The ability of the long-ruling Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) to govern virtually unimpeded by political opposition is diminishing rapidly. The Venezuelan legislature will hold its last session of the legislative calendar Dec. 15. So far, the executive branch has not requested an extension to the legislative schedule, suggesting President Nicolas Maduro recognizes his power is dwindling. Previously, Maduro had sought decree powers — which deprive the opposition of the ability to pass laws within the scope of the president's decree — from congress to bolster his ability to govern. But his current decree powers under an enabling law granted in March expire on Dec. 31, and he will have to act before the opposition takes its seats on Jan. 5 if he wants to extend them.
Maduro's failure so far to extend his decree powers resulted from Dec. 6 legislative elections, when Venezuelan voters — including those from districts historically loyal to the PSUV — flipped en masse to the opposition. The opposition coalition Democratic Unity Roundtable accordingly won a 112-member supermajority by about 2 million votes. Given the election's outcome, the Venezuelan elite, including Maduro and outgoing National Assembly Speaker Diosdado Cabello, will struggle to contain the congressional opposition in the coming months.
A unified opposition in the legislature would pose an existential threat to the long-ruling Chavista elite. If all 112 legislators voted in unison, they could secure the removal of Cabinet ministers, overturn presidential vetoes and remove Supreme Court justices. Without the power to keep his allied justices in power, Maduro would have little ability to contain the opposition.
Probably the biggest threat to Maduro is a recall referendum. Starting in mid-2016, the midpoint of his term, voters will be able to recall the president in a referendum, although the National Electoral Council would have to grant its approval first. The extent of the public dissatisfaction with Maduro makes such a referendum a potent threat to his presidency.
In light of the new reality, the PSUV has two main options. It can try to contain the opposition via negotiating legislative solutions to the country's political and economic problems; this would foster increasing political ties between more conciliatory sections of the PSUV and the Democratic Unity Roundtable. But the PSUV might instead choose confrontation to shield the country's elite from being removed from their posts. This option is riskier for the unpopular president because it is more likely to trigger a recall effort. Even so, the PSUV might well choose confrontation despite the risks it entails.
For its part, the opposition might hold off on using the full extent of its new powers against the PSUV, since going full bore would trigger months of political conflict and legislative gridlock, ensuring a chaotic national political scene in 2016 on top of a poor economic outlook. Caracas will face significant strains on its public finances and might even default on its foreign debt in 2016. This would complicate Venezuela's ability to secure financing for its ailing, but still crucial, energy production sector. Consequently, the opposition may opt instead for legal initiatives that would not trigger an immediate political conflict with the PSUV, though such measures — which include an amnesty law initiative announced to free opposition prisoners — would still encounter some PSUV resistance.
But even if the opposition and segments of the PSUV have the political will to make economic adjustments needed to tackle the country's considerable economic woes, Venezuela's problems will deepen next year. The country's deteriorating economy alone could well spark considerable upheaval. Consequently, things in Venezuela will most likely get worse before they get better.
