With the retirement of a leading U.S. military official, Afghanistan is reaching a significant moment in its seemingly forlorn trajectory. U.S. Army Gen. John Campbell, who on Wednesday stepped down as head of the International Security Assistance Force, presided over a military effort in which Afghan forces were primarily on the defensive. It was during Campbell's 18-month tenure that the U.S. forces began their drawdown from Afghanistan, enabling the Taliban to fill the resulting security vacuum. Meanwhile, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were focused on securing checkpoints that were dispersed widely throughout the country. Now, with a new general taking Campbell's place, the NATO-led effort may be considering a more robust approach.
Filling the outgoing general's position is John Nicholson, a four-star U.S. Army general who is now in command of about 13,000 troops — including 9,800 U.S. troops — in support of NATO's mission to train and assist the ANSF. Nicholson's appointment comes at a precarious time for Afghanistan. In 2015, the landlocked country experienced some of the worst violence of the 14-year war, as the Taliban intensified their insurgency through a spate of suicide attacks, territorial gains and guerrilla warfare. Compelled into action by the worsening situation, the four nations of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group — Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the United States — have convened four times so far in a bid to end a war that still threatens regional stability. During the latest meeting in Kabul, the coordination group closed by formally inviting the Taliban for negotiations. And yet last week, the death of 27 people in a pair of Taliban suicide bombings provided a stark reminder that the militant organization shows no signs of relenting. So emboldened are the Taliban that they sustained a high level of fighting even through the winter months, when the icy weather usually deters forces from engaging in heavy combat.
Clearly, Nicholson is inheriting a complex and difficult operation. Yet perhaps his greatest challenge will be bolstering the ANSF. Though the intent of the U.S. drawdown was to transfer combat responsibilities to the Afghan forces, a host of factors have complicated the handoff, including corruption, poor maneuverability and desertions. Last year alone, 36,000 of the ANSF's roughly 300,000 soldiers deserted. Moreover, Afghanistan's military suffers from a lack of adequate rest time, poor logistical and intelligence capacity, a lack of professionalization and a leadership deficit.
This beleaguered fighting force has yielded substantial territory to the Taliban, which is why Campbell advocated a significant shift in Afghan military tactics — something the ANSF is now considering implementing. Currently, a significant portion of Afghan military strategy involves manning thousands of checkpoints scattered throughout the country. By enforcing checkpoints, the Afghans can monitor people and vehicles for weapons and bombs, thereby preventing militants from installing roadside mines. That is the logic. However, this fundamentally defensive tactic also spreads Afghan forces too thin, creating vulnerabilities that the Taliban routinely exploit. Now NATO wants the ANSF to shift from a reactive to a proactive strategy by reducing its presence along checkpoints. This means consolidating and taking the fight directly to the Taliban.
The potential shift in strategy would come just ahead of the summer months, when fighting will intensify with the warmer weather. Of course, it carries risks of its own: As the Afghans withdraw from checkpoints, the Taliban can potentially fill the void. This recently happened when the 215th Maiwand Corps of the Afghan National Army withdrew from the district of Musa Qala, located in Helmand province, site of some of the fiercest fighting in the country and long a bastion of Taliban resistance (and also the center of the country's opium production). As a result, the Taliban now either control or contest 10 of Helmand's 14 districts.
Ultimately, the ANSF intends for the short-term costs to be justified by the long-term benefits of a strategy designed to deliver more potent and effective blows to the Taliban. Should the strategy backfire, however, an already bleak outlook may further darken. The new general is taking command just as the Taliban insurgency is intensifying — though it continues to be riddled with fractures that complicate negotiations. The fate of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, leader of the mainline Taliban, remains a mystery. And on Wednesday, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who remains an influential figure in his country, lashed out at Pakistan, accusing the country of sponsoring this week's attacks against the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad (in eastern Afghanistan near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border). Karzai's comments — and the broader tensions between the two countries — potentially add another complicating layer to Afghan peace talks, in which Afghanistan and Pakistan's cooperation is critical to any path forward.
Despite everything, some hope remains. The four-way talks, led by Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States and China, are among the most significant efforts for a negotiated peace since the war began in 2001. Their success may be the difference between a complete U.S. withdrawal and a continuing, drawn-out war: The United States is scheduled to reduce its total troop deployment in Afghanistan to 5,500 by Jan. 1, 2017, but that figure is contingent upon the ability of Afghanistan's rag-tag forces to gain and hold ground against the Taliban. There are no guarantees that a new, more aggressive approach will help. But given the rapid and sustained advance made by the Taliban in the past few months, a strategy shift is clearly in order, and as soon as possible.
