Thailand's Electoral Commission decided on March 4 to allow the caretaker government to reallocate 20 billion baht ($618 million) from the central budget to make overdue payments to disgruntled farmers for rice acquired under the government's controversial rice buying program. The commission had earlier approved a smaller sum, but it has now cleared the disbursement of about one-sixth of the total funds due to farmers — the government is struggling to find other means to cover the roughly 100 billion baht that will remain unpaid.

 

The Electoral Commission had little to gain from withholding funds from the farmers, which would have been an unpopular decision. The commission has given the government until the end of May to make up for budget reallocations. This will be difficult, considering the government has had little success in raising funds due to its caretaker status and remains focused on the unfinished elections and a range of judicial cases against it. Still, the decision gives the government a respite. It may prevent certain farmer groups, mostly in central Thailand — and in particular, those that had threatened to disrupt Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi International Airport — from holding additional protests.

 

While the government's rural base has not withdrawn broad support, the Pheu Thai party's pro-rural image is tarnished, and it has lost at least some farmers affiliated with a coalition partner. The commission's decision does not rescue the caretaker government from the other threats to its hold on office, but for now it should help the Yingluck administration manage problems in the rural sector.

 

 

Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court is due to decide in March how to deal with the incomplete Feb. 2 elections. Deliberate interference marred the polls in certain areas, disrupting voting in 28 constituencies across eight provinces, mostly in Thailand's southern opposition strongholds. Some constituencies held elections on March 2 — these were marked by low voter turnout — but in others, voting remains incomplete. In order to form a government, elections need to produce enough representatives to meet a quorum. The Pheu Thai party wants the court to allow the Electoral Commission to carry out the vote under the existing royal decree for elections. Opponents hope that the court will demand a new royal decree, which would in effect nullify the Feb. 2 elections and require a new vote. In order for Pheu Thai to stay in power, it needs to finish the elections and engage in political horse trading to convene parliament. Even if Pheu Thai manages to finish elections and form a government, it will be hobbled by the pending court cases.

Some of the legal cases could result in the ejection of Pheu Thai party members from public office. The party could even be forced to disband. Past court decisions have unseated previous parties affiliated with the Shinawatra movement, notably in 2008. Pheu Thai is therefore planning for a fall from power and is threatening to hold massive rallies in Bangkok, on the scale of protests seen in 2009 and 2010. The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship — the official name of the group known as the Red Shirts — has begun mustering forces, holding rallies and practicing rapid deployment so that its members are ready to descend on Bangkok this spring if necessary. They also claim to be gathering recruits to build a 600,000-strong movement to enable the northeast to make a bid for regional autonomy or secession in the event of exclusion from power in Bangkok. This threat bears watching over the long run.

 

Since November, the Red Shirts have avoided amassing in Bangkok, a decision meant to prevent direct confrontation with royalist protesters. Typically Thailand's two factions alternate holding mass protests, just as they alternate controlling government — simultaneous rallies could quickly raise the level of violence. The army has indicated that if large numbers of Red Shirts enter Bangkok, escalating civil strife could necessitate more forceful military action or even a coup in the name of preserving public order. 

The military has continued to favor the opposition while avoiding decisive moves and maintaining the appearance of impartiality. Its position hardened somewhat, however, after a number of attacks on protest camps in late February — in Bangkok and in the provinces — resulted in the deaths of children and heightened public fears. Army chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha recently reiterated the military's option to carry out a coup — an admonition for restraint by all political forces, but especially the Red Shirts. The army repositioned its forces in Bangkok to protect protest camps and major institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission that are likely to come under threat. It is also weighing the option of arming soldiers with firearms, since they so far have mostly used batons. These actions highlight the military leadership's broad sympathy with the opposition, though it continues to maintain its distance from all political players and retains the option of condoning a Pheu Thai government under certain circumstances, as it did from 2011 to 2013.

 

Thailand remains in limbo for now, but pressures are building across the political landscape toward some sort of compromise. Failure to achieve such a compromise could spark a new confrontation. While the government wishes to complete the election and form a new parliament, the opposition benefits from drawing out this period of uncertainty, preventing the government from exercising its powers in full — especially from implementing the 2 trillion-baht stimulus package — and sapping the administration of support. Indeed, the opposition has succeeded so far in trammeling the ruling party without overthrowing it, which would inevitably trigger a backlash. It can be expected to continue this strategy, which means that its sympathizers in the military and the judiciary may continue to refrain from decisive moves. 

 

Thailand is dealing with a combination of farmer protests, controversial government attempts to get financial support from state-owned banks, a spike in political violence against royalist protesters, military redeployments in Bangkok, a Red Shirt buildup in the provinces and pending court cases against the government. The circumstances indicate that Thailand's two main factions are raising the stakes even as they sit down to negotiate. 

 

A compromise that allows Pheu Thai to stay in power is possible. It would probably need to include guarantees that the party will not bring former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra back from exile or alter the constitution to entrench its power. But a continued push by anti-government forces to oust this government seems more likely. This would open a new chapter of unrest, since the Red Shirts seem prepared to respond. The opposition may at least be able to draw out the current impasse beyond the springtime, during which rural farmers could join rallies in Bangkok.