North Korea attempted another satellite launch early Feb. 7 local time. By most accounts, Pyongyang appears to have been at least partially successful in placing an object in a sun-synchronous polar orbit — a path used by many Earth observation satellites. It may take days or longer to verify that the satellite is sending and receiving signals from Earth, something that most analysts suggest the last satellite launched by Pyongyang failed to do. Should this launch prove successful, it would reinforce North Korea's demonstration of its capabilities to develop space and rocket technology despite years of sanctions and isolation. It would also bolster North Korea's missile technology development, given the dual use nature of space systems.

Coming on the heels of North Korea's latest nuclear test, the satellite launch is once again raising concerns that Pyongyang is heading rapidly toward the development of deliverable nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles. The reality is that though the North Koreans are making progress, their long-range missile systems remain unwieldy for any type of military use. And there are still several steps in the process to effectively miniaturize and ruggedize their nuclear warheads for active deployment. This is not to belittle the challenges North Korea poses to nonproliferation efforts, or the clear sense of regional risk Pyongyang's developments engender. But it is equally important not to overplay the developments.

North Korea's satellite launch can be seen through three lenses — military, political and technological. On the latter, North Korea is seeking domestic technological developments, largely because of its isolation but also as a way of harnessing the drive of the population. Heavy industry, science and technology have long been backbones of North Korea's economic and social system. Highlighting feats of accomplishment serves not only to preserve North Korea's independence from outside powers (at least conceptually) but also reinforces the inability of outside powers to effectively sanction North Korea into submission.

On the political front, Kim Jong Un, like his father, Kim Jong Il, has taken a significant interest in being connected with the North Korean space program as a way to strengthen his credentials, to appear modern and to highlight visionary leadership. Although the timing of developments is now more tied to technological readiness than purely political pageantry, it does not hurt if additional significance can be gleaned from the timing. In May, North Korea will hold the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, the first such meeting since 1980. The meeting marks the solidification of Kim Jong Un's power after years of at times tumultuous internal personnel realignments. Like his father, who used the North's first attempted satellite launch as a symbol of his assertion of power, the younger Kim, too, is playing off the symbolism, something we noted in our annual forecast.

But this also leads into the military aspect of the test. North Korea's Unha rockets (also referred to by outsiders as Taepodong) are potential intercontinental ballistic missiles, but without a more secure and rapid launch system, they would be ineffective in combat. The open launchers, coupled with the minimum of a day or two preparation time (if not longer), leave the systems vulnerable to pre-emptive action. Additionally, North Korea has only two launch sites, making monitoring rather simple. But the technology developed does allow the North to integrate elements into more viable missile systems in the future, and the perception of progress serves as an important component of North Korea's overall strategy of deterrence.

From the North's perspective, the conventional deterrent against South Korea, and even the ability to strike Japan with some intermediate-range missiles, may still not be enough to deter the United States at some point from seeking regime change through active means. But the ability to threaten a nuclear strike on the United States, even at low odds of success, may serve as the added deterrent to alter any U.S. calculus of the cost-benefit of intervention in North Korea. It is a risky strategy. Yet, the North has watched Iraq, Libya and countries around the world and has determined that the U.S. calculus for intervention or invasion is not always one that fully addresses the interests of others in the region (even allies). Nor is the United States always concerned about the implications for regional destabilization. The ability to strike the United States itself may be the only real form of deterrent.

For Pyongyang, what was once a bargaining chip — its nuclear and missile programs — is now a matter of national security strategy. These are not systems to trade away, they are systems to demonstrate, and that requires real technological advancements rather than simply showy political actions. For neighboring countries and the United States, this makes North Korean behavior harder to shape. It is no longer a matter of finding the right carrot for the North, rather, Washington is nearing the point of deciding just how to deal with what Pyongyang hopes soon will be a fait accompli — a nuclear-armed North Korea.

In the near term, the North's latest test has formalized and accelerated talks between South Korea and the United States on the deployment of terminal high-altitude area defense, or THAAD. This could put one of the world's most advanced missile defense systems on the Korean Peninsula, something China has been cautioning and lobbying against. The nuclear and missile tests may provide a brief respite in the mistrust and lack of coordination between Japan and South Korea, at least with regards to intelligence sharing with one another and the United States concerning North Korea. This complicates matters for China, but not significantly. The South Korea-U.S.-Japan triangle remains susceptible to internal divisions, and Beijing can still find ways to exploit small differences.

Perhaps more than anything, the North's latest tests reveal the continued disagreements between the United States and China on the threat posed by Pyongyang and on the appropriate response. Despite numerous nuclear and missile tests, despite several years of reports of poor relations between Beijing and Pyongyang, and despite closer economic and political ties between Beijing and Seoul, China seems no closer to either wanting or being capable of taking action to substantially alter North Korean behavior. For China, a U.S. facing numerous crises the world over reduces the ability of Washington to focus significant attention on countering the rising Chinese "threat." But Beijing may also be constrained both in its overall influence on a sovereign North Korea and in the tools it feels able to use. After all, instability in North Korea would be felt in neighboring China much sooner than it would in the United States. Distance provides a very different perspective of threat, options and immediacy.

Editor's Note: A previous version of this report misstated the date of the Feb. 7 satellite launch.