In the aftermath of the battle for the Tabqa airport in Syria, the narrative that has emerged is one of misplaced regime confidence in the airport's defenses and assumed certainty that the Islamic State would suffer major losses in its repeated attempts to seize the air base. Though the Islamic State had recently seized the 17th Division headquarters and the 93rd Brigade base in the same province, the Tabqa airport was different: It was heavily defended, recently reinforced, mined and wired, and supported by numerous air and ballistic missile assets.
In the subsequent battle, the Islamic State seized the air base from a heavily entrenched Syrian army despite suffering substantial losses. Many of the Islamic State's opponents have attempted to explain this victory as a result of the group's fanaticism, while many of its proponents have sought to highlight the jihadists' daring in contrast to many of the defenders who were taken prisoner and executed.
Extreme dedication is one of the Islamic State's key strengths. The group has also proven masterful in logistics, astute in financing and brilliant in recruitment. These attributes can for the most part readily explain the reasons the Islamic State is the most potent rebel outfit in Syria and Iraq. Yet these often-highlighted potencies cannot fully explain the jihadist group's considerable successes, particularly against the large and well-armed Iraqi and Syrian armies in entrenched positions and the reputedly tough, disciplined and motivated Kurdish peshmerga forces.
Arab Militaries' Shortcomings
In the last 70 years, Arab armies from Libya to Iraq have often displayed incredible bravery and esprit de corps, such as the Egyptian stand in the Fallujah pocket in 1948, the Egyptian Chinese Farm battle with Israeli armor in 1973, and the Syrian commando holdout on Mount Hermon in 1973. In terms of logistics, regional forces have displayed considerable skill; for instance, Iraq fielded more than one million men in battle during its war with Iran, and Libya supported thousands of troops across more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) during the Uganda-Tanzania war. Yet despite these considerable advantages, Arab armies as a whole have repeatedly failed in battle since the end of World War II.
A number of factors can help explain the failure of Arab armies in battle, ranging from poor training, a politicized officer corps and more recently a marked disadvantage in equipment and technology. However, as numerous battle testimonies, reports and studies have shown, the most detrimental weaknesses displayed by Arab armies in recent decades have been a lack of initiative, poor command and control, and an almost complete inability to effectively maneuver at the tactical level. An exhaustive explanation on the root causes of these persistent weaknesses is beyond the scope of this analysis, but they are likely linked to the heavily authoritarian, politicized and inflexibly hierarchical structure in Arab armies that discourages independent thinking for fear of repercussion.
The Islamic State's Advantages
The factors that have hampered Arab armies' operations are areas in which the Islamic State excels, particularly in battles with more traditional militaries. Because of the Islamic State's limited manpower, coupled with its desire to minimize its vulnerability to air power and concentrated artillery, its fighters operate mostly at the level of the company and, occasionally, the battalion. Rarely, such as during the storming of Mosul and the seizure of the Tabqa air base, does the Islamic State concentrate two to three of its battalion-sized outfits to seize hardened or oversized objectives.
This diffuse structure encourages flexibility and tactical initiative at the junior and mid-officer level or, in the case of the Islamic State, at the emir level. Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his associates cannot possibly attempt to micromanage their highly dispersed units across a vast battle space. Even attempting to do so would increase the chances that sophisticated regional and global intelligence networks would intercept the group's communications and increase the self-named caliph's vulnerability to attack. The emirs of the Islamic State therefore are imbued with sufficient decision-making responsibility which, when combined with often considerable experience in small unit, indirect fire and infiltration tactics, allows them to maximize the mobility and flexibility of their motorized light infantry outfits.
Unlike their counterparts in the traditional armies of Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State emirs can make rapid autonomous decisions of tactical and even operational importance, exploit fleeting battlefield opportunities and rapidly press their advantage against the enemy. Instead of charging into the opponent's carefully laid out field of fire, the Islamic State leader can probe the enemy lines for weakness. Facing stiff resistance or coming up against an ambush, the Islamic State emir can orchestrate a rapid retreat only to wheel back and flank the enemy. Leading by mission concept — which allows field commanders to make decisions based on what they deem most fit — is hardly new, having been proven crucial in battle since the German development of the concept in the 19th century, and it is a core component of modern and effective armies.
At times when the Islamic State comes up against equally diffuse fighting groups such as the Syrian rebels and armed tribes, the group depends on other core strengths such as superior combat experience, weaponry and fanaticism. Whether fighting against regular armies or against other combatants in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State can rely on an assortment of advantages to succeed in battle.
Neither Unique Nor Invincible
The Islamic State is hardly the first regional group to display the effectiveness of these core attributes in battle. Smaller rebel groups in Syria have shown very similar tenacity and tactical competence but remain too small and divided to rise to the Islamic State's level. Outside of Syria and Iraq, Gaza militants led by Hamas have recently proven the importance of highly effective and diffuse small unit tactics. However, the most similar organization in terms of size, operational outline and capability is likely Hezbollah, a Shiite force and an enemy of the Islamic State.
Moreover, the Islamic State is hardly an invincible force. Despite what many have argued, its draconian rule and fear tactics are ultimately sources of weakness, potentially cowing the population it controls in the short term but creating vulnerabilities in areas where its control is less concentrated and its enemies can exploit. This is especially likely in times when the Islamic State will be stretched thin and fighting the multiple enemies it has sought and created. Indeed, the Islamic State's mobility advantages would be diminished on the defensive, further enhancing its vulnerability.
It could be argued that the group has already created more conflict than it can handle, having attracted the wrath of damaging U.S. air power that has already slowed the group's momentum in Iraq. Yet for many years to come, whether the group endures or is once again crippled as its predecessor was by local uprisings and external forces, there is much to learn from the successes of the Islamic State and ultimately the enduring importance of flexibility, maneuvering and tactical initiative on the battlefield.
