Changes in Ukraine's energy consumption statistics, made available Wednesday, illustrate the country's strategy of shifting its allegiances between Europe and Russia. Two European energy companies, Hungary's FGSZ Ltd. and Poland's Gaz-System SA, released operational monitoring data showing that Ukraine imported 2 billion cubic meters of gas from Europe via Poland and Hungary in 2013, roughly 50 percent more than was expected. The data also showed that Ukraine suspended all imports of natural gas from these two countries, both of which are EU members, in the first week of January.

The discrepancy is not accidental; it is the result of a shift in Ukrainian energy policy made at the end of 2013. After several years of negotiation, Ukraine and Russia reached a landmark natural gas agreement Dec. 17, whereby Russia would lower the price of natural gas exports to about $270 per thousand cubic meters from $400 per thousand cubic meters. The agreement went into effect on Jan. 1, and Ukraine has not imported natural gas from Europe since.

The agreement was signed under fairly dramatic circumstances in Ukraine. The country had spent most of the past year trying to balance between the European Union and Russia, a strategy primarily involving negotiating an association and free trade agreement with the bloc while holding parallel talks over increased trade and political ties with Russia. However, Russia and the European Union indicated that Ukraine could not align with both simultaneously and Kiev was forced to choose sides. Because of heightened economic and trade pressure from Russia, exacerbated by Ukraine's already tenuous financial state, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich decided at a key EU summit at the end of November to suspend negotiations with the Europeans.

His decision outraged the country's pro-EU activists, hundreds of thousands of whom took to the streets to protest. From November to December, many observers believed Ukraine was on the verge of another Orange Revolution. However, these demonstrations never turned into a revolution. Eventually, the protests wound down for two primary reasons. First, the opposition was weak and divided, despite support from large constituencies in Kiev and western Ukraine as well as from some European officials. They were simply unable to overcome the cultural and political polarity of eastern and western Ukraine to force political change. Second, Russia announced that it would give Kiev a huge economic reprieve by lending the government $15 billion (in the form of purchasing debt) and discounting natural gas by 33 percent.

Though the $15 billion loan may seem flashier, cheaper natural gas is far more important for Ukraine strategically. For years, Ukraine has been trying to convince Moscow to lower its natural gas prices to no avail. Moscow would not comply while Kiev was trying to integrate with the European Union. Ukraine tried to strengthen its bargaining position by diversifying its energy supplies, an attempt to show Russia it had other options. In November 2012, it began to import natural gas via Hungary and Poland using reverse flow techniques, which involved purchasing the natural gas it piped from Russia to Hungary and Poland. Using this technique, Ukraine was no longer subject to the high fees and strict obligations associated with its existing contract with Russia — the very contract Kiev was trying to renegotiate.

This tactic did not provide significant amounts of natural gas, but it showed that Ukraine had at least one way around its contract dispute with Russia. And while Ukraine's decision to suspend its integration process with the European Union was the most important reason for Russia to finally offer lower prices, the increase in imports via Poland and Hungary in 2013 did shape the timing and manner in which the agreement was made.

Therefore, when reviewing the statistics released by FGSZ and Gaz-System, it becomes clear why the data shows what it does. In a technical sense, it shows that Ukraine no longer needs to import from Poland and Hungary, given that it can do so more cheaply from Russia. In a political sense, it shows that Ukraine has readjusted its energy acquisition strategy — and broader political orientation — in favor of Russia. 

However, this new orientation is not necessarily a permanent one. For the past decade, Ukraine has vacillated between Russia and the West in accordance with changing geopolitical conditions and with the government's own political expediency. Should tensions resurface between Moscow and Kiev, Ukraine could turn to its European neighbors once again. But for now, as the numbers show, the country is clearly leaning toward Moscow.