Syrian Kurds are coming to grips with the fact that victory on the battlefield does not always translate into political gain. Locked out of the Geneva peace talks, sensing the weakness of President Bashar al Assad's government as the Russians withdraw, and keen to pre-empt further Turkish moves, the Syrian Kurds are headed toward enshrining their significant control over parts of northern Syria. But gaining legitimacy remains a very tall order.

Aided by U.S. support and airstrikes, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People's Protection Units (YPG), have largely secured the Kurdish-populated areas of northern Syria. This success was greatly facilitated by two key strategic decisions. First, the Kurdish militia recognized the U.S. focus on defeating the Islamic State and deftly distinguished itself as a key ally in that fight, garnering considerable American support. Second, the group agreed to work within a coalition known as the Syrian Democratic Forces. This move proved beneficial, earning the YPG — who constitute 80 percent of the coalition forces — greater legitimacy among the Arab and Christian minorities in the coalition.

Now that it has mostly achieved its territorial objectives, the PYD is having trouble getting recognition. Though an undeniably important group in the Syrian Civil War, the militia has yet to be invited to the peace talks in Geneva because it occupies a position largely independent from both the rebel and the government causes. The Turkish-supported rebels insist that the PYD and YPG should be regarded as part of al Assad's side. For its part, the Syrian government, encouraged by Russia, has pushed to include the PYD in peace talks as part of the wider opposition.

The Kurds are immensely frustrated by the fact that their victories on the battlefield have not had greater political impact. On the ground, the group has achieved de facto Kurdish independence: The YPG controls large portions of northern Syria, even taking into account the presence of the Syrian Democratic Forces' minority members. The key difficulty lies in getting official endorsement for its authority.

Rejected and challenged on multiple sides, the PYD feels it has no choice but to demonstrate its willingness to act unilaterally. To this end, the group plans to set up its own political administration in Rojava, a federal autonomous region in northern Syria. To allay fears of Kurdish independence, the PYD insists that its government would include representation for other groups, such as the Turkmens and Arabs, and would still answer to the national government. This federalist model, the Kurdish group suggests, could be applied throughout Syria.

But Rojava faces significant resistance. Neither the wider opposition nor the Syrian government will entertain a federalist solution for the Kurds. Damascus fears that delegating some power to regional governments would threaten its ability to control the country. The opposition (which doesn't agree with the Syrian government on much) also wants a strong centralized state, with an eye to becoming the new ruling power in Damascus. At the same time, Turkey has even threatened in the past to go to war to prevent an established Rojava. And with Russia pulling forces out of Syria, Turkey may be more likely to act on that threat.

Meanwhile, the YPG and the Asayish — the PYD's internal security force — are advancing on those pockets of government control that remain within Rojava. The Syrian government has so far maintained a force in these pockets, centered in the cities of al-Hasaka and Qamishli. After tolerating each other's presence to focus on the Islamic State threat in al-Hasaka, the YPG and government forces are now clashing on an unprecedented scale. The Kurdish militia claims it is responding to loyalist provocations, but its ability to quickly arrest dozens of loyalist men in raids today suggests at least some preplanning.

There is no denying that the PYD and its military wing have skillfully maneuvered to gain physical control in Rojava. Absent a Turkish invasion or another foreign intervention, the Kurds will likely maintain their control for at least the duration of the Syrian Civil War. International legitimacy, however, will continue to elude the PYD, and without official recognition abroad, the party's hold over Rojava will remain under threat.