The Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics are byproducts of the crisis in Ukraine that began in November 2013. The decision by then-President Viktor Yanukovich to cancel a planned free trade and association agreement with the European Union spurred large-scale demonstrations, which eventually culminated in Yanukovich's February ouster and his replacement by a pro-Western government. This upheaval dramatically reversed Russia's position in Ukraine. Moscow responded by annexing Crimea and supporting pro-Russian separatist demonstrations throughout eastern and southern Ukraine.

These demonstrations were strongest in the easternmost provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, which after Crimea traditionally have been the most pro-Russian parts of Ukraine. Not unlike the pro-Western Euromaidan movement in Kiev, pro-Russian demonstrators stormed and occupied regional administrative and security buildings on the grounds that the new government in Kiev was illegitimate. Eventually, armed militants — many with direct ties to Russia — joined the demonstrations. The movement culminated in the announcement by activists of the formation of new People's Republics in Donetsk and Luhansk. Both regions held referendums in May on formally separating from the Ukrainian state and establishing self-rule. The results released showed that 89 percent of residents were in favor, although independent observers never verified this number. Following the referendum, pro-Russian leaders formally established the People's Republics.

Kiev did not recognize the legitimacy of these separatist republics and in June launched military operations to take the regions. What ensued has been more than five months of continual conflict between Ukrainian security forces and Russian-backed separatists. The Ukrainian government, however, has not managed to subdue large parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, largely because of weapons and personnel flows from Russia. This failure compelled Ukraine to sign a cease-fire with the separatists and agree to certain "special status" measures for the territories outside its control. The two sides nonetheless remain at odds. Early presidential polls and recent parliamentary elections show that the conflict has moved the Ukrainian government closer to the West while pushing the separatists further from Kiev and closer to Moscow. Thus the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics announced they would not take part in Ukraine's Oct. 26 parliamentary elections and instead would hold their own polls Nov. 2.

Recent reports have shown a significant uptick of Russian military activity in and around Donetsk as well. A column of BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems and associated logistical support vehicles was observed moving into Donetsk. This is in addition to confirmed sightings of Russian armored fighting vehicles, including tanks, moving along roads between the Russian border and Donetsk. Openly marked Russian vehicles have been confirmed in Donetsk proper. Infantry reinforcements are also known to have moved into the area, including alleged airborne elements from a parachute regiment and, reportedly, a Spetsnaz unit.

There have also been unconfirmed accounts of heavier BM-27 Uragan surface-to-surface missile systems moving into the area, alongside more advanced Russian surface-to-air missile systems. Any air defense systems would be in addition to the existing SA-11 Buk launchers that the separatists are known to possess. Most tellingly, unconfirmed but persistent rumors assert that over the last 24 hours separatist forces at Donetsk airport were placed under Russian command and control. This tracks with an Oct. 30 report stating that two separatist battalions were merged into one. Having a professional third-party command structure would go some way to obviating the inevitable friction that ensues when mutually exclusive chains-of-command are combined. 

Politics of the Separatist Republics

The elections in Donetsk and Luhansk will determine both the new heads of government and new members of parliament for each republic. Although ballots will present voters with several different candidates, the outcome of the elections for the top positions has largely been predetermined. One Russian-backed faction has prevailed over the other Russian-backed groups in a struggle closely tied to debates in Moscow, as well as in the Donbas region itself, where various factions are advocating for a different policy toward Ukraine.

In the Donetsk People's Republic, incumbent Prime Minister Aleksandr Zakharchenko is running for the post of the head of the republic. Zakharchenko is a native of Donetsk and former head of Oplot, the armed separatist group now leading the efforts to take control of the Donetsk airport. While Zakharchenko continues to employ combative rhetoric when discussing the future of the Donbas region, he has been largely supportive of the Minsk agreements for a cease-fire with Kiev and has not advocated for expanding separatists' control into other cities in the near future.

Zakharchenko belongs to a faction that gained prominence after a Ukrainian offensive over the summer put separatist forces on the defensive. This led to a change in strategy for the militants. Pro-Russian forces under the leadership of Igor Strelkov retreated from the separatist stronghold of Sloviansk in early July under pressure from Ukrainian troops who had his forces mostly surrounded. This resulted in an intensification of the divisions between factions in Donbas itself and in Moscow over the future direction of the Russian-supported separatist movement. Since the beginning of the conflict, a faction in Moscow generally supported Strelkov, Donetsk People's Republic's then-Prime Minister Alexander Borodai and local leaders such as the self-declared People's Gov. Pavel Gubarev. This Russian faction has a diverse array of members, including nationalist businessman Konstantin Malofeev and far-right philosopher Aleksandr Dugin. But this faction is only one among many. Others in Moscow and the Donbas region criticized Strelkov's methods and Russia's strategy in the region throughout the first half of the summer.

As a result, in early August a faction that had played a key role in separatist politics since the spring began to be sidelined. Borodai resigned as prime minister on Aug. 7, and Strelkov resigned from his position as the military leader of the Donetsk People's Republic Aug. 14. The same day, the head of the Luhansk People's Republic, Valery Bolotov, also resigned. A little over two weeks later, the new leaderships of both republics agreed to a cease-fire with Kiev.

Some separatist leaders with ties to Strelkov stayed involved in Donbas politics and Borodai remained an adviser to the new leadership. Their faction, however, continued to be both formally and informally marginalized. Pavel Gubarev's political movement, Novorossiya, was denied registration for the Donetsk People's Republic elections on Oct. 12. The same day, Gubarev — who had been planning to run for the position of head of the republic — was injured in a car accident and transferred to a hospital in Russia.

Zakharchenko replaced Borodai in August. Now that Gubarev is not running for office, Zakharchenko faces two lesser-known opponents with no power base of their own, meaning that he is likely to win. Similarly, the current head of the Luhansk People's Republic, Igor Plotnitsky, will likely return to his post after the elections. Both will continue to receive material and political support from Moscow, as can be seen by the fact that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced Oct. 28 that Moscow will recognize the elections despite opposition from both Kiev and the West, which consider the elections to be a violation of the Minsk agreements.

The New Frozen Conflict on the Russian Periphery

The previous leadership of both the Donetsk and Luhansk republics focused on supporting — and at times, leading — the Russian-backed armed groups fighting Kiev's forces in the region. The new leadership, however, is largely focused on defending its current territories and building the political, economic and security institutions of the self-declared republics. It is in this context that current and future negotiations with Kiev and the West will take place.

In a broader sense, the emergence of the separatist republics follows paths similar to those taken by other breakaway territories throughout the former Soviet Union. The breakup of the Soviet Union produced conflicts between some of the newfound independent republics and territories within their borders that did not wish to be part of the new state. This was the case for Moldova's Transdniestria region and Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, which all supported closer orientation to Moscow than to their host countries. Russia backed all of these territories in their conflicts to break away and, though they are not recognized by most of the international community, Moscow's military and financial support continues to fuel their existence.

The tension in Ukraine appears to be settling in to becoming yet another long-term "frozen conflict," with the breakaway territories established in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk outside Kiev's control and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. It is no coincidence that the former Soviet countries that seek to establish closer ties with the West — Georgia, Moldova and now Ukraine — are the very countries whose breakaway republics seek to undermine this cause. The upcoming separatist elections in Donetsk and Luhansk represent merely the latest iteration of the new reality in Ukraine, and in the evolving competition between Russia and the West over the former Soviet periphery.

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