The Ukrainian crisis has increased the polarization of the Russian and Western positions over Ukraine's fate and strategic orientation. It has also intensified the rivalry between blocs in the former Soviet space as some countries call for greater Western support while others more firmly pronounce their support for Russia.
Both sides are reflected in the Caucasus, where political activity has intensified since the crisis broke out. Georgia has sought Western backing for its bid to integrate with the European Union and NATO, and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili concluded a weeklong visit to the United States on March 1 in search of such support. Georgian officials have also pushed for an action plan toward NATO membership, and Georgian Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze said March 3 that any efforts toward EU integration should come with a clear prospect of membership. Meanwhile, Armenia has tried to increase its already strong strategic ties with Russia. The country announced March 1 its intention to fast-track efforts to join Russia's Customs Union, with the goal of concluding preparations by mid-April.
In stark contrast, Azerbaijan has been quiet since the unfolding of the Ukrainian crisis. The government has issued generic statements and joined a group of potential donors to offer money in exchange for resolving the political crisis in early February, but otherwise Azerbaijan has not been politically active with regard to the situation in Ukraine. There have been no official high-level meetings between Azerbaijan and either the European Union or Russia for the past month, and Azerbaijan has not followed its neighbors in pushing for closer integration with either the West or Russia.
Azerbaijan has long sought to avoid serious integration with any bloc, including not participating in the negotiations over the EU free trade and association agreements, which prompted the Ukrainian crisis, or Russia's rival Customs Union. Azerbaijan instead chooses to cooperate with both the West and Russia politically and economically, using its substantial energy resources to diversify relationships with both blocs without fully committing to either. Baku is likely to avoid any serious discussions on either EU integration or Customs Union accession.
However, with the standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine leading to Russian military deployments in Crimea and Moscow's threat of military action, Azerbaijan is bound to be concerned on the security front. Azerbaijan is the only country in the Caucasus without a Russian military presence in its territory — Armenia hosts a 5,000-strong Russian military base, and Russian troops occupy Georgia's breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia is unlikely to directly intervene in Azerbaijan, but any moves in Georgia could have serious implications for Baku and its energy industry, as the 2008 Russo-Georgian War shows. Given that Russia is Armenia's security guarantor and Azerbaijan continues to be in a standoff with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, further integration between Yerevan and Moscow is a worrying sign for Baku.
Azerbaijan could choose to fortify security relationships with other regional players. Azerbaijan already has a strategic partnership in the military sphere with Turkey, and the countries have increased their security cooperation in the past few years via military drills and weapons procurements. Azerbaijan has also strengthened security ties with Israel in recent years, signing a major defense deal in 2012. But relations with Turkey and Israel can go only so far. Turkey is dependent on Russia for energy, and Israel has its own complicated relationship with Moscow; neither is likely to stand up to Russia in the event of a military confrontation (as was also seen in the war between Russia and Georgia). Azerbaijan would also probably want to preserve some defense ties and arms deals with Russia.
Ideally, Azerbaijan would like to increase security ties with the United States and boost the level of training and weapons procurements (the latter currently banned) it receives from Washington. While this has not been an option for Baku in the past, the shifting alignment of forces could present Azerbaijan with opportunities for greater cooperation down the road. But for that to happen, the United States would have to demonstrate a level of commitment to Western-backed countries in the region it has not yet shown. In the more immediate term, Azerbaijan is likely to maintain its neutral stance on the European Union and Russia while trying to mitigate any negative consequences concerning its position and interests elsewhere in the region.
