Taiping Island is located more than 1,400 kilometers (870 miles) from the southern tip of Taiwan. With an area of 0.46 square kilometers (0.18 square miles), it is one of the largest of the Spratly Islands and one of the few in the group with its own freshwater supply. Taiwan's claims go back to 1946, when the government on the mainland claimed the island. After its defeat by the Chinese communists, the government in Taiwan retained control of the island, beginning formal military occupation in the 1950s. In 1999, as part of a more pragmatic approach to rival claimants in Southeast Asia, Taipei handed over the defense of the island to the coast guard in order to focus military capabilities on the emerging naval and missile threat from Beijing.

Growing competition around the disputed islands in recent years has forced Taipei to review its policies in the South China Sea. Expanding facilities on Taiping Island is central to this shift. Ongoing construction projects suggest that Taiwan is considering permanent troop deployments. By November, workers will complete a 320-meter (1,050-foot) pier capable of accommodating 3,000-ton naval frigates and coast guard cutters. The project will also include a 210-meter access road, a 350-meter extension to a 1,150-meter airstrip built in 2008 and new navigation guidance and auxiliary facilities. The expanded airstrip would likely accommodate P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft operated by the navy, boosting Taipei's anti-submarine surveillance and mobilizing capability in the South China Sea.

But Taiwan's ability to defend Taiping Island is limited. Taiwan does in fact possess coast guard and naval capabilities superior to those of the Philippines and, in some ways, Vietnam. Even in peacetime, however, maintaining regular supplies over the 1,400-kilometer distance to Taiping is difficult. To date, the island has no refueling facilities, relying instead on C-130 transport plane shipments every two months. Taiwan has only two replenishment ships in active service: the Wuyi fast combat support ship, or AOE-530, and Panshih fast combat support ship launched in 2013. It has no aerial refueling capacity and is therefore unable to support long-range, long-term deployment of naval vessels and aircraft over the distance between Taiwan and the Spratly archipelago.

Taiwan's competitors share most of these limitations, especially in their attempts to occupy the tinier islets, often little more than circles of rocks or artificial islands that need constant maintenance to avoid sinking. Most of the manned facilities in the South China Sea are hostage to the circumstances of water and weather, overshadowing their usefulness as forward operating positions and potential threats to competitors. In the long run, these facilities may provide support in monitoring the area, but primarily only in times of peace.  

Ultimately, these islands are quite different from the Pacific islands that underpinned the U.S.-Japanese confrontation in World War II, which served as forward operating bases to establish regional dominance. The islands of the South China Sea, in contrast, have served primarily as political outposts or placeholders that block rivals from exercising jurisdiction under international law. Trying to dislodge a neighboring claimant would risk a larger war — a possibility most would rather avoid. Instead, they choose to strengthen their positions and occupy remaining empty reefs to prevent others from doing so first.

In spite of its distinction as the first country to establish a military presence in the South China Sea and its ambitious claim, virtually identical to mainland China's, Taiwan was one of the last to catch up with the region's changing dynamics. Now that it has done so, its expansions will give Taipei a forward base to operate its surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft and stake its claim to the island. Taiwan's moves, however, do not fundamentally alter its strategic position in the Spratlys or grant control over the area. For its part, Beijing may view Taiwan's claim as politically useful because it will keep Taiwan distant from the Philippines and Vietnam. At the same time, however, Beijing may also feel the need to bolster its own presence as a counterbalance, a development not necessarily favorable to Taipei.