Three days after the assassination of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, there is still no indication of who was behind the seemingly professional hit. Regardless of who is blamed and who is actually culpable, Russia's opposition is still too weak to effectively challenge President Vladimir Putin. With more economic volatility to come, Putin will continue to rely on a divide-and-conquer strategy to keep a tight grip on his opposition.
The periodic rise and fall of political dissidence is a Russian tradition, though the factions opposing Putin have been roughly the same since he came to power. Most of the political opposition groups are divided by ideology and personalities, although when these groups put their differences aside to unite against the Kremlin, as they did in 2011-2012 when Putin returned to the presidency for a third term, the Russian government is compelled to react.
The first type of opposition is political parties with stakes in the government. The Communist and Liberal Democratic parties are the most prevalent. Both parties have been political forces for decades; the Communist Party is the successor to the Soviet Communist Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party was formed in 1991. Both parties made large gains in the 2011 legislative election against Putin's United Russia party. However, during the Putin era both parties have switched periodically between demonstrating against Putin and working with him.
The second type of opposition has evolved into a general anti-Putin protest movement focused on various causes (anti-corruption, protecting the environment, anti-Muslim, etc.). The most prominent faces of the protest movement have been Alexei Navalny, Boris Akunin and Kseniya Sobchak. Navalny has gained prominence in recent years, but he has been involved in the Russian political and opposition system for more than a decade. Akunin has been a political novelist for more than a decade, and Sobchak's influence stems from her father having been Putin's mentor.
Nemtsov was one of several opposition figures who had a long history in the Russian government. He rose through the political ranks in the 1990s, eventually becoming deputy prime minister during Boris Yeltsin's rule. Mikhail Kasyanov, who heads the People's Democratic Union, was finance minister under Yeltsin and prime minister under Putin. Vladimir Ryzhkov, who heads the Republican Party of Russia, was first deputy chairman of the Duma under Yeltsin. Most of these opposition leaders are connected to Yeltsin's policies, particularly the economic decisions that were responsible for the rise of the oligarchs and the Russian financial crash.
Thus, nearly all of the opposition movements and leaders are entrenched in the system. It is not easy for a leader to rise in Russia. Additionally, no opposition leader currently appeals to the wider Russian population. But when the differing groups come together, as seen in the 2011-2012 protests against the Kremlin, there is real cause for concern within the Russian elite.
That is what makes the demonstration on Sunday an important case study. Originally, Navalny had planned a mass protest against the Kremlin for Russia's actions in Ukraine, the declining economy and corruption in the government. Navalny planned to unite many of the various opposition groups across the country and said the demonstration would draw more than 100,000 people. On the Friday night before the protest, Nemtsov was assassinated, and protest organizers (including Nemtsov's group) changed the protest to a rally to mourn the opposition leader. This led to wide speculation that the gathering could gain more support than initially expected.
However, turnout at Sunday's rally was between 21,000 and 50,000 demonstrators. There was no widespread outrage against the Kremlin or in defense of Nemtsov. This is a reflection of Putin's fairly solid position. Putin has implemented a system in which the opposition remains on the sidelines and also plays by his rules. For nearly a decade, opposition groups have applied to the Russian government for permits for most of the large demonstrations. They have been told where to march and how many people can gather. The last notable breach in protocol was in 2007, when security forces cracked down on the Dissenters' March, which united all the aforementioned movements and parties.
This does not mean the Kremlin disregards dissent. Russia is undergoing a series of serious challenges leading the Kremlin to question whether dissent eventually could come from within the Kremlin itself.
Putin's popularity rose on a pledge to the Russian people and elites that he would keep Russia financially and economically stable, unlike his predecessor. Yet the Russian economy is entering its second recession in six years. The Russian people can withstand a great deal of economic pain, but not forever.
Moreover, the Russian government's confidence was shaken after its neighbor, Ukraine, underwent a series of protests that eventually toppled the government. Not only did Russia fail to predict such events, it also failed to maintain its influence in the country and in Kiev. In addition, the West has shown its intent to keep pressure on Moscow through security deals in the region and sanctions on Russia.
While the Kremlin strives to maintain control within Russia, even over the opposition, it has been more focused on alleviating other pressures. A few signs of relief have emerged: Russia and Ukraine have reached a fragile cease-fire agreement that is holding for now, and some Europeans are breaking rank to start business with Russia again. One early sign was Germany's RWE moving ahead with a deal to sell Kremlin oligarch Mikhail Fridman energy assets. Next, Moscow will be watching a series of meetings in Europe on whether to extend the sanctions against Russia. While these signs remain small, Putin is attempting to mend ties with the West while keeping a strong hand at home to keep dissent in check.
