Waging expeditionary warfare in a landlocked country is expensive, requiring long and vulnerable supply lines. In Afghanistan, such vulnerabilities have been marginal in a military sense, because the enemy had a limited capacity to disrupt supply flows. In a political sense, however, vulnerability has been high. For more than a decade, the United States and its International Security Assistance Force allies have had to weave through considerable political obstacles to keep their soldiers in Afghanistan supplied.
The Creation of the Northern Distribution Network
Logistics personnel look for supply routes that are the most timely, cost efficient and secure. After the initial invasion of Afghanistan, these lines primarily involved transit by truck across two main routes through Pakistan from the port of Karachi. This gave Pakistan enormous leverage over parts of U.S. policy regarding the war. When Pakistani and U.S. interests diverged, Pakistan could threaten to cut off access to the supply routes as a way to bring the United States to the table. Additionally, although the Pakistani routes were the shortest and cheapest of all the land route options, they ran through unstable regions where militant attacks were likely and the United States had no ability to enforce security. These factors prompted U.S. planners to develop the Northern Distribution Network as an alternative in 2008.
The Northern Distribution Network is a sprawling web of road and rail routes running from northern Afghanistan through a host of countries, but three of the four main legs traverse Russian territory on their way to other ports. It was put to the test in November 2011 when, after International Security Assistance Force troops inadvertently killed Pakistani military personnel, Pakistan suspended supply lines. The northern network — in conjunction with increased strategic airlift directly into the country — handled the bulk of the logistics burden, including 85 percent of fuel supplies, by early 2012. Moscow repeatedly threatened access to the network during periods of high tensions with the United States, knowing that it was crucial for U.S. forces and their allies.
Pakistan reopened its supply routes in July 2012. The Pakistani routes are much shorter than the Northern Distribution Network — and thus much cheaper — and quickly returned to heavy use by International Security Assistance Force troops. The northern corridor was maintained, though, in case the more volatile Pakistani routes were shuttered again. The recent escalated tensions between NATO and Russia over Ukraine have now made the Northern Distribution Network the more volatile route.
Logistically, this is not a major threat to combat forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistani routes, and the Northern Distribution Network during the closure of the Pakistani corridor, were able to support a fighting force that was much larger than the current one and was operating at a much higher tempo. Slightly more concerning is the huge amount of materiel that still needs to be brought out of the country to finish the International Security Assistance Force withdrawal by the end of 2014 (which is currently on schedule), but coalition planners have given assurances that the remainder can be removed through Pakistan. If Pakistan closes its routes as well, strategic air and the portions of the Northern Distribution Network that do not run through Russia could be used to remove the rest of the materiel, with the only consequence being a large increase to what had been assessed as a $7 billion cost.
Pakistan's Position
The most interesting implication is what Pakistan could do with the leverage it would gain as the primary supply route into Afghanistan. Ties between Islamabad and Washington have improved markedly since the most acrimonious days of their relationship, but many issues remain. The largest are the ever-increasing tensions between Kabul and Islamabad over militants, border transgressions and negotiations with the Taliban. Washington has had to walk a fine line on these issues to appease both sides. For example, recent plans to give some armored vehicles to the Pakistani military quickly drew a sharp rebuke from Kabul, which wants its own share of leftover International Security Assistance Force materiel. Washington quickly stepped back on the issue, and the future of the deal remains uncertain. In conflicts such as this, Pakistan could wield its newfound leverage.
Separately, political factions within Pakistan could exploit the supply routes. In November 2013, Imran Khan — the head of the Pakistani political party Tehreek-e-Insaf — initiated a blockade on the northern section of the Pakistani supply routes in response to a U.S. drone strike. The blockade was eventually lifted and did little to hurt the supply effort at the time. On the other hand, if Russia carries out its threat, Khan and his party — or any other actor — will be able to threaten the supply lines with much greater effect. This would make the routes vulnerable not only to militants and Islamabad's interests but to domestic political infighting as well.
The International Security Assistance Force presence is down to slightly more than 50,000 troops, and it has greatly diminished its operational activities. By the end of 2014, there will only be a small contingent of forces, if any at all (this hinges on the outcome of the Afghan presidential election). This small presence will not require nearly as much logistically as the full combat force did during the height of fighting. Islamabad senses that the supply routes do not carry as much weight as they once did, due to the drawdown. The logistics routes lever is only getting smaller, and Russia's threatened cutoff is thus more of an annoyance than a serious threat. Even if the Northern Distribution Network were shut down, Islamabad would have a small window at best in which to wield any influence the Pakistani supply routes might provide.
