Results continue to trickle in from Ukraine's parliamentary elections, which were held Monday, but it is clear that the next Ukrainian government will be overwhelmingly pro-Western. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's eponymous bloc and Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk's Popular Front are set to gain the most votes, with around 21 percent each. The two are likely to form a coalition that could include other Western-oriented parties such as Samopomich and Fatherland. The only Russian-oriented party to win more than five percent of the vote was the Opposition Bloc, which is projected to take around 40 or 50 seats in the 450-seat parliament.
On the surface, the election appears to be a tremendous defeat for Russia, which at the beginning of the year held significant influence over Moscow-oriented former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, who in turn had a pro-Russian majority in parliament consisting of his Party of Regions and the Communist Party. Now, most lawmakers have left the Party of Regions for other parties, while the Communists failed to win enough votes to make it into parliament. Yet despite the overwhelming victory of pro-EU parties, Russia will still retain significant leverage over the next government in Kiev.
First, it must be noted that being oriented toward the European Union and actually joining the bloc are two very different things. The European Union's new enlargement commissioner recently said the bloc will not admit new members for the next five years. Poroshenko himself has said Ukraine will not apply for membership until 2020. Actual EU membership for Ukraine is not even on the agenda for the new parliament.
Furthermore, less ambitious forms of integration can be problematic as well. Implementation of Ukraine's free trade agreement with the European Union has already been delayed until the beginning of 2016, a move largely seen as a concession to Russia. So for at least the next year, Ukraine's actual ties with the European Union are not likely to change much. In other words, the new Ukrainian government will be officially oriented toward the Western bloc, but in practice, meaningful efforts to integrate with the union are unlikely to materialize in the short term.
Still, this does not mean Russia will be satisfied with Ukraine's new government. A Western-oriented Ukraine poses a fundamental threat to Moscow's strategic interests. Russia could respond to its loss of influence in Kiev with a major move, such as military action or energy cutoffs to European countries. Both moves would carry significant risks, however, and with low oil prices and a weak economy, such risks may prove too dangerous for Russia. On the other hand, there are several areas in which Russia can exercise broader leverage over Ukraine that could serve as a check to Kiev's Western orientation over the longer term.
The most obvious source of leverage is the ongoing separatist rebellion in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. The rebel-controlled parts of these provinces did not participate in Monday's polls and will instead hold their own local elections this weekend — votes Kiev has said it will not recognize. These heavily populated areas, which include the major urban centers of Donetsk and Luhansk, have traditionally been some of the most economically productive in the country. Supported by weapons and personnel from Russia, the separatists will thus continue to undermine Kiev's authority and pose security and political threats to any pro-Western government in Ukraine. The Kremlin could use its influence in these territories to selectively increase pressure on Kiev by ramping up localized fighting.
The Russians can also continue to draw leverage from their energy exports. Moscow cut off Kiev's supply of natural gas in June in a move considered to be one of the byproducts of the political standoff between the two countries. An agreement to supply Ukraine through the winter and avoid a major crisis for the rest of Europe is likely to be signed in the near future, but it will be temporary. A prolonged dispute over natural gas will allow Moscow to retain considerable influence over Kiev's foreign policy, at least until Ukraine is able to significantly diversify its suppliers and rely less on Russia, something that is not likely in the near-to-medium term.
The economy will also be a major challenge for the new government. Ukraine's economy will probably contract at least 7-8 percent this year, largely because of instability related to the crisis. Most of Ukraine's coal, steel and other mineral resources are concentrated in the eastern conflict zones. To keep its economy afloat, Ukraine will need to rely on financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union, potentially requiring $15 billion to $20 billion in 2015 alone. In the event of trade restrictions and additional energy supply manipulation, Ukraine may be forced to seek reconciliation with Russia in at least some areas to lessen some of the economic pressure exerted by Moscow.
Next, there are Ukraine's own internal issues and inherent political divisions. The Euromaidan movement that unseated Yanukovich has heightened public expectation for reforms and opposition to what Ukrainians perceive as government corruption. A few scandals or controversial issues, such as the handling of the crisis in the east or the implementation of IMF-mandated austerity measures, could easily get large amounts of people back on the streets, forcing politicians to either side with the crowds or with their fellow leaders.
Finally, Ukraine's semi-presidential system can lead to conflict over the details of power-sharing and clashes over certain decisions, especially when the president and prime minister are not from the same faction or party. Given the strong performance of Yatsenyuk's Popular Front in Monday's elections, there is a risk that he and Poroshenko could get locked into a president-prime minister rivalry, creating volatility within Ukraine's government. Indeed, this is what happened following the Orange Revolution, when a rivalry between former President Viktor Yushchenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko undermined Ukraine's pro-Western drive, ultimately serving in Russia's favor. Ukraine's bureaucracy is currently a mess, and infighting over power and limited resources is likely to occur, especially within a new coalition that is expected to be formed out of several distinct parties that are likely to control different ministries.
Therefore, it may well be in Moscow's interest not to make a big move in response to the elections in Ukraine. Rather, Moscow can count on its broader levers, combined with Ukraine's inherently fractious political system, to serve as a check to Kiev's long-term EU integration aspirations.
