Ben Sheen: Hello and thank you for joining us. My name is Ben Sheen. I'm a managing editor here at Stratfor, and I'm joined by Vice President of Tactical Analysis Scott Stewart. Today, we will be talking a little bit about the current situation in Yemen. Scott, we've seen some relative stabilization recently, but actually for the country itself, unity is kind of a new concept, isn't it?
Scott Stewart: Yes. To really understand what's going on in Yemen today and the morass that we find there and the number of players, we really need to look at that history. The construct of Yemen as we see it on the map today as one unified country is really something that didn't exist prior to 1990. Even in the years since 1990, the country has been racked by a civil war, both in the south with the southern secessionists, with the al-Houthis in the north, and of course, the tribal-types in the hinterlands. Really, Yemen's always been divided, and the hope of keeping it together as a unified entity is very difficult
Ben: To what extent do you think external players have had an influence on Yemen, both from countries like Iran but also the interests that countries like the United States have shown in terms of controlling the situation so Yemen doesn’t become a haven for terrorist or jihadist groups?
Scott: Certainly, external groups have always played an important role the divisions in Yemen. We had the south of Yemen as a British protectorate from the 1800s, and certainly, during the Yemeni Civil War in the 1960s, we saw Jordanians and the Saudis backing the royalists while we had the Egyptians fighting with the Nasserites. These foreign influences have always been there, and that really hasn’t changed today. We see, obviously, the Americans, the United Nations and the Europeans wanting to try to stabilize Yemen so that it can really kind of defend itself and protect against this al Qaeda threat in the hinterlands, but at the same time, you have this al-Houthi movement that has received some nominal support from the Iranians, and we have tribal-types in places like Marib and Hadramawt actually receiving support from the Saudis, so there really is quite a bit of external influence and meddling going on there still today.
Ben: At the moment, the al-Houthis are in quite a dominant position. They've been strong in Sanaa for months, since really taking power in the capital city. From Jan. 19, we started to see a real ramping up of tensions in the capital. They surrounded the presidential palace and now they’ve actually effectively overthrown the government there. What do you think of their long-term aims and objectives? What do they want from this?
Scott: The al-Houthis were never really happy with the proposed constitution and the way that it limited their part of Yemen. Basically, they wanted a bigger piece of the pie, and in many ways, what they want to do is kind of replicate the areas they controlled prior to the 1962 revolution. What we have is the Zaidis kind of reconstituting that Zaidi core that was their kingdom up until 1962. One of those important things, by the way, that we are looking at right now, the province or governorate of Marib. Marib was always part of the north, and Marib is important not necessarily just because of the history, but more importantly because of the energy assets there. So the al-Houthis would very much like to take the energy fields in Marib because they’ve already taken the Ras Isa export terminal and the other export terminals on the coast of the Red Sea, so if they can get these energy fields, that allows them to consolidate and control over at least that portion of the energy infrastructure, and of course, the income that comes along with that.
Ben: Absolutely, and they're in such a dominant position at the moment. Do you think they're actually interested in having a power sharing agreement within the country? What's to stop them from just completely taking control and running the country as they would wish to?
Scott: I think it’s the divisions and the base. It's going to be very difficult for them to get much popular support in the south and of course in Hadramawt and the other places that were always part of the tribal lands under the British protectorate. It's going to be very, very difficult for them to establish control there without a very, very firm iron fist-type approach, and that's going to take a lot of resources. Even if they control at least a portion of Yemen's oil assets, they're really not going to have the wherewithal or the resources to be able to devote the forces required to keep that iron heel down on the south and on the tribal-types.
Ben: Certainly, and this is going to be an area we are going to continue to track closely because it's still very volatile on the ground, and a lot of things could happen, to be honest. Scott, thank you so much for taking the time to explain this to us today. For more information on Yemen and the surrounding area, please continue to read Stratfor.com.
