Uncertainty has become the prevailing characteristic of North African governments, including Libya's, since the popular uprisings of 2011. Despite the relatively free and fair election of the General National Congress in July 2012, many of the power brokers of post-Gadhafi Libya view the political process with unease. The collapse of the dictatorship left space for the emergence of local, tribal and ethnic interests to compete with the authority of the internationally recognized central government in Tripoli. Local city councils and militia groups filled the void and also served as a self-appointed check against the rise of another dictatorship.
The members of the constitutional drafting committee have a difficult task ahead of them. They must create a legal framework that codifies the relationship between the country's numerous armed groups and the central government; they must determine how oil revenues will be distributed; and they must safeguard the rights of minority groups. In addition, there will be regional power centers such as Misurata and Benghazi that will push for greater regional autonomy, if not an outright federal system. Beyond the domestic concerns, states in the region want to see a stable Libyan government that can secure its vast desert territories and borders, and Western observers are not only watching the regional security climate but are also seeking a more permanent political entity in control of Libya's considerable hydrocarbon reserves.
Political Barriers
For roughly the first 10 months after Gadhafi's ouster, the unelected National Transitional Council oversaw Libyan affairs — namely, restarting the energy sector and bringing oil exports to the international market. The council also oversaw the distribution of oil revenues to a wide range of domestic actors, including militias — which sought recognition for their help in overthrowing Gadhafi — as well as regional councils and tribal leaders who needed to rebuild their communities after the war. As a temporary revolutionary body, the National Transitional Council did little to secure Libya's borders, limit the influence of the armed groups that rose up during the revolution or rebuild the infrastructure and government institutions that were destroyed during the war.
These tasks were left to the General National Congress, which took over in August 2012. However, like the National Transitional Council, the General National Congress failed to establish a cohesive national identity or meet the expectations of government aid from certain segments of the populace. The congress' weakness had the unintended effect of prolonging the tenuous peace that had existed during the council's tenure. It was unable to challenge the growing influence of regional leadership councils. In addition, the congress has depended on militias to secure the country's vital energy infrastructure.
But regional neighbors such as Algeria and Tunisia are dealing with the security fallout of a weak and often distracted Libyan government. Moreover, foreign investors, which are vital to the continued operations of the country's energy sector, are growing impatient with the deteriorating security situation and uncertain investment climate, leading them not to expand exploration and production activities. This stalled political momentum following the elections last year has also led to infighting within the congress itself, complicated by the passing of the Political Isolation Law, which bans Gadhafi-era officials from holding office for the next 10 years.
More important, the General National Congress is creating bureaucratic logjams that are delaying reallocations and payments through state oil funds, with serious potential consequences for domestic security. To make matters worse, protests caused domestic oil output to drop by as much as 500,000 barrels per day in the weeks preceding the July 20 ceremony, which, according to government officials, meant upward of $50 million in lost revenue each day. The transitional government's budget for 2013 assumed 1.7 million barrels of production per day were needed to remain balanced, but with June and July 2013 seeing daily production frequently dip below a million barrels, Tripoli has become increasingly reliant on its reserves to cover domestic spending. In turn, Tripoli is facing political pushback, delaying payments and continuing the crisis.
A Contentious Constitutional Process
Libya's minority ethnic groups, such as the Tuaregs and Toubou, have already criticized the electoral law that will determine the drafting committee, saying it fails to accurately represent their interests. The Libyan Berber community has even threatened a boycott. The law also excludes members of the military or the vaguely termed "security establishment" from participating.
The country's revolutionaries have successfully influenced Libya's political discourse in the past through largely peaceful demonstrations or by supporting public protests and sit-ins that have disrupted oil production. Large local councils or those aligned with powerful militias, such as Zentan, Misurata and Benghazi, can be expected to leverage their local networks during the drafting process, resulting in continued oil production cut-offs and tense demonstrations. The congress is already anticipating these sorts of issues. Indeed, many saw the decision to host the constitutional drafting process in Al Bayda as a nod to the political aspirations of the country's eastern half, but it has just as much to do with the congress' inability to secure its personnel in Tripoli and the lack of an appropriate building space.
In the face of considerable domestic challenges, Tripoli is also increasingly coming under pressure from foreign governments, which are seeking a more assertive, permanent government in Tripoli with which to coordinate on key issues. The West in particular would like to see Tripoli be less beholden to the country's militias, hoping that any short-term domestic unrest would be replaced by a stronger, more secure state in the long term. To that end, Italy, France and the United Kingdom have offered to train some 20,000 Libyan soldiers, while others, such as Switzerland and the United States, have joined EU states in providing the central government with ammunition, arms depots and military vehicles to help authorities secure the country's borders.
This aid comes in coordination with several Libyan initiatives to disband or limit the authority of the militias and to create one of several proposed national military or security bodies. However, Tripoli's continued reliance on the militias for security underscores the central government's inability to effectively engage and disarm them.
But this assistance will do little to alleviate the real challenge that Libya will have to address in the coming months: namely, redefining the nature of a state whose complex geography for much of the past century was united either through strong colonial management or autocratic rule. The General National Congress has yet to decide when elections for the constitutional committee will be held, though currently the law states that a referendum should be held within four months of the commission's first session. The process will continue to be a contentious one, judging from the explosions that rocked Tripoli the night its leaders were celebrating in Al Bayda, ultimately destabilizing the very same domestic security and energy sector it seeks to protect.
