Editor's Note: Periodically, Stratfor publishes guidance produced for the analysis team and shares it with readers. This guidance sets the parameters we are using in our own ongoing examination and assessment of events unfolding in Libya as retired Libyan Gen. Khalifa Hifter tries to assert his dominance in the country's east. Given Libya's regional importance, we consider it valuable for readers to have access to this additional insight.
As we alerted May 18, assaults launched by militias affiliated with retired Libyan Gen. Khalifa Hifter in Tripoli and Benghazi pointed to a new phase in Libya's post-Gadhafi power vacuum. Hifter has a long and well-documented relationship with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and has been rumored to carry support from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These countries have varying ambitions and tolerance for intervention in Libya, but all share a desire to contain jihadist activity in eastern Libya. The United States and its European allies also have interests in stabilizing eastern Libyan oil production.
The intelligence we've collected since May 18 points to various channels of foreign backing to Hifter, but there also appears to be a concerted effort underway by the general's allies to exaggerate the extent of that support in the hopes of securing backing within Libya and building momentum for more serious foreign assistance. Indeed, some of Hifter's foreign backers could still be trying to gauge his capabilities before channeling more serious support to his forces. As we build an assessment on Hifter's ability to mount an offensive in eastern Libya and succeed in buying off and fighting off resistance — a highly ambitious goal — we need to bear in mind the following guidance:
- Hifter and his forces will not succeed in an offensive in the east without substantial foreign support. Egypt is the key regional player to watch in terms of military aid going to the general's forces. With rumors circulating that Egyptian military personnel are on the ground in eastern Libya, we need to watch for any signs of direct Egyptian support.
- Hifter's allies will make many claims about his military capabilities and growing foreign support. We have received word that the general's forces in Benghazi have allegedly been receiving from Egypt small shipments of Soviet-era equipment, including T-62 tanks, armored personnel carriers, rocket launchers and 130-mm howitzers. Large armaments are difficult to conceal and require significant logistical support. We need visual confirmation of this equipment, as well as cross-verification from Egyptian contacts on the type and volume of armaments flowing from Egypt to sites in eastern Libya.
- We have observed significant military movements from the United States in the region recently. The United States has positioned about 200 Marines in Sicily, and it moved the USS Bataan amphibious assault ship from the U.S. 5th Fleet's area of operations to the Mediterranean. Officially, these assets are being pre-positioned to facilitate a possible evacuation of U.S. personnel from the Embassy in Tripoli, but the move at minimum reveals that the United States is anticipating a destabilizing event in Libya, whether or not Washington is helping to facilitate Hifter's moves.
- Hifter has attracted long-term opponents to Libya's General National Congress to join him in decrying the government. He has also forced most groups and government forces in western Libya to coordinate their opposition to him. He has pledges of support so far from Zentan's al-Qaqaa and Sawaaq brigades, regional military police, the Saiqa special forces group in Benghazi, the Libyan air force and Ibrahim Jadhran's federalist militias that maintain control over key export terminals in the east. We need to watch for any fissures within this support network, as well as signs of his support base expanding.
- The General National Congress, though still internally divided, has proposed a new electoral process for the elections on June 25 and has tried to communicate to interested foreign governments that it will shift to a more aggressive posture against militants who have found sanctuary in Libya. We will need to watch U.S., European, Egyptian, Algerian, Saudi and Emirati engagement with Tripoli closely to see if Hifter's opponents in Tripoli are capable of undermining his external support network. Tensions between Algeria and Egypt could grow should Cairo significantly escalate its involvement in eastern Libya.
Hifter and his forces are undoubtedly up against considerable constraints in trying to emerge as the dominant militia force in eastern Libya. The uptick in reporting on his foreign support raises questions about how serious that support is becoming and whether the general's chances for success are actually improving. U.S. government contacts have been in direct communication with Hifter and Tripoli at the same time as rumors of Egyptian military support have been escalating. These developments will require close attention in the coming days as Hifter readies his forces for what may be a more serious offensive in eastern Libya.
