Anarchist cells under various names have claimed most of the more than 200 improvised explosive devices that have been planted around banks and state and religious buildings in Santiago since 2005. Of those, at least 133 have detonated, but most were small and inflicted few casualties. That changed Sept. 8, when an IED exploded at a metro station in the capital and injured 14 commuters.
Chile has experienced more IED attacks so far this year (at least 30) than in any other year in the past decade. As a result of those attacks, more people have been injured in 2014 than in any year in the past 20 years. It is clear that the campaign of anarchist violence in Chile is escalating.
The Growth of Chilean Anarchism
Before the Sept. 8 metro bombing, the Lautaro faction of the Marxist-Leninist radical cell known as the Popular Unitary Action Movement (Movimiento de Accion Popular Unitario, or MAPU), which has not been active since 1994, was behind the worst terrorist attacks in Chile in over two decades. Three members of the group have been in jail, serving prison terms of at least 18 years, since 2007 for killing a police officer during a bank robbery. The Chilean Supreme Court was set to rule on their appeals on Sept. 8.
Chilean anarchists had warned of an attack in the run-up to the ruling, which was expected to — and did — end with a rejection of the appeal. Prosecutors say they have evidence that the three imprisoned Lautaro faction members were in contact with the perpetrators of the Sept. 8 metro attack, though they have not yet released that evidence.
The metro attack was merely the culmination of several events leading up to early September. In December 2013, 13 members of the Greek anarchist group Conspiracy of Fire Cells convicted of terrorism released a memorandum encouraging other anarchists to strike human targets. Chilean anarchist groups publicly endorsed the statement.
The first attempted attack of the year came Jan. 1, when someone tried and failed to set off a large IED at a police station in Santiago. No one has claimed the failed attack, but a Chilean group calling itself the International Conspiracy for Revenge voiced its approval. The failed attack featured an unusually powerful IED that consisted of a pressure cooker loaded with gunpowder, TNT and shrapnel. Had the IED functioned, it surely would have killed and injured many police officers.
Some 30 attacks followed, with the most significant occurring July 11, July 13 and Aug. 11. All of those attacks featured similar devices: fire extinguishers loaded with gunpowder and set on a timer. The July 11 attack has gone unclaimed, but the International Conspiracy for Revenge claimed the Aug. 11 twin bombings at two police stations. Another group, the Chilean faction of the Conspiracy of Fire Cells, claimed the July 13 bombing that occurred in a metro station.
Ten days after the Sept. 8 metro attack, three suspects were arrested in connection with the bombing. A few hours later, the Conspiracy of Fire Cells-Chile claimed responsibility for the attack. This is also when the group said it was behind the July 13 metro bombing. The IEDs from both attacks used fire extinguishers, suggesting the same bombmaker was involved.
Another IED made from a fire extinguisher appeared Sept. 25 in Santiago, this time killing one person. It is unclear whether the victim was a bystander or was planting the device when it went off.
Finally, on Sept. 11, authorities stopped a car in the Antofagasta region of northern Chile that was carrying an IED made with dynamite and shrapnel, a kilogram of mining explosives, balaclavas and bombmaking manuals. Authorities could not link the car’s passengers to previous attacks, suggesting the existence of yet another extremist cell. The IED in question was also different from the fire extinguisher bombs seen in Conspiracy of Fire Cells-Chile and the International Conspiracy for Revenge's attacks. Add the pressure cooker bomb from the Jan. 1 attack and there are at least three bombmakers working with various anarchist groups in Chile.
Flying Under the State’s Radar
When Chile returned to democracy in 1990, its intelligence service had to comply with democratic standards and set limits on its authority. The result has been two decades of an anemic and flawed intelligence apparatus. The military bureaucracy of the National Intelligence Directorate was replaced with a civilian-led intelligence agency, the Public Security Council, in 1991. The council was then reshuffled and renamed in 1993 before becoming the National Intelligence Agency in 2004.
With only civilian analysts and no independent intelligence collection capabilities, the agency has neither the means nor the legal authority to gather human intelligence, track suspects’ communications or infiltrate criminal cells with covert agents. Similarly, only the police and gendarmerie can collect human and signals intelligence.
Moreover, the agency and the justice system have failed to cooperate effectively. Of more than 100 suspects charged with terrorism, only 11 have been tried, and only one is serving time. Existing counterterrorism law dates back to the military junta and gives prosecutors little ability to proactively begin criminal investigations or make arrests on the basis of suspicious behavior or handling of explosives.
The limited reach of Chilean intelligence has left space for anarchist cells to operate below the government’s radar since 2005. Extremist groups were clear about their intention to conduct an attack ahead of the three MAPU-Lautaro members’ appeal on Sept. 8, for example, but authorities were unable to stop them.
The Rush to Reform
The Chilean government will hastily negotiate amendments to the counterterrorism legislation. The goal will be to grant the National Intelligence Agency and security forces more legal power and a larger budget to combat anarchism and terrorism. The National Congress is likely to pass the reform and amendments before the end of the year. Intelligence agencies will probably be given more resources and have enhanced interagency collaboration and the legal instruments to request and conduct covert operations and infiltrate suspicious groups.
The counterterrorism law may be modified to enable the investigation of individuals on the basis of suspicious behavior, facilitating the arrest of potentially dangerous ones. It could also lead to tougher punishment for those found guilty. Other changes could make the unauthorized acquisition, construction, transportation and possession of explosives or related equipment a punishable offense. At the moment, the offense warrants only a modest punishment under Chilean gun control law. Tighter control over the acquisition, storage and use of high-explosive materials in the mining industry is expected to keep extremists from creating deadlier IEDs.
Yet the effects of the agency’s restructuring and of the legal amendments will not have an immediate effect. In response to the effort, extremists in Chile could resort to using more powerful IEDs, such as the ones featured in the International Conspiracy for Revenge's Jan. 1 and Sept. 11 police station attacks. The governments in Greece, Italy and Spain must also be on alert for possible attacks in solidarity with the suspects in the Sept. 8 Santiago metro bombing.
