Georgia's path toward Western integration has been a volatile one. The Rose Revolution of 2003, which forced Eduard Shevardnadze out of power and replaced him with the United National Movement's Mikhail Saakashvili, set Georgia on a decidedly pro-Western trajectory. Soon, the official goal of obtaining EU and NATO membership became Georgia's primary foreign policy objective.
This path created a hostile relationship with Georgia's northern neighbor, Russia. In 2006, Russia placed an embargo on many Georgian products, and in 2008, tensions culminated in a full-scale war. Georgia was quickly defeated, leading to the de facto independence of two breakaway territories in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and to the establishment of Russian military bases in these territories.
The Russo-Georgia War was profoundly disappointing for Saakashvili, who had hoped to receive NATO support during the conflict, given Georgia's partnership with the military bloc and its desire to become a full member state. However, the United States and Europe were unwilling to become directly involved in the conflict, and since then, Georgia has been under a de facto arms embargo from the West because of Russian pressure.
The war also weakened Saakashvili politically. His aggressive rhetoric toward Russia and insufficient progress on the EU and NATO issue led to his party's defeat in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Elected in his party's place was the newly formed Georgian Dream movement, a collection of opposition groups organized by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who advocated a more pragmatic approach to Russian concerns, such as economic ties and energy policy. Eventually, Saakshvili completely lost his hold on power when Ivanishvili's preferred candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili, defeated Saakashvili loyalist David Bakradze in the 2013 presidential elections.
Georgian Dream did not, however, abandon the country's path toward Western integration. Ivanishvili, and later his chosen successor Irakli Garibashvili, continued to pursue EU and NATO membership, even as he enhanced economic cooperation with Russia. Eventually, Georgia, along with Moldova, moved forward with the EU Association and Free Trade Agreement at the same Eastern Partnership Summit where a former Ukrainian president had officially rejected the deal.
The Ukraine Crisis and Ramifications for Georgia
Indeed, the summit proved to be momentous for Ukraine and the wider region because it initiated the protests in Kiev, which eventually culminated with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's ouster. This in turn led to the Russian annexation of Crimea and to the rise of the pro-Russia separatist movement in the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, which has led to the current state of war between the Ukrainian military and Russia-backed separatist forces in these regions.
For Georgia, the current crisis between Russia and the West over Ukraine presents risks and potential opportunities. Russian actions in Ukraine have raised fears in Tbilisi that Moscow could also pursue a more aggressive policy in Georgia. Russia has increased its security presence and support to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Moscow has warned that it will suspend its free trade agreement with Tbilisi in retaliation for its signing of the EU Association agreement. But at the same time, Ivanishvili and his political allies have maintained close ties with Russia, and Moscow has been much more lenient to Tbilisi's signing of the EU agreement than it has been to Ukraine's or Moldova's.
Unlike the war in Georgia, the Ukraine crisis has led the West to challenge Russia in the former Soviet periphery. The United States and Europe have provided financial and nonlethal military assistance to Ukraine, while imposing sanctions on Russia for Moscow's involvement in the crisis. NATO has given more support to its member states on the frontlines of the crisis, including Poland and the Baltic states, and the United States has shown greater willingness to become involved in the region. Georgia is therefore hoping that the Ukraine crisis will raise Western support for Ukraine (and other Western-oriented former Soviet states) and that this support will find its way into Tbilisi.
However, there is still plenty of reason for Georgia to be cautious. Georgia has little to show for more than a decade of work toward EU and NATO membership. The EU Association deal was an important milestone, but practical benefits will take several years to materialize and will depend on painful economic reforms to make Georgian products more competitive on the European market. Actual EU membership remains a long-term goal with unclear prospects. The success of Georgia's NATO prospects will largely depend on how the crisis in Ukraine plays out. For Russia, Georgia's NATO membership is a line that cannot be crossed. And while the West has become more engaged on this issue, the United States and Europe are reluctant to directly challenge Russia when it comes to countries outside the NATO umbrella.
Georgia's future ultimately will be determined by the West's willingness to boost political and security ties with Tbilisi more than it has in the previous decade. If the West refrains from helping Georgia, the Ukraine crisis notwithstanding, then Tbilisi may reconsider its orientation toward the European Union and NATO and the bitter dispute this has created with Russia. While pro-Russia parties are still rather marginal actors in Georgia, there is a general frustration in the country at the lack of progress made in Western integration efforts but also a practical acknowledgement that cooperation with Russia is necessary. Thus, the crisis in Ukraine could prove to be pivotal for that embattled country and for Georgia as well.
