Though a Russian proposal to place Syria's chemical weapons under international supervision may not be realistic, it still could derail already-tenuous efforts for a U.S.-led military intervention against Syria.
After meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem on Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Russia could begin immediately working with Damascus on an agreement that would transfer control of Syria's chemical weapons to U.N. inspectors, who would then destroy the weapons stockpiles. For good measure, Lavrov added that he would call on Syria to sign and ratify the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which outlaws the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Al-Moallem quickly, though vaguely, responded to the Russian proposal by saying the Syrian government "welcomes the Russian initiative" and "the wisdom of the Russian leadership" in trying to avoid a military strike. But he did not say concretely that his government would meet the conditions set forth in the proposal.
If the Russian diplomatic solution to the Syrian imbroglio sounds too good to be true, that's because it is. The logistical complications alone far exceed Russia's diplomatic ambitions. Syria is believed to have 1,000 tons of chemical weapons stockpiles dispersed among 50 different sites across the country. The majority of these bases are located in areas where the regime has relatively secure control, but some suspected sites are located in battle zones between regime forces and rebels. For example, rebel forces have regularly targeted Safira Defense Factories in Aleppo province.
Securing chemical weapons stockpiles in the middle of a war zone is not a job for which a U.N. inspections team is well-suited. U.N. inspectors already got a hint of the dangers they would face when their team sent to investigate the Ghouta chemical weapons attack came under fire as it traveled in a Damascus suburb. In addition to being vulnerable to indirect fire, U.N. inspectors are also likely to become targets for rebel factions that want to derail the U.N. mission and recreate the conditions for a strike to help shift the battlefield in their favor.
There are several ways to define "control" over chemical weapons stockpiles, none of which are free of complications. If Russia attempts to create a symbolic presence at weapons sites through U.N. inspectors, that would still require hundreds of experts spread across multiple sites nationwide that would be at risk of coming under siege by rebel forces. Moreover, it is unclear which countries would actually be willing to contribute the experts and — most critically — the accompanying security detail to a U.N. contingent on the scale needed to take over large amounts of chemical weapons stockpiles at several locations, especially when those forces are unlikely to be accepted by rebels and regime forces.
This would not be a quick and easy operation, either. Chemical weapons stockpiles are not easily transported, particularly in war conditions, and it would be difficult to verify that all chemical weapons are accounted for. If an inspection team attempted to destroy the stockpiles on site, such an operation would entail a great deal of time and risk. For context, the U.S. Field Deployable Hydrolysis System can begin operating within 10 days of arriving at a location, but it can only neutralize between 5 and 25 tons of chemical agents per day, depending on the type. Neutralizing 1,000 tons of chemical agents in dozens of sites across the country amid a civil war is a job for a monthslong military campaign, not a U.N. mission. Given deep and widespread unease — from the United States to Russia to Europe — over placing ground troops in Syria, it is difficult to envision any country willing to apply the forces necessary to carry out such a mission.
Russia understands these complications just as well as the U.S. administration, but that isn't the point. Russian President Vladimir Putin can clearly see European and U.S. congressional trepidation over a military intervention no matter how limited in nature. With Congress back in session, this is a critical week for the United States to stake out a position on a military strike and pave the way for those straddling the fence, like France, to define their position either way.
If the U.S. administration were to ignore Russian protests and proceed with a strike with at least rhetorical coalition support, Russia would have little to show for its claimed influence in the Middle East. However, if Russia could effectively stunt the U.S.-led military campaign through an airy diplomatic proposal, then Russia will have played a hand in directly showcasing U.S. unreliability to its allies. The United States would come off as weak and indecisive, while Moscow would come off as the sound of reason in a war effort that no country is particularly enthused about.
The French and British governments have already responded positively to the Russian proposal, meeting Russia's objective of splitting the Europeans from the United States and reducing the potential for the United States to cobble together a coalition. Russia's proposal may even carry weight with members of Congress who argue that all diplomatic options have not been exhausted and that the justification for a military response, in spite of Obama's now-regretted red line statement, has not been convincing.
Either way, Obama is cornered. He already created a potential exit for himself by seeking authorization from Congress for a strike, and Congress is so far not convinced by his appeals. The Russians have just provided him another exit, but pursuing an impractical diplomatic solution, which would only empower Russia and Iran in a moment of U.S. weakness, will be a difficult pill for the U.S. president to swallow. Obama and his administration will likely spend this week continuing their appeals to Congress to authorize a military response, but if the votes don't add up, he may have to find a creative retreat from this crisis, with or without the Russians.
