Turkey's future plans for Syria became clearer Tuesday, following weeks of speculation over Ankara's involvement in the civil war waging along its southern border. On Tuesday, the United States and Turkey began talks involving special U.S. presidential representative Gen. John Allen and a host of U.S. and Turkish military and intelligence officials. The two countries have struggled to forge a common strategy in response to the Syrian conflict and a burgeoning jihadist presence perhaps best exemplified by the Islamic State. The United States has long wanted Turkey — a NATO member and arguably the most capable military power in the region — to step up its role against militants, much to Ankara's consternation.
At the meeting Tuesday, Washington and Ankara made progress on several key points, including the United States using Turkey's Incirlik air base in Adana as a staging ground for coalition airstrikes in Syria, and discussions about Turkey's role in combating the Islamic State. But more important, the talks covered Ankara's plan for establishing a "safe zone" inside Syrian territory to support and protect rebel groups that are fighting not only jihadists, but also Syrian government forces. No plans have been finalized, and the U.S. delegation is expected to remain in Turkey through Wednesday night. Still, the talks are one of the strongest signals yet that Ankara may be ready to take on a larger regional role and cooperate more closely with the United States on opposing militant threats such as the Islamic State. Moreover, troop movements indicate that Turkey is serious about at least controlling its border with Syria, disrupting Islamic State supply lines and maintaining an option to move into Syria if needed.
Competing visions and interests in Syria (and the overlapping conflict in Iraq) have thwarted previous attempts at cooperation between Washington and Ankara. They have also driven a wedge between the groups supported by Turkey and those supported by Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. Turkey, as well as Qatar, has maintained a strong position on ousting Syrian leader Bashar al Assad and dismantling much of the Iranian-backed Baathist government, hoping to introduce a pro-Islamist government in its wake. But Ankara's Syrian strategy is at odds with many in the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
Turkey has also struggled with Syrian Kurdish groups emboldened by the Syrian conflict. These groups have strong backing from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from the Sunni Arab states seeking to limit Turkey's regional footprint. Consequently, Ankara adopted a controversial position against the Islamic State aimed at limiting violent retaliatory strikes against Turkish targets. Risk reduction has long been the defining principle of Turkey's Syrian strategy; a necessary extension of domestic political and economic challenges also requiring Ankara's attention.
As the United States and Iran move closer toward an agreement after more than 18 months of nuclear negotiations, Turkey and its erstwhile Sunni Arab allies have found common ground in working to erode Iran's sphere of influence, especially in Syria. A rapprochement between Riyadh and Doha has led to less competition and infighting among northern rebel groups fighting both the Islamic State and al Assad's forces. Saudi Arabia's prioritization of battling Iran over mainstream Islamist groups also has resulted in less friction between Riyadh and Ankara. In recent weeks, rebels have made impressive gains against Syrian government forces, and these victories have encouraged their supporters — including Turkey — to push harder against al Assad and his Iranian backers.
The United States' primary goal is fighting the Islamic State, especially because it does not want to harm its growing relationship with Iran or completely dismantle Syrian state institutions. However, limited gains in the conflict are likely forcing Washington to revisit Turkish proposals it had previously opposed, such as establishing a safe zone — as long as that safe zone focuses on diminishing the Islamic State and does not encroach on the Kurds or enable a chaotic government collapse, as seen in Libya. This threat of mission creep will weigh heavily on U.S. calculations in deciding whether it can afford to back a Turkish move in northern Syria.
Of course, U.S. President Barack Obama reiterated the U.S. position that al Assad must step down, even as news broke that only 60 recruits in the much-touted, U.S.-backed rebel training program were ready for combat, instead of the hundreds initially anticipated. Turkish-, Jordanian-, Saudi- and Qatari-backed rebels, though admittedly without the same vetting processes the United States uses, have fared much better in recent months by comparison. Washington now has to work more closely with regional players, despite differences in medium- to long-term strategies for Syria and the broader Middle East.
Whatever agreements are made during Allen's visit to Turkey, the results are likely to play out slowly over the coming months. Ankara will not abandon the cautiousness that has guided its decision-making, as evidenced by leaks of Turkey's request for U.S. support for any safe zone or other large-scale Turkish military involvement on Syrian soil. Turkey is not ready to shoulder the responsibility alone, especially when it is already in the middle of a difficult government formation process. Moreover, Turkish military action in Syria is extremely unpopular among the Turkish electorate, which believe such a move might result in an escalated jihadist and Kurdish threat. Turkey's Justice and Development Party will be cautious not to alienate supporters.
Turkey will thus seek U.S. backing for initiatives that will run contrary to regional Arab ambitions. And though Ankara and Riyadh have streamlined their support for rebels in the short term and are united by a common goal of defeating al Assad, they have strongly competing visions of Syria's future. Even as Washington has to balance its Syria strategy with its negotiations with Iran, the United States will struggle to facilitate a larger regional role for Turkey and not disappoint Sunni Arab states that have already balked at the premise of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement. Despite these difficulties, however, it appears that at least Turkey is seriously reconsidering what its role will be in the emerging Middle East balance of power, with signs pointing to more action.
