The Egyptian government dealt the Muslim Brotherhood another significant blow Monday, when a court issued a ban on the group's activities. Historically the Brotherhood thrived under its outlaw status; it curried sympathy from the Egyptian public, especially when it was targeted by security forces. But this no longer holds true now that Egyptians have seen the Brotherhood briefly hold power. The group has lost so much political capital that it faces challenges not only from the secularists, who are supported by the military, but also from its fellow Islamists. This may have been what the regime had in mind when it lobbied for the ban.

Responding to a petition filed by the leftist al-Tagammu Party, an Egyptian court banned the Brotherhood and declared all entities affiliated with the group illegal. It also ordered all Brotherhood assets frozen. The regime has systematically weakened the group since the popularly backed July 3 coup and the ensuing crackdown, and the ban is designed to ensure that the Brotherhood will not be able to recompose itself. By neutralizing the Brotherhood, the military-dominated government no longer faces any major organized opposition.

However, Islamism, including Salafism and jihadism, remains a major concern for Cairo. The country's second-largest Islamist group, the Salafist al-Nour Party, supported the July 3 coup and has since cautiously supported the military's political roadmap. Al-Nour is trying to exploit the Brotherhood's decline so that it can position itself as the country's main Islamist movement.

But it has run into problems of its own. By supporting the July 3 coup, al-Nour demonstrated far more pragmatism than even the Brotherhood. However, it cannot go so far as to endorse a secular order. For this reason, it has opposed the constitutional committee's proposal to amend constitutional articles, which pertain to religion, that were added by an Islamist-dominated constitutional body during the rule of former President Mohammed Morsi.

For its part, the military needs al-Nour to manage Islamism and the jihadist threat that has been growing since Morsi's ouster. Because Salafists and jihadists share a common theology (they differ politically), al-Nour could indeed serve as a counter to jihadism. So while the decline of the Brotherhood has provided a historic opportunity for the secular political forces to roll back the political influence of Islamists, the military needs al-Nour as an ally. Thus, the military may try to mediate an accommodation between the constitutional committee, which is dominated by secularists, and the Salafist party.

Any compromise will enhance al-Nour's position in the political system. Al-Nour finished behind only the Muslim Brotherhood in the most recent parliamentary elections, held a few months after the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, and already it is anticipating the next legislative vote. Unless the secularist camp can organize itself into a coherent political force, al-Nour will likely emerge as a major bloc in the parliament, especially now that the Brotherhood has been sidelined politically.

Notably, al-Nour is the political arm of the movement that shunned politics for decades — it entered the political arena only after Mubarak's ouster. It grew powerful by adopting the Brotherhood's strategy of creating an Islamic state through political participation. This means that while, as an organization, the Brotherhood has declined, its political philosophy is likely to endure for the foreseeable future. Between al-Nour appropriating the Brotherhood's model and the regime's need for mainstream Islamists, the military will face a dilemma as it tries to maintain secular autocratic order.