Events in Venezuela over the past week suggest the South American country is entering a more unstable political phase in the post-Chavez era. On Sept. 30, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro expelled three U.S. diplomats, including the charge d'affaires, the top-ranking U.S. official in Venezuela; an official in the embassy's political section; and a vice consul. The officials were accused of meeting with the vote-monitoring nongovernmental organization Sumate and opposition mayoral candidates in Bolivar state, and with promoting destabilizing actions ahead of December municipal elections. The charge d'affaires has said she did meet with both groups, but that doing so is a common, legitimate diplomatic action. Maduro also accused the United States of general political interference and opposition groups of economic sabotage. 

That same day, Maduro announced the creation of a Strategic Center for Security and the Protection of the Homeland. The new organization is to collaborate with three of the country's military and intelligence bodies — the Strategic Operational Command, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service and the Director General of Military Counter-Intelligence — to eliminate threats against the country. The organization adds to several newly created institutions that will report directly to Maduro, such as the Higher Body for Popular Defense of the Venezuelan Economy, designed to combat economic sabotage, and the Civil-Military Joint Chiefs for the Border, designed to combat border smuggling.

On Oct. 2, Maduro met with the country's High Military Command, which consists of the defense minister, the head of the Strategic Operation Command, and the commanders of the army, navy, air force, national guard and Bolivarian militia — all of whom were replaced in July. The meeting was probably intended as a demonstration of civilian-military cooperation to assuage concerns of differing interests, and Maduro reportedly agreed to adhere to the recommendations of the body for organizational changes in the armed forces.

And today, Maduro hastily canceled a planned trip to meet with Bolivian President Evo Morales and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa in Cochabamba, Bolivia. Though some 60 Venezuelan officials had preceded him on a military plane, Maduro canceled at the last minute. The Bolivian foreign minister said this was due to health reasons; Maduro later tweeted he had the flu.

Alone, each of these incidents might not raise too much attention. Maduro has stoked tensions with the United States several times since assuming power, meetings with the High Military Command are relatively regular occurrences, and it is entirely possible Maduro has the flu. That all three coincided with Venezuela's deteriorating domestic economic situation, however, piques our interest. Maduro is taking increasingly heavy-handed actions not just against the United States but also against frequent scapegoats, including the private sector (the government temporarily seized a paper company Sept. 21 to ensure supplies of toilet paper), the media (the government ordered punitive action Sept. 29 against a prominent media group for "creating anxiety"), and, of course, the opposition. On Oct. 2, the head of the Accion Democratica party alleged that the attorney general intended to press charges against opposition leader and Miranda state Gov. Henrique Capriles, who is currently campaigning for the December municipal elections in Bolivar state. 

Meanwhile, Attorney General Luisa Ortega Diaz lodged her fourth impeachment request to Venezuela's Supreme Tribunal of Justice on Oct. 2, all of which have targeted opposition lawmakers. The ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela is one vote shy of the three-fifths majority needed to pass a controversial law that would enable Maduro to pass decrees without congressional approval. Facing difficulty lining up the support, the government could be attempting to get its way by forcing out a lawmaker on accusations of incompetence.

These actions are well within the classic Venezuelan framework pursued by the late President Hugo Chavez of blaming political opponents for economic problems ranging from food shortages to infrastructure failures to currency distortions. These kinds of allegations were typically reserved for strategic moments when the government needed popular support. But as time passed, the accusations have become increasingly frequent, and the population — the opposition and the party's support base — may be less receptive to political witch hunts as economic realities began impinging on their daily life.

Maduro lacks his predecessor's charisma and credentials, and there is a very real possibility he could lose support if he cannot manage the economic situation without alienating factions within his own party. To get a sense of the magnitude of his challenge, there were three refinery outages in one week in August, a major power outage in early September, inflation recently hit 45 percent (the highest since the hyperinflation of the 1990s), the scarcity indicator has doubled since early 2012, and foreign reserves are down to around $20 billion. Moreover, attempts to garner financing from abroad have been less successful than anticipated.

The big question in Venezuela is if and when the masses will lose patience with Maduro and his ruling party. The 100-day honeymoon period is over for Maduro, and his to-do list is only getting longer. The events of the past week suggest the strains are starting to show.