EU leaders meet in Brussels on Aug. 30 to decide who will replace Herman Van Rompuy as president of the European Council and Catherine Ashton as high representative for foreign affairs and security. The decision follows weeks of bargaining, and the United Kingdom in particular will be looking for some kind of gain from the new appointments, considering Prime Minister David Cameron's defeat in his campaign against Juncker for European Commission president. With Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini almost certain to be named high representative, Cameron will be aiming to place an ally in the final available position. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt and Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny would all be acceptable choices. Never an enthusiastic supporter of the European project, the United Kingdom under Cameron is likely to become even more vociferous in its demands for European reform in the coming months, with a strong speech expected at the Conservative Party summit in late September.
Meanwhile, Europe has been struggling with several internal issues. The eurozone is showing zero growth, Germany is trying to resolve the conflict in Ukraine while preserving its relationship with Russia and the tottering French government recently faced an insurrection from its economy minister, who was relieved of his position on Aug. 25. The anti-austerity sentiment that this debacle highlighted in France is echoed in Italy, which has been struggling with high debts and a shrinking economy and has requested (along with France) increased financial leeway from the German-dominated center. Against this backdrop, the United Kingdom's growth and positivity in 2014 has pulled up the European average, and it is forecast to continue to expand by 2.6 percent in 2015. Cameron could use this economic performance to give his demands at the Brussels conference more weight.
London and Brussels: An Uncomfortable Marriage
Accustomed to being the "difficult" one in the European Union, the United Kingdom has grown more demanding in recent years. Fueling this behavior is increasing Euroskeptical sentiment among its population, electoral gains by the anti-system U.K. Independence Party and growing Euroskepticism among the rank and file in the Conservative Party.
Until recently, Brussels shrugged off most British demands, safe in the knowledge that the eurozone is the United Kingdom's top trading partner, a fact that hampers London's room to maneuver. Traditionally, the danger of a single hegemon emerging on the Continent has led the United Kingdom to pursue a strategy of maintaining a balance of power. Currently, the easiest way to keep Europe from fully uniting is from inside the organization itself. However, London's calculus changed in May when the populist, anti-Europe U.K. Independence Party came first in European Parliamentary elections with 27 percent of the vote. Popular pressure had already compelled Cameron to promise an in/out referendum if he was returned to power after the next election, a failed political move designed to mollify the hard-liners in his own party and steal some of the U.K. Independence Party's momentum. In fact, on Aug. 28, a sitting Tory Parliament member defected to the U.K. Independence Party. This will result in a by-election that could give the populist party its first seat in Westminster.
In June, perhaps stiffened by the U.K. Independence Party's success, Cameron took a hard stance against Juncker's candidacy for president of the European Council, believing him to be too integrationist. In a meeting with other European leaders during the election process, Cameron warned that a victory for Juncker would make it harder for the United Kingdom to stay in the European Union. In the end, Juncker was voted in comfortably, with Hungary and the United Kingdom as the only dissenters. This chain of events, and the emergence of Euroskeptical London Mayor Boris Johnson as a realistic alternative leader for the Conservative Party, led Cameron to consider threatening actions far outside his comfort zone. For instance, he is expected to threaten to support the "out" vote in the 2017 referendum unless certain reforms are made by then.
The United Kingdom's strategy since World War II has been broadly consistent: to remain close to, yet distanced enough from, both Europe and the United States. The former is an ideal economic partner but could absorb the United Kingdom and strip it of autonomy if not resisted, while the latter is the second-largest recipient of British exports, behind only the European Union, and gives London a seat at the table in global discussions in exchange for military support. Since its accession to the European bloc in 1973, the United Kingdom has been careful to remain part of the European project while negotiating vetoes and exceptions for itself at every juncture. To continue on this course, Cameron needs to negotiate the latest set of exemptions for the United Kingdom to prove to the British population that he is capable of resisting Europe while remaining part of the bloc.
Cameron's Quest for Exceptional Treatment
Cameron's wish list can be divided into three categories. The first, which involves changes in the way the European Union is constructed, will never be granted by German Chancellor Angela Merkel's government. Within this category is the demand that the centralization of power in Brussels be reversed and for national parliaments to be able to work together to block EU legislation.
The second, more negotiable, category touches trends that are to some extent already underway. The request that mechanisms be installed to prevent vast migrations when new member countries join the European Union plays into a process that already exist; when Romania and Bulgaria joined the bloc, member states were allowed to prevent Romanians and Bulgarians from accessing their labor markets for almost a decade. Meanwhile, Germany is already embracing the mindset that freedom of movement laws should mean freedom to take up work, but not benefits, having recently announced steps to expel EU benefit cheats.
The third category is where Cameron is most likely to make headway and contains the reforms that focus mainly on the United Kingdom. The amount of British exports to the United States would make giving businesses more freedom to trade in the Americas and Asia a very suitable reform for the British economy. Freeing British police and the British judiciary from EU interference, including the EU Court of Human Rights, would earn a great deal of political capital back home without costing the EU too dearly. The final overarching reform — to free the United Kingdom from the concept of "ever closer union" enshrined in the treaty signed by every EU country — could be difficult at first, but once the negotiations laid out above have turned the United Kingdom into a special case with its own vetoes and entitlements, it will be a less significant leap to release it from this commitment.
For key decision-makers in Brussels — Merkel, Juncker and French President Francois Hollande — the danger in permitting these sorts of freedoms for the United Kingdom is that other member states might see it as a precedent to try to negotiate better terms for themselves. For example, as Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban grows more authoritarian, it is becoming an uncomfortable fit in the European Union. Orban could easily point to the United Kingdom's independence from the EU Court of Human Rights and similarly request an independent judiciary. For a European Union already struggling to find an answer to Orban's institutional reforms, losing influence in its courts would exacerbate the problem. That said, the United Kingdom's size, history and identity outside Europe (such as its membership in the U.N. Security Council and the G-7) should help to provide a basis for its uniqueness.
Cameron will not obtain all of the reforms on his wish list, a fact he probably knows already. A substantial reform of the EU treaties would expend both time and political capital and will not happen at a time when the union is deeply fragmented. Germany and other large European powers are not willing to review the bloc's legal framework in the current context of uncertainty and political fragmentation. That said, British trade is important to Europe, and the departure of the third-largest economy in the union would leave a large hole, affecting many member states' economies. Moreover, Germany sees the United Kingdom as an ally that counterbalances France in some issues, such as the defense of free market in Europe and keeping the size of the EU budget under control. Thus, Germany will prefer to strike a deal before allowing a British exit. A former public relations man, Cameron will judge how much of his demands will need to be met before he can herald them to the British public as "substantial." For reasons of perception, any reforms need to be seen as making the United Kingdom an exceptional case and not as weakening the union, and this would require some political finesse.
Once every generation, the United Kingdom redefines its relationship with Europe. Weakness in the European center and a politically hostile climate in the United Kingdom have created the circumstances needed for the latest redress.
