So far, Japan has sent a group of six people to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Netherlands. The group includes an unspecified number of Japan Self-Defense Forces personnel who have previously worked with the Dutch organization. This suggests that the government intends to send technical staff or inspectors, rather than combat troops to protect inspectors — an impression backed up by Japanese media reports. In any case, there are no details yet on how inspectors in Syria will be protected, and countries are understandably averse to putting boots on the ground in the midst of a civil war.
Meanwhile, Japan's foreign and defense ministries are reportedly preparing a concrete response in the event Japan is asked to help in Syria. Abe is expected to offer Japan's assistance formally in his U.N. speech, and Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida is expected to do the same in talks with British, French, Iranian and Egyptian foreign ministers on the sidelines of the General Assembly.
Deploying personnel positions would establish Japan as an early volunteer in weapons eradication efforts in Syria and would elevate its involvement in the conflict. Japan has offered only monetary assistance to Syria thus far, and recent reports suggest Tokyo will also increase aid to Syrian refugees through the United Nations and through the Red Cross, adding $60 million to existing contributions of $95 million. In addition to the six staffers already sent, Japan could pledge personnel to provide equipment for removing and destroying the chemical weapons stockpiles.
Motivations for Involvement
A Japanese mission to Syria would fit into Abe's broader plan to revive Japan's image as a great power, while keeping well within the country's preference for playing a technical or humanitarian role in international operations under the auspices of international institutions. Deploying a Japanese team would show that Japanese Self-Defense Forces are positively engaged in upholding international peace and stability in cooperation with other nations. This type of action helps distinguish Japan's accelerating military normalization from the country's historical militarism — an important diplomatic consideration, especially in the Asia Pacific region. Depending on what kind of action Tokyo ultimately takes, Japanese technicians, inspectors or troops would also gain some experience abroad, helping the government expand the military's range of operations and its global reach.
Moreover, Japan has recent experience destroying large volumes of chemical weapons. Since 2010, Japan has deployed mobile destruction units in China to incinerate chemical weapons that it abandoned during World War II. Of course, tracking down, excavating and destroying 60-year-old chemical weapons during a time of peace differs greatly from entering a potentially hostile country amid a bloody civil war and destroying its stockpiles. Nevertheless, unlike most other countries, Japan actively researches, plans and executes chemical weapons eradication operations. It also manufactures specialized mobile destruction facilities such as detonation chambers and static kiln furnaces. Japanese police investigators and defense agents also have experience with sarin gas due to the Aum Shinrikyo domestic terrorist attacks at Matsumoto in 1994 and the Tokyo subway in 1995. These experiences also differ from the challenges presented by Syria, but they may help provide popular if not technical support for the mission.
Thus a deployment to Syria would enable Japan to demonstrate its expertise in chemical weapons elimination even as it shows the United States and the rest of the world that Tokyo prefers multilateral and diplomatic solutions over military strikes. This is especially true with the Middle East, a region where any unintended destabilization would threaten Japan's access to natural resources.
Potential Backfire
However, the mission would be a logistical nightmare. There are few details about the plan for entering Syria or for locating, securing, destroying and verifying destruction of weapons, but such a mission would be extremely hazardous to Japanese personnel and thus could backfire domestically.
It is unclear whether public support for a reinvigorated Japanese role in the world has overcome Japan's aversion to casualties. Defense hawks in Japan see the threat of casualties as a reason to bolster Japan Self-Defense Forces. But even a main coalition partner of the ruling party remains skeptical of the military's expanding role, and serious backlash could ensue if the mission costs Japanese lives in the service of Syrian rebels. Moreover, if the diplomatic intervention fails, Japan may face U.S. pressure to commit greater resources to the follow-on response.
Japan is therefore likely to commit limited resources to Syria, preferring to supply equipment and money over personnel and, if it indeed commits personnel, preferring to play a technical role over a security role. If Japan only commits a handful of inspectors or technicians, it would be contributing only a tiny fraction of the number of people that experts believe would be required to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons — roughly 2,000. A more ambitious commitment that would put Japanese troops in a position to fire or be fired upon is conceivable, given the government's eagerness to expand the military's global reach, but it remains unlikely. Taking on such a role would demonstrate a profound change in Japan's tolerance for international conflict.
It is not clear what Abe will offer when he speaks at the U.N. General Assembly. Nor is the Syrian mission itself clear. But Japan's leaders may see Syria as a chance to demonstrate Japan's status as a great power and a leader in preserving international order without overcommitting to the conflict.
