Iraq's divisive former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, returned to Baghdad on Wednesday after attending a religious conference in Tehran, ending days of speculation over whether the former premier would stay in Iran to avoid possible charges stemming from an ongoing anti-corruption campaign. The charges relate to al-Maliki's responsibility for Baghdad's failure to prevent the fall of Mosul in June 2014 as well as several long-standing accusations of corruption and cronyism.
Numerous protests in areas such as Iraq's oil-rich, predominantly Shiite region of Basra and Baghdad have spurred current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to undertake reforms aimed at easing the strong ethnic and sectarian divisions that the Islamic State's seizure of vast swaths of Iraqi territory have exacerbated. But rumors published by Gulf Arab media outlets have overshadowed al-Maliki's return, focusing instead on the role of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani in encouraging Shiite resistance to al-Maliki's potential trial. The fate of Iraq's former prime minister is largely symbolic, but the editorials and rumors swirling around the region have clearly expressed the Gulf Arab monarchies' fears of Iranian influence in Iraq and Tehran's concerns that al-Abadi could become independent of its assistance. Iran is flexing its muscle in Iraq, allegedly organizing Shiite militias against al-Maliki's trial. As they have so many times before, al-Maliki's woes give Iran an excuse to meddle in Iraqi affairs.
According to a Wednesday report in the Khaleej Times, Soleimani visited Baghdad to organize opposition to al-Abadi's attempts to deliver al-Maliki as a scapegoat to Iraqi protesters. Iranian-backed Shiite militias, religious organizations and politicians voiced their support for the former prime minister, displaying Iran's considerable institutional clout in Baghdad. Despite the sectarian affiliation between Iraqi and Iranian Shiite populations, Iraq's people and politicians will not be content to remain Iran's vassal state.
These sentiments are at the heart of Iranian misgivings over al-Abadi's plan, aimed ostensibly at placating the Iraqi people and stabilizing the political sector. Too much broad support for al-Abadi and his attempts to restructure Iraq's bureaucracies and political patronage networks could enable the prime minister to be somewhat self-reliant. Al-Maliki was beset by a series of scandals and opponents, forcing him to depend on Iran for cash, political connections and influence with al-Maliki's Shiite and Kurdish political opponents. But during al-Maliki's tenure, Iran's primary goal was not necessarily to maintain a lackey prime minister but to prevent a strong, stable Iraq from emerging. Mesopotamia has traditionally served as the main conduit for foreign invasion into the Iranian heartland, and Saddam Hussein's Baathist state proved to be the most serious direct regional threat to Iranian security in its modern history.
Iran's Arab competitors in the Gulf are well aware of this history and Iran's insecurities. By leaking stories such as Soleimani's stymying of reform efforts and his intervention on behalf of the largely unpopular al-Maliki, the Gulf Arabs are appealing to Iraq's sectarian divisions and existing frustrations with the level of Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. If Soleimani did visit Baghdad to organize resistance to al-Maliki's trial, the Iranian action will have confirmed Iraqis' fears. If Iran is demonstrating its leverage over Baghdad through its interventions, the Gulf states will gladly exploit Iraqi misgivings of the process.
Turkey and the Gulf Arabs have long bristled at the extent to which Iran was able to pervade Iraqi institutions after the fall of Saddam. Baghdad remains dependent on Iranian backing, particularly in managing a tumultuous political landscape and in the training and organization of Shiite militias that have become the face of indigenous opposition to the Islamic State. But Iraq's anti-corruption reform drive risks real change, and change creates opportunities — not just for Iraq and Iran but also for other regional players. Syria has long served as the regional battleground for competing Turkish, Iranian and Arab ambitions, and despite the threat of the Islamic State, Iran has been able to count Baghdad in its sphere of influence. Tehran is keen to curtail Sunni Arab and Turkish defiance to its position in Baghdad, but it is using al-Maliki to contain pushback against Iran-supported Iraqis.
