The United States is starting the year with an ambitious agenda in the Middle East. In January alone, U.S. officials will try to finalize the terms of the first phase of a nuclear settlement with Iran, mediate between the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad and various fragments of the Syrian opposition in Switzerland and craft a framework for peace talks that can be tolerated by Israel and the Palestinian National Authority.

Of the three initiatives, only the first is likely to make serious headway. While a sobering prediction, this would be a suitable outcome from the U.S. point of view. As long as the Syrian negotiations and the Israeli-Palestinian talks can be managed in such a way that they reinforce the U.S. negotiating position with Iran, there is little harm in expending diplomatic energy on such intractable issues.

The U.S. priority for this year is to pursue a settlement with Iran that would eventually restore a balance of power in the region, enabling Washington to step back, catch its breath and focus on neglected issues beyond the Middle East. Rolled up in this negotiation are a number of peripheral issues that the United States will need to manage, but not necessarily resolve, in pursuing a detente with Iran. These include Israeli and Saudi concerns over the scope of Iran's nuclear program, the political and military status of Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, Iran's aid to Palestinian militant proxies and the future sectarian power balance in what is now a broken Syria.

Israel and Saudi Arabia collectively lack the ability to derail the U.S. negotiation with Iran, but they do have the means to complicate it. Washington will therefore try to manage Israeli and Saudi interference by keeping them engaged on certain peripheral issues, no matter how incurable those matters currently appear. Likewise, Israel and Saudi Arabia will use these side issues to extract concessions out of Washington, knowing that the U.S. administration will be more willing to bargain while trying to preserve a detente with Iran.

The dynamic is evident along the length of the Levantine coastline. Starting in Syria, the United States is trying to bring enough rebel factions to the negotiating table with al Assad to work out a power-sharing agreement, even though the Syrian battleground is unlikely to be pacified by foreign mediation anytime soon. The sectarian wounds of this conflict run deep, and Iranian and Saudi sponsorship of warring factions in both Syria and Lebanon will only widen the fault lines. Still, it does not hurt the United States to at least appear as though it's doing something to mediate a conflict in which Saudi Arabia is heavily and directly involved.

Unable to prevent the United States from dealing with Iran, the Saudis have tried to focus instead on pumping money and militants into Syria and Lebanon to undermine Iran's position. So long as the chemical weapons factor is neutralized and Washington does not have to worry about getting dragged into the war, the United States can comfortably referee from the sidelines while Iran and Saudi Arabia compete in Syria and Lebanon. Notably, even while negotiating directly with Iran, the U.S. administration has publicly displayed its reluctance to have Iran participate in the Syria talks, a gesture no doubt noticed by Saudi Arabia, which wants to keep Iran out of these negotiations altogether. Saudi Arabia will lean on Washington to make up for the lack of U.S. support to Syrian rebels and Saudi Arabia's overall displeasure with the U.S.-Iran talks by appealing for new energy and defense concessions from the United States.

The U.S. administration may be employing a similar strategy with Israel. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is currently on his 10th visit to Israel to negotiate the framework for a peace settlement with the Palestinians. But even a limited negotiation between Israel and Fatah over territorial swaps in the West Bank that leaves out Hamas-controlled Gaza is fraught with complications. For a peace negotiation to move forward, it needs political salesmanship, and neither Israel nor the Palestinian National Authority currently has leaders who can sell enough of their population on a compromise over issues as thorny as Israel's right to exist, Palestinians' right of return and the division of Jerusalem.

The U.S. administration is aware of these constraints and likely will not get to claim Israeli-Palestinian peace as one of its foreign policy achievements. That said, the United States does see the value of simply keeping the negotiation alive and keeping Israel engaged on an issue other than Iran's nuclear program.

Like Saudi Arabia, the Israeli government cannot prevent the United States from dealing with Iran. Instead, Israel has tried to apply enough pressure on Washington to shape the terms of its agreement with Tehran. But by elevating the Israeli-Palestinian talks (at least on the surface) to a priority issue in the Middle East, the United States can redefine its conversations with Israel. Israeli demands over Iran can thus be met with U.S. demands over the Palestinian issue. Israel could then make visible but limited concessions on the Palestinian issue to bargain with the United States on other issues.

For example, Israel released 26 Palestinian prisoners this week and has agreed to halt West Bank settlement construction — at least until after Kerry leaves the region. At the same time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pressuring Washington to release Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. intelligence analyst who spied for Israel and has been jailed for decades. In other words, Israel does not necessarily need to make a serious effort in these peace talks, but it can make gestures as it bargains with the United States.

Managing the concerns of Israel and Saudi Arabia through peripheral issues will require a great deal of diplomatic balancing and juggling from Washington. But no one said pursuing a detente with Iran would be easy.