A recent string of leaks from the U.S. National Security Agency appears to show that the United States carried out surveillance on the current presidents of Brazil and Mexico. The backlash resulting from the disclosure may set back U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region by years.
Responding to documents presented on Sunday by journalist Glenn Greenwald, who has acted as a conduit for much of the leaked material from former NSA employee Edward Snowden, the governments of Brazil and Mexico summoned their respective U.S. ambassadors on Monday, and rumors swirled in Brazil on Tuesday that President Dilma Rousseff might cancel a much-anticipated state visit to the United States in October.
On one hand, revelations that the United States may be conducting surveillance on foreign leaders are at this point not entirely surprising. On the other hand, very real relationships are at stake as the breadth and scope of U.S. surveillance programs becomes public knowledge. At the very least, these revelations provide fodder for governments hungry for a distraction from domestic uncertainty.
Mexico will not contemplate a true break with Washington. Mexico's relationship with the United States is of critical significance for both parties. Although Mexico's indignation at the recent revelations will require a response from Washington, any damage to U.S.-Mexico ties will be temporary.
However, the U.S.-Brazil relationship will be more tumultuous. The two countries are uneasy allies at best, and as the dominant regional power in South America, Brazil at a more advanced stage of industrialization would find itself in direct and sustained competition with the United States for influence in the Western Hemisphere.
As it stands, Washington's largely aloof and drug-centric policy toward Latin America has left Brazil in a position to pursue its own ends and consolidate its own interests. Brazil's regional strategy has focused on cultivating a broad coalition of states under the umbrella of Mercosur with the common interest of forming an ad hoc set of trade regulations and permit protections for local industry. Mercosur faces a regional ideological and economic rival in the Pacific Alliance, which finds itself much more closely aligned — both politically and economically — with the United States, with which most Pacific Alliance countries have a free trade agreement.
But Brazil's model is facing challenges. The ongoing outflow of currency from emerging markets has dealt a blow to the Brazilian real. The country's economic leadership has vocally opposed U.S. monetary policy, and that policy has likely affected the value of Brazil's currency, as have Brazil's dollar-denominated commodity exports. At the same time, Brazil has experienced a level of public political unrest unprecedented in its recent history.
In many ways, a breakdown in relations with the United States as a result of the NSA scandal dovetails with Brazil's pressing need to direct attention away from domestic concerns. While Rousseff's October visit had been planned for months, and was meant to demonstrate a reversal of tense relations between the two countries, the Rousseff government cannot afford politically to appear complacent on an issue as high in profile as the clandestine surveillance of its leadership.
This reality poses real drawbacks for the United States — Brazil does have a limited ability to affect core U.S. interests in the region and may find the means to carry out minor retaliation. The country has proven willing enough in the past to endorse tit-for-tat restrictions on U.S. travelers and visa applicants, as well as file disputes with the World Trade Organization against U.S. trade practices it deems unfair.
Most important, Brazil wields influence in South America, a region where Washington maintains considerable interests, ranging from strategic and historical concerns to immediate security concerns. A deterioration in relations with Brazil will represent a setback for the United States in a region that has already begun to polarize along ideological lines.
