The only countries that have contributed military assets to a potential Syria operation so far are the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Only the United States and the United Kingdom have dispatched vessels that are actually capable of launching cruise missiles to strike targets in Syria. The United States has five destroyers and an unknown number of submarines in the area, and the United Kingdom has one submarine nearby to strike targets in Syria. The United Kingdom also has one amphibious ship, two frigates and six Typhoon fighters in Cyprus for air defense, and France has also dispatched a frigate that can contribute in an air defense role.
The State of the Coalition
On Aug. 29, the British Parliament voted against military action in Syria. The loss of London as a potential coalition partner is critical because the United Kingdom is the only viable ally with the ability to strike with land attack cruise missiles from the sea beyond the Syrian anti-ship missile defenses. Many other NATO allies, including France, have the capability to launch standoff attacks using air-launched cruise missiles such as the Storm Shadow, but such munitions typically have a much shorter range than the Tomahawk missile and would require the deployment of tactical aviation squadrons to air bases closer to Syria. Such a deployment would necessarily raise the stakes.
The United States so far looks to be the only country that would militarily engage Syrian targets in the event of an intervention. If the strike were to escalate, then other allies that have not yet refused participation, most notably France and Turkey, could contribute tactical fighter squadrons, warships and other assets. Paris also has the option of dispatching the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier in support of operations. Notably, French President Francois Hollande told Le Monde newspaper Aug. 30 that, even with the United Kingdom bowing out of the operation, France could still participate in a U.S.-led strike against Syria. However, France has decided to buy some time to get a clearer picture of the situation in the United Nations, the White House and within its own Parliament before making any firm commitments. A parliamentary debate in France is scheduled for Sept. 4 to weigh the military option. The French president is not bound by the need for parliamentary approval of a strike, but his already low popularity will make it difficult for Paris to commit to an operation in its former colony without sufficient parliamentary backing.
Due to geographic proximity, Turkey could provide critical support if a military operation escalates beyond a limited strike. But Turkey is also the NATO member most vulnerable to retaliatory strikes, and although the already constrained government issued strong statements calling for action, Ankara could be calculating that it is not worth the risk to join a dwindling coalition at this point, particularly for a limited strike scenario.
A Trying Negotiation
The mounting limitations on the U.S. military option will redirect U.S. attention to an uphill diplomatic effort with difficult negotiating partners. Russia has an opportunity to demand U.S. attention on a number of issues related to defining a Russian sphere of influence in former Soviet territory and having the United States respect the boundaries that Moscow sets. The United States needs a creative diplomatic solution in Syria, and Russia might be able to deliver such a solution given its influence within the Syrian regime. It will be politically difficult to fashion a settlement that would grant Syrian President Bashar al Assad and his inner circle amnesty, especially since al Assad has little reason to trust a deal when he is likely to be tried for war crimes. There may be more innovative ways to facilitate an "escape" for al Assad (most likely to Iran) to then pave the way for the creation of a post-al Assad regime.
There likely are Russian efforts underway to pick out and present to the United States the Alawite regime members who could fill a void left by al Assad. However, removing al Assad could open the regime up to fracturing and will likely be violently rejected by the Sunni rebels, a situation that could spiral beyond the Russians' control and create an even bigger political mess in Damascus. Moreover, any such deal would be designed to allow Russia and Iran to preserve political influence in Damascus. The United States could get a reprieve from its current military predicament, but it would still in the longer term have to deal with an emboldened Russia and Iran. Even if the United States scrapped both a military operation and a negotiation, Russia and Iran would still be in a comfortable position.
Russia currently has the upper hand in Syria, and Moscow certainly would not mind having the United States embarrassed by inaction on Syria or, better yet, bogged down in another military operation in the Middle East. Still, Russia has a rare opportunity to engage in a long-deferred negotiation on issues that extend well beyond Syria. Moscow is unlikely to pass up that opportunity, but the negotiation itself may be too ambitious for the time. The United States is already seeing its credibility over even a limited, punitive Syria military operation erode, but it is also unlikely to strike a deal that strengthens Iran and Russia over a country whose civil war is manifesting beyond the control of any one foreign player. Given the constraints, the United States may begin backing off its position that a military operation is necessary and, for now, absorb the risk of having a reputation for issuing questionable ultimatums.
