It is easy to look at the fight in Yemen as yet another sectarian proxy battle in the region. Saudi Arabia is fighting Iran-backed rebels and Iranian warships are seemingly facing off against the Saudi navy, which is blockading Yemen's ports. And with the number of security incidents picking up inside the Saudi kingdom, many are questioning whether a more assertive Saudi role in the region could end up bringing more trouble, potentially affecting Saudi Arabia's mostly Shiite oil-rich Eastern Province. A more careful look at Iranian capabilities, however, may reveal a less alarming picture.
First, the framing of the conflict as a sectarian one is a bit of an exaggeration. Yemen has long been fighting with itself. Factions such as the Houthis have taken advantage of a power struggle in Sanaa. Al Qaeda, southern separatists and various tribal factions, meanwhile, are playing various sides. Even Yemen's southern separatists have admitted to receiving Iranian financial support and military training in summer 2013. By framing the war in Yemen as a battle against an Iranian bid for regional hegemony, Riyadh can play on emotions to galvanize a Sunni coalition to fight back.
Iran has played an unclear but minor role in supplying Houthi rebels in Yemen, but with a Saudi-led blockade now in effect, that becomes much more difficult. Iran is also trying to flex its muscles by making a media splash out of the routine rotation of a naval group to the Gulf of Aden. But Iran is not about to enter a losing naval battle with Saudi and Egyptian naval forces in the Bab el-Mandeb strait. While Riyadh projects power from the Arabian Peninsula, it is simply too much of a reach for the small Iranian navy deployment operating far outside the umbrella of Iranian air cover.
Second, Iran's reach into the Saudi kingdom is also minimal. A gunbattle in the eastern Saudi city of al-Awamiya on April 5 that ended with one Saudi policeman dead and three others wounded raised alarm that Iran could be stirring the embers of unrest. Sporadic attacks, usually involving small groups of gunmen ambushing security checkpoints, have occurred in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province over the past couple of years. But we have not seen any enhancement of the capabilities and organization of Shiite activists challenging Saudi authorities. As evidenced by the police raid and the militants' continued reliance on light arms, Saudi Arabia has kept a close watch on Eastern Province for good reason. Moreover, Riyadh appears to have been quite successful in preventing outside material support from reaching rebels in the interior.
At most, Iran is able to encourage Shiite militant activity, primarily through religious conduits in Beirut and Bahrain who go between Iranian intelligence and Saudi Shiite community leaders. As much as Iran would like to build up a fifth column in the Saudi kingdom, Saudi Arabia still appears capable of containing low-level unrest in the east to protect its oil wealth.
To be sure, a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement will help rehabilitate Iran's economy, enabling Tehran to project influence in the region. Consequently, Sunni powers are ramping up efforts to curb Iran's ambitions. But Iran's recovery should not be mistaken for a rapid expansion of power. Iran's power began peaking with the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and declined again when the civil war in Syria gained momentum. Tehran is now struggling to sustain its allies in Baghdad and Damascus. With Turkey and Saudi Arabia striving to fill a void left by the United States, Iran will try to preserve its gains rather than opening new fronts.
