After more than a year of haggling between Libya's competing governments in Tobruk and Tripoli, the U.N.-backed effort to transform Libya from a divided nation into one country under a unified and credible administration looks to be finally bearing fruit. U.N. envoy Martin Kobler announced Dec. 11 that the country's two governments, the Islamist-dominated General National Congress in the west and the internationally recognized House of Representatives in the east, are ready to sign a power-sharing agreement as early as Dec. 16.
There is just one problem: The U.N. deal is not the only deal on the table. The very day the United Nations announced its proposal, a group of dissenting representatives from both governments proffered a rival deal, one that threatens to undermine negotiations and draw out the peace process indefinitely.
The U.N. plan comes after more than a year of negotiations to restore stability after Islamist group Dawn of Libya in 2014 took over the capital, Tripoli, and forced the country's elected government to regroup in the eastern city of Tobruk. Ever since, Libya has been divided between the two governments. The U.N.-sponsored talks, led by General National Congress Vice President Salah al-Makhzoum and House of Representatives Deputy President Mohammed Choueib, finally culminated in the deal announced Dec. 11, which would set up a multi-member presidential council to govern the country. The council would consist of a prime minister, five deputy premiers and three senior ministers. The power-sharing agreement would provide more representation to tribal and regional political actors across the country. If there had been no rival deal and U.N. officials had not opted to announce their own proposal early, it likely would have been put forth at a U.N. summit on Libya scheduled to take place Dec. 13 in Rome.
But some in Libya seriously question the validity of the U.N.-sponsored deal, in no small part because the United Nations itself is not entirely neutral. Former U.N. envoy Bernardino Leon, after all, has close connections to the United Arab Emirates, a country that has unambiguously thrown its support behind the Tobruk-based government. Indeed, in the eyes of many Libyans — and in particular supporters of the Tripoli administration — Leon's acceptance last month of a lucrative Emirati job offer is blatant confirmation that the U.N. negotiations have all along been hopelessly biased in favor of the House of Representatives.
Supporting a Libya-Made Deal
Frustrated with the U.N. involvement, Deputy President Awad Abdul-Sadiq from the General National Congress and Ibrahim Amish from the House of Representatives negotiated the alternate deal. Now critics of the U.N.-backed agreement are rallying around the rival proposal because it sends a clear signal to foreign interests to stay out of Libyan politics.
The rival plan, dubbed the Libya-Libya deal, has garnered considerable support despite the fact that its actual content is not nearly as politically feasible as the U.N.-backed power-sharing agreement. The U.N. talk participants took into account Libya's complex and extremely fragmented political environment, and their agreement appropriately gives voice to a variety of regional and tribal interests across the country. The Libya-Libya proposal, by contrast, concentrates power in the hands of Tripoli- and Tobruk-based actors. It offers a new representative body that would choose a committee to nominate a prime minister within 15 days, while another committee would conduct a review of the Libyan Constitution. Each government would have equal representation on both committees.
According to Choueib, who was part of negotiations for the U.N.-backed deal, Amish did have a mandate to negotiate, but he stepped far beyond his authority in these parallel talks. Amish and Abdul-Sadiq claim that they have already named their interim president along with two deputy prime ministers. Now they are just trying to garner enough international support to make the Libya-Libya deal a viable competitor, even publishing an article on it in The Hill.
Ultimately, the Libya-Libya deal falls short. Not only the United Nations but also the United States, the European Union and most neighboring states have all rejected it. (Tunisia's president initially made some favorable remarks about it but soon after confirmed his support for the U.N. deal.) The rival agreement oversimplifies Libya's power structure, so much so that many militias and regional groups are sure to reject it outright.
Still, whatever its flaws, the Libya-Libya deal does not have to be feasible to be effective. Its authors have no illusions that the international community will sanction their proposal, much less that it will actually ever go into effect. The deal is nothing more than a carefully crafted political tool to upset the U.N. proposal, something confirmed by the fact that demonstrations in support of the Libya-Libya proposal have largely taken place in the western cities of Tripoli and Misrata. Libya, then, is a country twice divided: Torn between east and the west, it is also caught between those who are willing to work with foreign sponsors and those who fiercely reject outside influence. That deep, enduring fault line in Libyan politics will ensure that negotiations continue, unsuccessfully, for the foreseeable future.
