Three notable security incidents have occurred in Tunisia since Brahmi was killed. On July 27, two individuals reportedly associated with a radical religious group were arrested for detonating an improvised explosive device that had been placed under a police car at the La Goulette Port police station. The blast did not inflict serious damage or casualties. Still, La Goulette is Tunisia's most important port for receiving tourists, and since the adjacent Port of Rades accounts for some 25 percent of the country's overall port traffic, it is notable that the port was targeted, even by amateurs. On July 29, at least eight Tunisian soldiers were killed in a landmine explosion and a jihadist ambush while the soldiers patrolled in the Jebel Chaambi mountain region of the Kasserine governorate. According to Tunisian state television, five of the soldiers were subsequently mutilated. Finally, on July 31, a roadside bomb likely targeting a national guard patrol detonated in Mhamdia, a town roughly 32 kilometers (20 miles) south of Tunis. No casualties were reported.
It is important to note that this type of violence is not new in Tunisia, and the country's insecurity did not develop overnight. A pattern of sporadic security incidents over the past eight months has simply picked up intensity in the context of Tunisia's political malaise. In addition to the intermittent clashes in the northwest, there have been other concerning incidents, including the discovery of a large weapons cache in Tunis on Feb. 20 and clashes between military and jihadist forces in Cebbala Ouled Asker, a town some 30 kilometers outside the city of Sidi Bouzid.
Jihadists in the Border Regions
Tunisian government officials first publicly indicated the government's awareness of jihadist activity in the Jebel Chaambi mountain region, and in the Le Kef region that runs along the Tunisia-Algeria border, in December 2012. At the time, current Prime Minister Ali Larayedh, then the interior minister, identified the insurgents as youths belonging to the Okba bin Nafaa Brigade — a group that reportedly consisted mostly of Tunisian youths but was led by Algerians allegedly linked to Abdel Mossaab Abdelwadoud, a leader in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Current Interior Minister Lofti Ben Jeddou has since said that there are two major groups operating around Jebel Chaambi and Le Kef, each comprised primarily of veterans of the conflict in nearby Mali.
The July 29 attack on Tunisian soldiers was just the latest in a series of security incidents in the mountainous region since December that have led Algeria and Tunisia to cooperate over security in the border region. Algiers deployed eight brigades of troops and special forces to the area in May. On July 12, news broke that Algeria had warned Tunisia and Libya about the increasing possibility of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-led attacks in the region. Tunisian radio station Mosaique FM then reported July 30 that Algeria one week earlier had arrested Kamel Ben Arbia, also known as Abou Fida — a leader of one of the militant cells known to be operating around Jebel Chaambi and an alleged intermediary between Algerian and Tunisian militants in the region. According to the report, the July 29 attack was motivated in part by Abou Fida's arrest, and militants planned additional attacks meant to take place throughout the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
The killing of Brahmi, who was reportedly shot outside his home in a Tunis suburb by unidentified gunmen, can be tenuously linked to the jihadists in Jebel Chaambi. Tunisian authorities have identified the primary suspect as Boubakeur Hakim, a well-known jihadist who arrived in Tunisia in January 2011 after serving a seven-year sentence in a French prison for helping recruit French youths to fight for al Qaeda in Iraq. Naming Hakim as a suspect would be an easy way for the Tunisian Interior Ministry to boost its image. Nonetheless, Hakim is believed to have links to the Jebel Chaambi militants. If he were indeed guilty, it would indicate that the jihadists are not merely looking to capitalize on the political chaos that has reigned in Tunis since Brahmi's assassination, but that they also had a hand in causing it.
Tunisia's Salafists
Meanwhile, the role of Tunisia's various Salafist movements in the country's violence over the past eight months is also unclear. There are three Salafist political parties in Tunisia, in addition to the increasingly prominent radical Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia. Upon taking office in 2011, the ruling Ennahda party initially seemed to tolerate Ansar al-Sharia, but the moderate Islamist party has turned against the radical group in recent months for two primary reasons: First, Ennahda is under pressure to prove its governing credentials to its secular coalition partners. In May, the party outlawed Islamic proselytizing in public without a permit, and the government then used the law to shut down a planned Ansar al-Sharia conference. Subsequent clashes between Salafists and Tunisian security forces resulted in the arrests of more than 200 people. Second, Ennahda is also concerned that the type of vigilante activity in which Ansar al-Sharia often engages, such as attacks against hotels or stores that sell alcohol, could morph into jihadist activity.
In recent months, Larayedh, the prime minister, described Ansar al-Sharia as an illegal and violent organization, and Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi, while advocating for dialogue with the group, said its "refusal to operate in accordance with state law" is a major problem. Indeed, Ansar al-Sharia has been involved in incidents such as an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis in September 2012. While it is premature to link Ansar al-Sharia to the recent jihadist incidents, the fact remains that the group exemplifies the complicated role of Salafists in Tunisian society — it is a segment that tends to have little in common with Tunisia's political culture. If the government cracked down on the group, its members could become ideal recruits for jihadists attempting to expand their operations to more important parts of Tunisia outside of the northwest.
Amid Gridlock, Unified Opposition to Jihadists
While the political process in Tunisia is in a state of gridlock, and the recent security incidents have increased the pressure on the ruling coalition, the vast majority of Tunisia's political spectrum is united in its desire to oppose jihadists.
The kind of secular-Islamist polarization that exists in other countries in the Middle East is less acute in Tunisia; secular Tunisians and mainstream Islamists have found ways to partner and work together in society. Even the most outspoken political factions advocating for a change in government, such as the powerful Tunisian General Labor Union and its secular coalition partner, Ettakatol, have thus far resisted suggesting the dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly — the body charged with drafting a new constitution — even though Ennahda holds by far the most seats and has been made politically vulnerable by the security incidents.
Nonetheless, Tunisia's security forces cannot eliminate the jihadist threat entirely, partly due to their limited size and resources, as well as the rough geography in the areas in Tunisia's northwest where jihadists are primarily operating. Thus, the Tunisian government will likely continue to face a low-level jihadist insurgency — just one of many steep challenges facing Tunisian leaders. Tunisia's experiment with democracy has resulted in the elimination of the single-party structure that both former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's founding president, used to rule the country as authoritarians. That explains in part why the political process in Tunis has been so disjointed and mired in competition among unions, elements of the former regime, Islamist parties and others.
From the outside, the gridlock could be seen as a sign that Tunisia will be unable to rise to this challenge. But Tunisia's government has two factors going for it: The army is not powerful enough to solve Tunisia's problems on its own, making a situation like the current one in Egypt nearly inconceivable. This creates short-term problems since the military cannot fully secure Tunisia's borders or its interior. Over the long run, however, a less politically active military is good for the country's democratic process.
Moreover, though Ennahda is an Islamist movement, it has shown a willingness to compromise and to work with secular segments of society. More important, the ruling party has also demonstrated a respect for the offices of the Tunisian state and the ultimately secular laws that govern it. Violence may increase in the short-term, but jihadists will likely find that the Tunisian landscape — outside of the jihadists' mountain-protected havens — is an infertile place for their ideas.
