Baqaa, just south of the Syrian border, was established in 1967 to house Palestinian refugees fleeing the Six-Day War. Now the largest of 10 Palestinian refugee camps scattered across northwest Jordan, Baqaa is home to a community that tends to be much more devout than the rest of the country. It is the primary source of popular support for Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood party branch, which is currently represented by three somewhat overlapping institutions: the original Muslim Brotherhood Group and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front; the Zamzam Initiative, popular among urban youth; and the Muslim Brotherhood Society, the party's charitable arm.
The groups have differing levels of official support. For example, the Jordanian government tolerates the Zamzam Initiative and the Muslim Brotherhood Society charity group because they provide a moderate outlet for the population's Islamist sentiments. By contrast, the state has persecuted the original Muslim Brotherhood Group. In mid-April, Jordanian authorities cracked down on the group, shuttering its offices and forbidding it from holding elections for its Shura Council, an internal consultative council maintained by each Muslim Brotherhood branch across the region. (The group flouted this ruling and proceeded with elections on May 18.)
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan reached this fractured state after years of contentious infighting between the "hawks," a mostly Palestinian faction of hard-liners, and the "doves," a more moderate and diverse group. The party's decision to boycott parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2013 only deepened these rifts. After the 2011 Arab Spring protests, Amman became increasingly wary of the party. Drawing from Syria's and Egypt's experiences, the Jordanian government realized that it needed to tread carefully. Despite its need to contain the anti-state discontent embodied in the party, the government could not ban outright a group with such massive popular support. Instead, Amman has worked to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood politically while appeasing the Islamist political community, eschewing mass arrests like those carried out by Egypt and supporting the movement's more moderate wings.
More pragmatic Muslim Brotherhood members recognized this trend and peeled off from the main group to maintain legitimacy. As a result, the Zamzam Initiative formed in 2012 and the slightly overlapping Muslim Brotherhood Society in March 2015. Meanwhile, the Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood Group have found themselves mired in disputes over administration, direction and ideology.
Having declared loyalty and respect for Jordan's Hashemite government, the Muslim Brotherhood Society announced June 4 that it intends to participate in nationwide parliamentary elections, due before October. In March, Zamzam also discussed forming a political party. The two groups may be gearing up to establish a joint political party, which could be a welcome outcome for the Jordanian government. The 2007 and 2013 Muslim Brotherhood boycotts yielded parliaments without Islamist members, leading many in the public to complain about lack of representation. An electoral bid by Muslim Brotherhood affiliates may allay such criticisms.
But the Jordanian government is playing a delicate game. It badly needs to maintain stability and prevent the rise of militancy in the country. Given its weak domestic production base, the best way for Jordan to do this has been to secure outside support. For decades, the strategy has proved effective, and U.S., Gulf, European and International Monetary Fund loans have helped to stave off economic crisis. More aid is in the offing as negotiations proceed on yet another IMF loan. After all, governments inside and outside the region rely on Jordan as a bulwark against the Islamic State and share intelligence with the country's robust General Intelligence Directorate. At the same time, the assistance comes at a cost: the Gulf has pressured Jordan to clamp down harder on Islamist sentiment, and IMF loans come with structural reform requirements.
As parliamentary elections approach, the government will continue its back-and-forth with the different Muslim Brotherhood groups and, more important, with their underlying constituency. This will be no easy feat. Amman must keep the fringes of that constituency from being drawn to militant jihadist movements while also granting them a credible political outlet, albeit one that does not threaten political stability.
