Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera concluded the second day of a four-day meeting with his Indian counterpart, A.K. Antony, on Tuesday. Regional media often tout the strengthened ties between India and Japan — the bookends of the broader Indo-Pacific region — but a closer look at the relationship between the two shows that they actually have not worked very hard to tighten their geopolitical alliance.

Japan and India share mutual concerns and ambitions — namely, a rising China, involvement in Southeast Asia and broader regional security issues — and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is expected to visit New Delhi later this month. But a true strategic alliance, whether over security issues or regional and developmental cooperation, is obstructed by a variety of issues. The two countries often vie for the same resources, and each has different geopolitical perspectives. So while India and Japan will continue to try to nurture bilateral relations, deep structural impediments will limit the partnership and prevent the construction of a formal alliance. Japan and India's relationship is based less on either side's ability to jointly pursue areas of mutual benefit and more on an absence of outright competition.

The two countries have a tradition of positive engagement, historically on the same side of opposing Western colonial encroachment and, more recently, carefully monitoring a rising China. Following World War II, Japan's closeness with the United States stood in contrast to India's official policy of non-alignment, but the past decade has seen a renewed focus by both Asian powers to become more cooperative. Indeed, Indian and Japanese national interests overlap quite comfortably in several areas, including supporting political and economic stability in Southeast Asia and limiting China's sphere of influence in the broader Indo-Pacific region, as well as bilateral economic and defense interests ranging from nuclear power to investment in India's manufacturing potential and securing vital maritime trade routes. Tokyo and New Delhi have pursued high-level bilateral meetings nearly every year since 2010, when Washington announced its so-called pivot to Asia.

However, even with the tacit encouragement of the United States, India and Japan have struggled to implement the bulk of their bilateral agreements and strategic planning. This has been due to geopolitical limitations — especially India's — not a lack of will. Moreover, while Japan has maintained and even escalated its rhetorical attacks against China, India has worked to normalize border relations with Beijing. Such a move may complicate Japan's own ambitions by freeing China from focusing on its southwestern border and allowing it to expend greater energy on its eastward concerns, such as those in the South China Sea. Moreover, given the history of conflict over the Chinese-Indian land border, and India's current efforts (Beijing has been signaling interest as well) to reduce tensions along the Line of Actual Control, a decision to support efforts to challenge China's sphere of influence would complicate New Delhi's ability to partner with Japan in Southeast Asia.

India and Japan share concerns over the expansion of Chinese influence into their peripheries, and both countries would like to become more competitive in their surrounding regions. But Indo-Japanese relations extend beyond the direct threats posed by China, and the possible benefits of cooperation between the two countries are indeed lucrative. However, both have struggled to move beyond incremental gains in proposals to expand collaboration in areas such as energy development or support for each other's initiatives — such as road construction, investment and stronger political influence — in Southeast Asia.

Relations between New Delhi and Tokyo remain quite friendly despite these setbacks, and attempts to translate goodwill into tangible geopolitical benefits will continue. The pair will seek to build a relationship (with U.S. backing) that serves as a bulwark against rise of China while also advancing their respective regional interests. Still, real successes will be limited.

The India-Japan partnership will continue to face significant constraints despite its ample potential and will likely fail to check Chinese influence in the region. Without a substantive change in India's domestic political climate or in Japan's ability to affect economic or development change within India, their partnership will not have the necessary tools to escape the inertia of two decades of Indian focus on domestic issues or to rebuild the diplomatic dynamism Japan lost before the 1990s. Until then, both countries, but especially India, will likely find it easier to advance their interests by directly engaging China rather than by working with one another to outmaneuver it.