The two hostages, Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa, have been in Islamic State hands for several months — since October and August, respectively. Both were picked up in Syria not because they were Japanese but simply because they were easy targets. The Islamic State held both of them in custody until now, using Abe's tour — and his statements supporting coalition efforts against the group — as an opportunity to up the stakes for Tokyo.
Although Japan is not militarily involved in the U.S.-led coalition carrying out airstrikes in Iraq and Syria against Islamic State militants, Abe's pledge of $200 million would provide personnel, infrastructure and refugee support for affected states, easing the burden of the conflict. The United States' decision to tap a key ally such as Japan — alongside the U.S. decision to rely on a military coalition in Iraq and Syria — reflects the shift in strategy away from unilateral action. After a decade and a half of war in the Greater Middle East, the United States wants to enforce its interests there through trusted partners.
A Non-Polar World
The change in U.S. policy in the Middle East reflects the broader international shift toward a non-polar world — one in which nations can no longer rely on powerful patrons for support. Countries that have traditionally relied on outside help face an era of dealing with new challenges themselves, or remaining neutral in the hope of local intervention — a dangerous strategy. Increasingly, regional and local issues require direct action by more and more countries. China faces this dilemma in Afghanistan, Iraq, across Africa and potentially in Central Asia. Japan must also consider its level of involvement in Southeast Asia and, now, the Middle East. For Tokyo, the risk of a hazardous new world is particularly acute because of its sole reliance on economic and political levers.
In the 70 years following the end of World War II, Japan has cleaved to a pacifist foreign policy — a stance that it has slowly begun to shift in the past decade. Tokyo has long influenced the world using diplomatic tools and its substantial economic clout. Japan's adjustment of its foreign policy, referred to as "re-normalization," would see the country slowly add military options to its toolkit. Abe throwing Japan's weight behind the battle against the Islamic State, and his efforts to increase ties with key regional nations, is part of this broader shift.
Japan's move toward re-normalization as an international player began at the end of the 1980s, when the Cold War strategic structure collapsed and factors began to undermine the longstanding U.S.-Japanese economic relationship. Tokyo came to understand that it could no longer rely on the United States to always handle Japan's core — or even subsidiary — strategic interests. In 1996, a watershed moment came when Peruvian leftist militants captured hundreds of high-level Japanese officials, businesspeople and military leaders at the ambassador's residence in Lima. The United States had little incentive to help and the Japanese had no tools to intervene on their own. In the end they relied on Peru's government — and then-President Alberto Fujimori, of Japanese ancestry — to resolve the situation. In the following decade, the increasing missile and submarine threat from North Korea as well as the rise of China reinforced the need for Japan to re-normalize its military.
Re-Normalization in the Middle East
Cautious involvement in Western efforts in the Middle East has been part of this effort. In 2004, Tokyo deployed the battalion-sized Japan Self-Defense Forces Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group to southern Iraq. This group pulled out in 2006. In 2010, Japan announced that it would establish a $40 million naval base in Djibouti along the Gulf of Aden to combat regional piracy, its first foreign military base since World War II. Abe's recent $2.5 billion pledge for regional aid to the Middle East adds to the $2.2 billion pledged by Japan two years ago.
Japanese presence in the Middle East has already led to several hostage situations, though none as high profile or dire as the present one. Iraqi Saraya al-Mujahideen militants took three Japanese volunteers hostage in 2004, demanding the pullout of Japanese forces. The hostages were released after negotiations and Japan's troops remained, though much of the rest of Japan's deployment was spent trying to curry favor with tribal leaders in order protect its troops. In 2007, militants captured and later released a Japanese student in southwest Iran. Most recently, in 2013, 10 Japanese workers died during the Ain Amenas hostage crisis in Algeria. None of these situations specifically targeted Japanese nationals — most were opportunistic captures — but these situations test Japan's desire to create stronger international ties.
Japan is not going to resort to bombing Syria or sending troops to assist against the Islamic State. However, it is also unlikely that Tokyo will pay the exorbitant ransom. Abe has already said he will not back down on his $200 million pledge of support. For the moment, he has simply cut his tour short and appealed for help during the crisis from the United Kingdom, NATO, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. Regardless of Tokyo's choice on how to resolve the immediate crisis, the Islamic State kidnapping will condition how Japan proceeds with re-normalization and the gradual building out of its long-defunct military tool in foreign policy, especially with regard to the Middle East.
