good governance and institutional stability in international relations. Georgetown University experts named chronic instability as the single biggest threat to U.S. interests and security in the Middle East . Similar reports point to the destructive role of humanitarian crises and ecological catastrophes, including the consequences of climate change, as aggravating the military conflicts in the region . State fragility and infiltration of the Ukrainian government by Russian agents of influence contributed to the success of the hybrid war operations in the Crimea and the Donbas region.
Of course this is not to say that military power is losing relevance. It is still one of the main instruments of foreign policy. Yet even well-run military operations such as French interventions in Mali (Opération Serval) or across Sahel (Opération Barkhane) have limited influence on the security situation in the region. The physical elimination of the threat yields only short-term results. The void, caused by the failure or absence of the state and the ongoing humanitarian crises is a fertile breeding ground for organised crime or terrorist organisations. Their activity, in turn, prompts civilian flight, increasing the migratory pressure on Europe. The interdependence between security and development policy is clear. Efforts to provide security to the EU must contain a pre-emptive element - aimed at stabilising the institutional setup, improving the work of local administration and law enforcement and contributing to the strong foundations of economic growth in regions like Eastern Europe, Middle East or North Africa .
The EU emergency crisis response mechanism has proven to be woefully inadequate - as demonstrated by the lacklustre reaction to the migratory pressures coming from the Middle East and North Africa. Yet a preventive approach, aimed at addressing the root causes of the crises and enabling the EU to do what it is institutionally prepared to do - provides a chance for the new security strategy to offer some added value. This approach is already reflected in the EU external policy financial instruments, such as the Instrument for Peace in Africa, the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, the Development Cooperation Instrument or the Neighbourhood Policy funds. The EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) dedicated over 51 billion EUR for the aforementioned policies in the 2014–2020 financial perspective. But any prospective results of these projects would only be visible over the mid-to-long-term period.
Should the new EU security strategy pursue the above outlined course it would provide a much needed synergy with the foreign policy objectives of several Member States, including Poland. Stability, democracy and economic development among its Eastern neighbours is of paramount importance to Warsaw. Poor governance, stalling reforms and growing dissatisfaction with pro-Western governments can deliver power to pro-Russian populists (which is still the main risk factor in Ukraine and Moldova) or lead to an increasingly authoritarian course of nominally pro-Western parties, as in Georgia. Should the European Neighbourhood Instrument (15 billion EUR available in 2014–2020) or the Partnership Instrument be properly used, they could offer substantial benefits for East European countries, while boosting stability in the EU neighbourhood. Moreover, a financial involvement on behalf of the EU is much more likely than any military presence, even one aimed at resolving the frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
There can be no doubt that the EU external policy is effectively demilitarised; whether it had any military potential to begin with is a different matter. This should not lead the EU to abandon all effort to develop a coherent security strategy based on a realistic assessment of existing challenges and available instruments. If developed, such a policy would complement the renewed military efforts of the North Atlantic Alliance, becoming a second pillar of the transatlantic security community.
