Editor's Note: The following is an internal Stratfor document produced to provide high-level guidance regarding the state of North Korea's leadership. This document is not a forecast but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions for areas of focus.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is one of the most closed countries on earth, yet it is also one of the most watched. The absence of ruler Kim Jong Un from public appearances for over a month has fueled speculation about the state of North Korea's leadership. Adding to the supposition are comments made by exiled former members of Pyongyang's political bureau, including senior counterintelligence personnel, alleging that North Korea is managing an internal battle for power.
The problem with this speculation, however, is that no one outside Pyongyang's elite knows the full story. All that the government has said about Kim's status is that he is suffering from "discomfort." Kim has not made any public appearances since Sept. 3, and most notably, he failed to attend the most recent Supreme People's Assembly. At the very least, footage of an overweight Kim struggling with a limp suggests the man is in poor health — reportedly suffering from gout and obesity — but it does not entirely explain his continued absence.
When considering Kim's health and well-being, it is important to remember that he had little formal preparation before ascending to power in 2011. He is relatively young and certainly inexperienced, at least in comparison to his father, who worked side by side with Kim Il Sung for years before assuming the top leadership role. Since taking power, Kim has been subjected to a punishing schedule. A relentless itinerary of official meetings, briefings and governing committees comes alongside the numerous public appearances he is expected to make every week. From parades, sporting events and public galas to school visits and inspections of factories, facilities, military units and government offices, Kim's public duties are varied and taxing.
While Kim may feel the mental and physical strain of being the supreme leader, he does not share the burden of absolute authority alone. That responsibility is shared officially between the premier of the Cabinet, the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and the chairman of the National Defense Commission and unofficially among numerous individuals and interest groups constantly jousting for influence and access to money, resources and privilege.
Recent reports suggest that with Kim temporarily indisposed, the responsibilities of leadership have fallen on his younger half sister, Kim Yo Jong. This would not necessarily be an odd development for North Korea. At times when Kim Jong Il was in poor health, he relied on family members, including his brother-in-law Jang Song Thaek, to be his trusted go-between with the rest of the government. Kim Yo Jong is not untested — she served in various official positions under Kim Jong Il, is well educated and reportedly traveled abroad with Kim Jong Il on at least one of his visits to Russia. Working through a trusted family member fits well with the pattern of North Korean leadership and emphasizes the closed circle at the center of power.
Regardless of who is currently running the country, one thing is clear: Under Kim Jong Un's tenure, North Korea's power structure has been a system based on struggle, with constant ebbs and flows. Since he took over, hundreds of military and administrative officials have been replaced, including three army chiefs who were removed over a period of just 15 months, culminating in the December 2013 execution of his uncle Jang Song Thaek. In North Korea, the true bearer of power is the individual who balances competing factions most effectively. This fact explains how the Kim family has remained so prominent throughout North Korea's recent history.
What to Watch For
When analyzing the hierarchy of North Korea's power structure, it is important to watch for any deviation in behavior or policy. So far, few abnormalities have been seen that suggest the internal balance has been disturbed. If anything, business continues as usual, albeit without the daily public tours by Kim Jong Un. The state's mechanisms have continued to run. There have been no sudden announcements, no outlandish political statements — at least, no more outlandish than usual for North Korea — and no outward indications that a transition of power has taken place.
On short notice, Pyongyang dispatched three senior officials to attend the Oct. 5 closing ceremonies of the Asian Games in the South Korean port city of Incheon. This appears to be an evolution of the progress toward reconciliation made by both countries during talks that took place in February. That South Korea's Unification Ministry announced the possibility of further talks within the next month indicates that both Koreas could be serious about building a more harmonious relationship, something that is easier said than done. Pyongyang and Seoul have incentives to reconcile, though. The South seeks the reunification of separated families, and the North wants crippling sanctions to be lifted. An agreement could lead to a temporary easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. If there is an internal power struggle, it is unlikely that such a high-level visit would have taken place amid dissent and internal conflict. Even the brief Oct. 7 maritime firefight between the two Koreas quickly de-escalated, showing a desire for cooperation instead of conflict.
In addition to affecting relations with South Korea, any leadership rift in North Korea would reveal itself in the North's relations with Japan. Pyongyang has attempted to thaw its frosty relations with Tokyo in hopes of courting a benefactor other than its traditional ally of Beijing. Warmer relations are also meant to keep South Korea off balance and eager to pursue its own dialogue and offers of assistance to the North. In the period of Kim Jong Un's absence, no major deviation has been seen in North Korean and Japanese relations.
Relations with China are just as telling. Not only has Beijing continued its track record of cooperation, there has even been talk of inviting Kim Jong Un for an official state visit. Although that visit remains unconfirmed, it serves as a good indicator of relations, which have been somewhat strained in recent months. Nonetheless, proposed joint economic venture agreements, particularly the Rason, Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa islands, the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang special economic zones, appear to be moving forward. These economic zones are particularly attractive to North Korea because they enable Pyongyang to access technology and cash while minimizing the country's exposure to foreign influence.
Moving forward, it is important to closely monitor the North Korean regime's actions to determine if there is a deeper struggle taking place in Pyongyang. Will the military shift its training cycle or carry out significant movements of troops in and around the capital? Will there be a sudden spike in defections, particularly by higher-level officials? Will North Korea once again shut out foreign tourists, increase restrictions on foreign media and clamp down on foreign diplomats? Will China begin to take a very different approach to North Korea, increasing security forces along the border or significantly increasing the number of officials sent to Pyongyang? These shifts in behavior will provide greater insight into North Korea's internal power struggle than the rumor mill can.
Of course, keeping up with the rumors is important. Sometimes they offer glimpses into North Korea and into the ideas and intent of those who spread them. But they must also be assessed cautiously. There are plenty of reasons to spread misinformation and disinformation, and the North Koreans themselves have become very adept at shaping international perception through the manipulation of rumors. Therefore, it is important to stay focused on the real indicators when examining North Korea's recent courses of action.
