Recent jihadist activity in Iraq is evoking early parallels with the chaos of 2003-2004, when al Qaeda in Iraq militants capitalized on a security vacuum and Sunni Arab disenfranchisement to enhance its influence within Sunni regions and promote sectarian strife. Over this period, the group managed to seize and control Ar Ramadi and Fallujah, proved it was capable of directly confronting the Iraqi army in Anbar province and carried out regular strikes on key infrastructure such as bridges and pipelines. Al Qaeda in Iraq's activities directly threatened the stability of the state and challenged Baghdad's control over Sunni regions, fracturing the state's sectarian balance of power and inciting violent civil war.
Al Qaeda's successors (including most recently ISIL) have retained their predecessor's goals within Iraq but have demonstrated far diminished capabilities — ultimately lacking the domestic and regional environment that allowed al Qaeda in Iraq to flourish temporarily. However, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 provided an opportunity for Iraqi jihadists to expand their influence across the border, leading to the emergence of ISIL in April 2013 and a new goal to carve out an uninterrupted operating space stretching from Iraq to Lebanon.
The group quickly distinguished itself on the battlefields of eastern and northern Syria and reached the peak of its influence there in the latter half of 2013, giving those ISIL militants still in Iraq limited access to more powerful ordnance either stolen from Syrian armories or shipped in by foreign backers of opposition groups. In this period, attacks accelerated considerably in Iraq, with growing numbers of complex operations against infrastructure and civil society facilities that had been relatively unscathed since al Qaeda in Iraq was neutralized in the mid-2000s.
So Far This Year
Since early January, ISIL has been withdrawing to Syria's eastern regions near the Iraqi border under heavy pressure from mainstream Syrian opposition forces and, to a lesser extent, the Syrian regime. Driven by these developments, more experienced ISIL fighters are returning to Iraq with heavy weapons and explosives. ISIL's Iraq faction has also benefited from friendly forces concentrated across the border, expanding the security vacuum in western Iraq and providing a base of operations to which they can fall back to resupply and rest and then use to stage attacks back into Iraq. Oil shipments trucked in from Syria's eastern ISIL-controlled fields are also increasingly making their way to militants in Anbar province and providing revenue for the group.
The regional dynamic compounds the pre-existing social frustrations because growing segments within the Sunni Arab community feel disenfranchised and ignored by the government of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki — particularly in the Sunni Arab stronghold of Anbar province. ISIL capitalized on these sectarian tensions in early January to regain its predecessor's control over Fallujah, Ar Ramadi and surrounding towns. This provided the group a domestic base from which to expand operations and strike out at vulnerable state targets. ISIL has attempted to repeat this strategy in the east, most notably on March 21-22 when militants blocked all entrances and took control of the local police station in Buhriz, Diyala province, before eventually withdrawing under pressure from security forces.
Across the sectarian borderlands, key bridges have been attacked, often with large truck bombs, in most cases causing extensive structural damage if not complete collapse. On April 28, a coordinated predawn operation destroyed two bridges in a village outside the eastern Diyala town of Qara Tepe. ISIL planners have used the extensive Tigris and Euphrates river systems to their benefit, targeting bridges to insulate regions from Baghdad's influence and leaving population centers isolated.
The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline transported 90 percent less oil in March than it did in February due to frequent bombings by the jihadist group. This cost the Iraqi state more than $1 billion in lost revenue in March alone, with state oil exports falling by some 400,000 barrels per day. Pipelines are notoriously difficult to defend because they often run across vast swathes of rugged terrain. Jihadists have capitalized on these vulnerabilities to disrupt the State Oil Marketing Organization's northern and western export options, while cutting off smaller branches that supply local towns and villages.
The jihadists have also targeted critical water sources, including an April 9 explosion at the al-Kanaka water project in northern Tikrit and the April 8 seizure of the Nuaimiya and Haditha dams near Fallujah, which divert Euphrates water to the central and southern provinces. In the latter incident, ISIL closed most of the dams' gates, restricting water supply to downstream regions — where most Iraqis depend on agriculture for their livelihoods — and flooding the area around Fallujah to prevent Iraqi army movement. On April 17, militant attacks on a pipeline in northern Tikrit produced a major oil spill on the Tigris River, forcing downstream Baghdad authorities to cut drinking water due to contamination.
ISIL has also attacked electricity generators, power stations and communications towers with improvised explosive devices. Police stations, administrative buildings, universities and other state facilities have been frequent targets of suicide bombers or powerful vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, used to breach outer defenses, followed by coordinated ground assaults.
Recent ISIL operations should be viewed as part of a broader transformation of the group's tactics and capabilities that have allowed ISIL to make limited gains in restricting Baghdad's control of Sunni regions, as the group seeks to expand the reach of its base of operations and deepen the security vacuum beyond western Iraq. Meanwhile, the group's ability to strike at key infrastructure and civil society buildings in the restive sectarian borderlands has allowed it to stoke underlying tensions among Iraq's various communities.
ISIL seeks to highlight Baghdad's inability to manage the social contract that has loosely incorporated these groups into the state structure and prevented further deterioration of the security environment. The ability of jihadists to disrupt these state services incites panic and anger among affected populations who now see their livelihoods threatened. ISIL's ultimate goal is to push this frustration into sectarian reprisals and expand the presence of self-defense militias operating outside Baghdad's control — creating the conditions necessary for greater sectarian civil war.
An Intensifying but Manageable Challenge
ISIL will likely continue to prioritize operations against lightly defended targets, since the group has not yet demonstrated the capabilities to directly take on Iraqi security forces at hardened sites. The Iraqi army is well equipped to respond to attacks with mobile strike forces, but limited resources and manpower will force the military to prioritize the defense of key facilities, leaving many lower-priority sites vulnerable. ISIL will continue to focus its operations in the group's traditional area of operations — Iraq's sectarian borderlands and the western Sunni regions.
For the time being, the group is still far from demonstrating the capabilities of al Qaeda in Iraq during the 2003-2004 violence, despite early similarities. Their hold over Fallujah and portions of Ar Ramadi is tenuous at best, and ISIL has yet to demonstrate an ability to overcome the heavy security presence and hostile ethnic groups in the Shiite and Kurdish heartlands. The southern hydrocarbon sector, which provides the majority of Iraq's oil revenues, and the country's main export port remain unthreatened. Moreover, Baghdad retains limited ties within the Sunni community and will use this leverage to support pro-Baghdad self-defense and tribal militias. This was highlighted by a May 7-8 agreement that saw a number of ISIL militants withdraw from northern Fallujah under heavy pressure by Sunni tribal power brokers. For the time being, a highly localized insurgency still in its early stages of development remains manageable for Baghdad.
Nevertheless, Baghdad will likely find itself facing growing security challenges as increasing numbers of ISIL militants and ordnance return from Syria. And as ISIL in Syria continues to consolidate its base of operations in the east, the security vacuum in western Syria is likely to deepen, allowing Iraqi jihadists to gain greater mobility and access to Syria's oil deposits. New obstacles are on the horizon for Iraq as it struggles to preserve the last decade's internal balance of power.
