While Russia recovered from the breakup of the Soviet Union, all three Baltic states joined NATO and the European Union (Estonia and Latvia are also in the eurozone, and Lithuania has aspirations to join next year). Their ties to the West are a concern for Russia, particularly since their membership in NATO means that the Western military alliance is close to Russia's heartland and directly abuts Russia's access to the Baltic Sea. Despite their Western alliances, Baltic states are still vulnerable to Russian destabilization tactics.
Baltic states are largely dependent on Russian energy imports, and Russia remains an important trade partner for them. On several occasions, Russia has temporarily cut off energy supplies or hindered cross-border trade to inflict economic pain on the Baltic states. While Russia can benefit from such moves in the short term by creating tensions between the Baltic governments and business communities that want stable ties with Russia, this strategy strengthens the Baltics' long-term resolve to take measures that limit their exposure to Russia, specifically in terms of energy supplies. The Baltic states are using liquefied natural gas terminals — one will be operational soon and others are still in the planning stages — along with further electricity and natural gas links to weaken Russia's energy leverage over the coming years.
Russia could also use cultural and political ties to destabilize the Baltics. All three Baltic countries have prominent political parties that are rather pro-Russian. These parties often are sidelined in the formation of national governments, but they still carry weight in domestic politics because of their strong presence on the municipal level. On March 5, Grybauskaite created a controversy when she said she would not include the Labor Party, a member of the current government coalition, in discussions on Lithuanian defense and NATO because Moscow has too much influence on the party.
Moscow could provide some of these parties with financial support, but it could more fundamentally affect the political and social stability in the Baltics with the ethnic Russians that make up sizable (though isolated) parts of the populations in all three Baltic countries. More than 20 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the integration of ethnic Russians remains problematic in the Baltics. The three countries fear being culturally dominated by their larger neighbor, hence their policies that protect their national characteristics and alienate ethnic Russians, such as limiting the use of the Russian language at public schools and creating difficult processes for ethnic Russians to obtain citizenship. Such policies have long drawn criticism from Moscow, which has intervened militarily in its neighbors, as it did in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea recently, under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians. On March 6, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev said Russia would simplify procedures for native Russian speakers from former Soviet states to gain Russian citizenship. Thus, Russia could take the current battle over Ukraine to other former Soviet countries.
However, Russia's actions in the Baltics are constrained. Despite the large ethnic Russian populations there, the Russians in the Baltics are not nearly as loyal to Moscow as those in Crimea. Moreover, the Baltic states' NATO membership makes it very unlikely that Russia would be willing to directly engage in these countries militarily. Rather, such moves give Moscow a source of leverage in the competition with the West over the more immediately contested states in the Russian periphery.
