Alasania cited maintenance costs as the reason for switching from Soviet to Western helicopters. He also said procurement of spare parts is "problematic" and involves dealings (presumably with Russia) that are prone to corruption. In a broader sense, the planned transition is in line with Tbilisi's integration process with NATO, a process that requires adjusting Georgian military hardware to the organization's standards.
Georgia has expressed interest — and has even acquired — Western helicopters before. Most of Georgia's helicopter fleet consists of Soviet models, mainly Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 utility helicopters. In fact, Russia was Georgia's only supplier until the early 2000s, when its fleet included 16 Mi-8s, 12 Mi-24s and 16 Mi-14 "Haze" maritime search and rescue helicopters. However, when Georgia began to turn to the West, increasing its ties with NATO under the administration of former President Mikhail Saakashvili, the country reportedly received at least 12 UH-1H helicopters (otherwise known as Hueys) from the United States and Turkey. Some of these were destroyed during the 2008 war with Russia, when Russian forces targeted them and other military assets.
After the war, Georgia recovered some of these aircraft losses after Washington delivered additional Hueys. The United States delivered the first two UH-1H "Huey Plus" helicopters in 2009, which were refurbished and upgraded to include new main and tail rotor blades as well as a night vision goggle-compatible cockpit and modern avionics. Therefore, the announcement that Georgia will completely phase out Soviet helicopters in favor of U.S. (and possibly French) models is not a shift in procurement strategy but rather an escalation.
Legally, such helicopter procurements do not violate the de facto weapons embargo put in place by the West (and certain other countries) as a result of the Russo-Georgia war. The Hueys are not outfitted with weapons at their time of delivery and have not been subject to Russian opposition in the same way that other offensive weapons transfers would. Georgia still faces major constraints in acquiring weapons from the West, both for financial and political reasons.
The timing of the announcement is also notable. At the same news conference, Alasania also hinted that further defense and weapons cooperation between Georgia and the West could be in store, saying "certain barriers which existed in military-technical areas have been lifted." This comes as Russian news agency Izvestia released unsourced reports that Georgia could be looking to get rid of its Soviet-era T-55 and T-72 tanks as well as its Mi-series helicopters.
An Aggressive Response?
While it is still unclear how far Georgia will actually go with these plans (particularly on the more speculative and sensitive issue of tanks), any new equipment procurement comes in the context of an evolving relationship between Georgia and Russia. Ties have improved noticeably over the past year with the emergence of the Georgian Dream movement, which defeated Saakashvili's camp in elections and resumed economic and trade ties with Russia. Georgian Dream leaders also indicated that they would soften the harsh anti-Russian stance taken by Saakashvili and would work to build closer ties with Russia in key areas such as energy and transport.
However, ties between Russia and Georgia in the security sphere have not improved with the political transition in Georgia. Tensions have been building between the two countries over the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which the Russian military occupied after the 2008 war. A recently constructed security fence along the border reportedly has penetrated Georgian territory in some locations. Georgia has also maintained its efforts to build closer EU ties, which could be one of the reasons for Russia's more aggressive posture in these territories.
The overall nature of Georgia's relationship with Russia remains problematic, making any change in Georgian military and weapons acquisitions important to watch. If Georgia does try to procure Western equipment more assertively, Russia likely will respond aggressively on security matters in Georgia, especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But how far Russia will go depends on how far Georgia goes — the government in Tbilisi already has a good cautionary tale from the war of 2008. Therefore, the most likely outcome is a preservation of the status quo or a minor attempt to build closer ties to NATO that fall short of Tbilisi's hopes and expectations.
