The battle for the Benina air base intensified Oct. 2 as Islamist militants launched a series of suicide attacks against the installation. The air base is the last stronghold held by the forces of Libyan Col. Wanis Bukhamada, who is loyal to rogue retired Gen. Khalifa Hifter and supports Hifter's Operation Dignity. A coalition of Islamist forces — the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council, the Libya Shield brigade and Ansar al-Shariah — claimed responsibility for the attacks, which reportedly involved four suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices that killed more than 40 of Hifter's fighters and injured dozens more.
The Islamist coalition had turned its attention to Benina after ousting Operation Dignity forces from most of their positions in Benghazi, forcing them to retreat to the air base. Seizing the air base would mark a substantial victory for the Islamist forces because it would not only clear Benghazi from any proximate threat, but it could also provide substantial spoils given the large amount of heavy weaponry housed at the base.
The battle raging in Benghazi is only one part of the larger struggle for dominance among many actors and coalitions across the country. Islamist militias in Benghazi, for instance, have nominally sided with the Libya Dawn alliance, which is largely spearheaded by Misrata-backed fighters, but the relationship is more an alliance of convenience than one born of a seamless agreement on the shape of Libya's future. The geographic distribution of the country's tribal and ethnic groups, combined with the fact that Libya does not have a long history of being a cohesive territorial entity, has magnified pre-existing tribal and ethnic divisions in the aftermath of the country's civil war.
The absence of the rule of law in Libya has also precipitated a spate of tribal infighting, as Warshefana and Zawiyan forces continue to clash in Tripoli on the sidelines of the larger conflict between Misratan and Zintan fighters from the Nafusa Mountains. Over the last few days, fighting has also intensified in Libya's arid south, with the Kadhadfa and Awlad Suleiman tribes battling in Sabha. The Islamist militias in Benghazi are, themselves, divided to some extent because they do not all uphold the same ideology or goals, though they are likely to remain united in the short term as they attempt to drive back Hifter's forces and allies.
Continuing Stalemate
None of the country's armed groups are even close to being able to extend their writ across the majority of the country, let alone all of Libya. Some factions such as the Misratan fighters and the Operation Dawn movement have, for the most part, successfully solidified their bases in northwestern Libya, but even they remain heavily constrained within the capital and its outskirts. Other forces, including those that support Hifter, are increasingly under pressure. Though Hifter and his allied forces nominally command the skies over Libya, the meager remnants of the Libyan air force are withering away as accidents and losses lead to further deterioration.
Within the sea of warring groups and factions, the Libyan Majlis al-Nuwaab, or House of Representatives, has sought refuge in the port city of Tobruk's Dar al-Salam seaside resort in eastern Libya. The House of Representatives' original plan to relocate to Benghazi from Tripoli had to be modified as Islamist militias increasingly consolidated their control over the northeastern city. Hifter has declared his support for the parliament, but significant concerns remain over his ability to protect the group as Islamist forces continue to launch offensives against his remaining forces in Benghazi and on the road to Tobruk, near Derna.
With Hifter's forces under considerable pressure, it is not clear how much can be done by international actors, such as Egypt and its Gulf allies, to shift the tide in the retired general's favor. Egypt has offered military training to pro-government forces in response to the growing Islamist militant threat, but as Stratfor has noted before, countries with an interest in intervening in Libya's ongoing conflict have few good options to do so. It is therefore unlikely that any of Libya's neighbors will deploy the resources and forces that would be needed to displace Misratan fighters in Tripoli and stabilize the country.
