Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah has announced that he would resign and support the formation of a national unity government if Hamas and Fatah successfully reached a reconciliation agreement. And it appears as though they did just that on Tuesday. But as remarkable an agreement as this may at first seem, it is, in truth, only nominally important: Far more interesting than the reconciliation itself are the agreement's provisions over the Rafah crossing, an issue that has much broader economic and political implications for the region.
Palestinian political parties have tried to come to terms before. Most of their attempts have failed. What distinguishes the new agreement, regardless of its chances of success, is that there is now regional — not only Palestinian — interest in Rafah. The Rafah crossing is the one place Gaza's 1.9 million residents can (legally) enter Egypt, which is a vital source of supplies for the Palestinian territories. But Cairo has mostly kept it closed of late. The government there is concerned that Palestinian militants are using the crossing to come to Egypt — a concern compounded by the jihadists who already operate in the Sinai Peninsula. Cairo has even gone so far as to destroy the smuggling tunnels underneath the border.
The latest reconciliation puts forth a new way of administering Rafah, whereby the Fatah Presidential Guard would take over for Hamas, though some Hamas personnel would stay behind. With Fatah in charge of the crossing, Egypt may be much less concerned about the spread of militancy and thus less inclined to keep the border closed.
Enter Turkey and Israel. Diplomats from both countries met in Switzerland on Wednesday to normalize ties. Relations between Ankara and Jerusalem — so strategically important for both sides — cooled in 2010, when a raid on a Turkish flotilla carrying aid to Gaza left 10 Turks dead. Turkey demanded an apology, compensation for the victims and most important, an easing on the Gaza blockade. Israel capitulated to the first two demands but has balked on the third; it is worried that allowing freer access to Gaza would bring in too many weapons and supplies that could be used to threaten Israeli interests. However, Israel's intransigence on Rafah stems largely from its distrust of Hamas, not Fatah. Indeed, Jerusalem regularly cooperates with Fatah in the West Bank. Israel may be more willing to ease up on a Rafah crossing administered by Fatah. If it does, it will have complied with Turkey's final demand, improving bilateral ties in the process.
Of course, a changing of the guard at Rafah would first require a unity accord between Hamas and Fatah. It is possible that this latest political reconciliation agreement has a greater chance of success. Given how much it could help normalize the region, it may attract more foreign support than previous agreements. After all, both parties have seen significant decline in their support and could benefit from demonstrating their ability to put Palestinian issues ahead of their own agendas. In addition, both parties wish to demonstrate success in Gaza: While Hamas wishes to increase its clout by demonstrating its ability to open the border crossing, Fatah wants to re-establish some authority in Gaza as head of the Palestinian Authority.
In addition, Hamas was unable to successfully capitalize on the would-be third intifada (which had failed to gain momentum in the way the previous two had), and now public support for a Palestinian uprising is rapidly declining (in October, 63 percent of Palestinians supported it, and now only 42 percent support it according to the Awrad Research Poll). For Hamas, the choice is either increasing its violent resistance credentials by competing with more radical groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and nascent jihadist units in Gaza for political support, or moderating its position and finding a political solution with Fatah. The benefits to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas are also clear: For some time Fatah has been viewed as ineffective and irrelevant, and its potential stewardship of Rafah could help to change that perception.
